Cisco Response

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  Introduction

  Microsoft announced nine security bulletins that address twenty-six vulnerabilities as part of the monthly security bulletin release on August 14, 2012. A summary of these bulletins is on the Microsoft website at http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/MS12-aug. This document provides identification and mitigation techniques that administrators can deploy on Cisco network devices.

  The vulnerabilities that have a client software attack vector, can be exploited locally on the vulnerable device, require user interaction, can be exploited using web-based attacks (these include but are not limited to cross-site scripting, phishing, and web-based e-mail threats) or e-mail attachments, or files stored on network shares are in the following list:

  • MS12-052
  • MS12-053
  • MS12-054
  • MS12-055
  • MS12-056
  • MS12-057
  • MS12-058
  • MS12-059

  The vulnerabilities that have a network mitigation are in the following list. Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector, which will be discussed in detail later in this document.

  • MS12-053
  • MS12-054
  • MS12-060

  Information about affected and unaffected products is available in the respective Microsoft advisories and the Cisco Alerts that are referenced in Cisco Event Response: Microsoft Security Bulletin Release for August 2012.

  In addition, multiple Cisco products use Microsoft operating systems as their base operating system. Cisco products that may be affected by the vulnerabilities described in the referenced Microsoft advisories are detailed in the "Associated Products" table in the "Product Sets" section.

Vulnerability Characteristics

• MS12-053, Vulnerability in Remote Desktop Could Allow Remote Code Execution (2723135): This vulnerability has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2012-2526. The attack vector for exploitation of CVE-2012-2526 is through Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) using TCP port 3389 packets. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and without user interaction. Successful exploitation of the vulnerability that is associated with CVE-2012-2526 may allow an attacker to run run arbitrary code on the target system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

  MS12-054, Vulnerabilities in Windows Networking Components Could Allow Remote Code Execution (2733594): These vulnerabilities have been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifiers CVE-2012-1850, CVE-2012-1851, CVE-2012-1852, and CVE-2012-1853. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and without user interaction. Successful exploitation of the vulnerability could cause a target application to stop responding. The attack vector for exploitation of CVE-2012-1851 is via the Print Spooler Service. The Spooler service uses the Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol. The attack vector for exploitation of CVE-2012-1852 is a specially crafted Remote Administration Protocol (RAP) response. The Remote Administration Protocol is implemented using the Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code on the target system. The attack vector for exploitation of CVE-2012-1853 is specially crafted RAP responses. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could run arbitrary code on the target system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.

  MS12-060, Vulnerability in Windows Common Controls Could Allow Remote Code Execution (2720573): This vulnerability has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifiers CVE-2012-1856. This vulnerability can be exploited locally, with authentication, and requires user interaction.The attack vector for exploitation is through HTTP packets that typically use TCP port 80 but may also use TCP ports 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326. Successful exploitation of the vulnerability that is associated with CVE-2012-1856 may allow an attacker inject a client-side script into the user's instance of Internet Explorer. The script could spoof content, disclose information, or take any action that the user could take on the site on behalf of the targeted user. The attack vector for exploitation of CVE-2012-1856 is through HTTP packets that typically use TCP port 80 but may also use TCP ports 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326.

Vulnerability Overview

• The Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module (ASASM), the Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers, and the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module provide protection for potential attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities (a topic that is included in this document).

  Information about vulnerable, unaffected, and fixed software is available in the Microsoft Security Bulletin Summary for August 2012, which is available at the following link: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/MS12-aug

  The vulnerabilities that have a client software attack vector; can be exploited locally on the vulnerable device; require user interaction; or can be exploited using web-based attacks (these include but are not limited to cross-site scripting, phishing, and web-based e-mail threats), e-mail attachments, or files stored on network shares are in the following list:

  • MS12-052
  • MS12-053
  • MS12-054
  • MS12-055
  • MS12-056
  • MS12-057
  • MS12-058
  • MS12-059

  These vulnerabilities are mitigated most successfully at the endpoint through software updates, user education, desktop administration best practices, and endpoint protection software such as Cisco Security Agent Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) or antivirus products.

  The vulnerabilities that have a network mitigation are in the following list. Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for these vulnerabilities. This section of the document provides an overview of these techniques.

  • MS12-053
  • MS12-054
  • MS12-060

Mitigation Technique Overview

• Cisco IOS Software can provide effective means of exploit prevention using transit access control lists (tACLs).

  This protection mechanism filters and drops packets that are attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector.

  Effective means of exploit prevention can also be provided by Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module (ASASM), and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers using the following methods:

  • tACLs
  • Application layer protocol inspection

  These protection mechanisms filter and drop packets that are attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector.

  Effective exploit prevention can also be provided by the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module using application protocol inspection.

  Cisco IOS NetFlow records can provide visibility into network-based exploitation attempts.

  Cisco IOS Software, Cisco ASA, Cisco ASASM, Cisco FWSM firewalls, and Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module can provide visibility through syslog messages and counter values displayed in the output from show commands.

  Effective use of Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) event actions provides visibility into and protection against attacks that attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities as discussed later in this document.

  The Cisco Security Manager can also provide visibility through incidents, queries, and event reporting.

Risk Management

• Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluationand mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of these vulnerabilities. Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely to be successful. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams. Risk Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk Triage and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security evaluation and response processes.

Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification

• Caution:The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change, evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.

  Specific information about mitigation and identification is available for these devices:

  • Cisco IOS Routers and Switches
  • Cisco IOS NetFlow and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow
  • Cisco ASA, Cisco ASASM, and Cisco FWSM Firewalls
  • Cisco ACE
  • Cisco Intrusion Prevention System
  • Cisco Security Manager

  Cisco IOS Routers and Switches

  Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists

  For MS12-053, and for MS12-054, to protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy transit access control lists (tACLs) to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.

  The tACL policy denies unauthorized RDP IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP port 3389, and SMB IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP ports 139 and 445 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 and 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 represent the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the hosts at 192.168.100.1 and 2001:DB8::100:1 are considered trusted sources that require access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.

  Additional information about tACLs is available in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.

  !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted
  !-- sources that require access on the vulnerable
  !-- ports and protocols for MS12-053
  !
  access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 3389
  !
  !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted
  !-- sources that require access on the vulnerable ports
  !-- and protocols for MS12-054
  !
  access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 eq 139 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 established
  access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 eq 445 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 established
  !
  !-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries 
  !-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks against MS12-053
  !
  access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 3389
  !
  !-- The following vulnerability-specific ACEs can
  !-- aid in identification of attacks against MS12-054
  !
  access-list 150 deny tcp any eq 139 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255
  access-list 150 deny tcp any eq 445 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255
  !
  !-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
  !-- with existing security policies and configurations
  !
  !-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
  !
  access-list 150 deny ip any any
  !
  !-- Create the corresponding IPv6 tACL
  !
  ipv6  access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy
    !  
    !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted
    !-- sources that require access on the vulnerable
    !-- ports and protocols for MS12-053
    !
    !
    permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 3389
    !  
    !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted
    !-- sources that require access on the vulnerable ports
    !-- and protocols for MS12-054
    !
    !
    permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 139 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 established
    permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 445 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 established
    !
    !-- The following vulnerability-specific ACEs can 
    !-- aid in identification of attacks to global and
    !-- link-local addresses
    !
    deny tcp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 3389
    deny tcp any eq 139 2001:DB8:1:60::/64
    deny tcp any eq 445 2001:DB8:1:60::/64
    !
    !-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in 
    !-- accordance with existing security policies and configurations
    !-- and allow IPv6 neighbor discovery packets, which
    !-- include neighbor solicitation packets and neighbor
    !-- advertisement packets
    !
    permit icmp any any nd-ns
    permit icmp any any nd-na
    ! 
    !-- Explicit deny for all other IPv6 traffic
    !
    deny ipv6 any any
    !
    !
    !-- Apply tACLs to interfaces in the ingress direction
    !
  interface GigabitEthernet0/0
   ip access-group 150 in
   ipv6 traffic-filter IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy in

  Note that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the transmission of ICMP unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered traffic. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of increasing CPU utilization on the device. In Cisco IOS Software, ICMP unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by default. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the interface configuration commands no ip unreachables and no ipv6 unreachables. ICMP unreachable rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration commands ip icmp rate-limit unreachable interval-in-ms and ipv6 icmp error-interval interval-in-ms.

  Identification: Transit Access Control Lists

  After the administrator applies the tACL to an interface, show ip access-lists and show ipv6 access-list commands will identify the number of RDP IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP port 3389, and SMB IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP port 139 and TCP port 445 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show ip access-lists 150 and show ipv6 access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy follows:

  router#show ip access-lists 150
  Extended IP access list 150
      10 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 3389
      20 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 eq 139 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 established
      30 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 eq 445 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 established
      40 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 3389 (29 matches)
      50 deny tcp any eq 139 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 (12 matches)
      60 deny tcp any eq 445 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 (26 matches)
      70 deny ip any any
  router#

  In the preceding example, access list 150 has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

  • 29 RDP packets on TCP port 3389 for ACE line 40
  • 12 SMB packets on TCP port 139 for ACE line 50
  • 26 SMB packets on TCP port 445 for ACE line 60

  router#show ipv6 access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy 
  IPv6 access list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy
      permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 3389 (25 matches) sequence 10
      permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 139 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 established (80 matches) sequence 20
      permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 445 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 established (16 matches) sequence 30
      deny tcp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 3389 (49 matches) sequence 40
      deny tcp any eq 139 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 (20 matches) sequence 50
      deny tcp any eq 445 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 (36 matches) sequence 60
      permit icmp any any nd-ns (50 matches) sequence 70
      permit icmp any any nd-na (37 matches) sequence 80
      deny ipv6 any any (80 matches) sequence 90

  In the preceding example, access list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

  • 49 RDP packets on TCP port 3389 for ACE line 40
  • 20 SMB packets on TCP port 139 for ACE line 50
  • 36 SMB packets on TCP port 445 for ACE line 60

  For additional information about investigating incidents using ACE counters and syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Cisco Cisco Security white paper.

  Administrators can use Embedded Event Manager to provide instrumentation when specific conditions are met, such as ACE counter hits. The Cisco Security white paper Embedded Event Manager in a Security Context provides additional details about how to use this feature.

  Identification: Access List Logging

  The log and log-input access control list (ACL) option will cause packets that match specific ACEs to be logged. The log-input option enables logging of the ingress interface in addition to the packet source and destination IP addresses and ports.

  Caution: Access control list logging can be very CPU intensive and must be used with extreme caution. Factors that drive the CPU impact of ACL logging are log generation, log transmission, and process switching to forward packets that match log-enabled ACEs.

  For Cisco IOS Software, the ip access-list logging interval interval-in-ms command can limit the effects of process switching induced by IPv4 ACL logging. The logging rate-limit rate-per-second except loglevel command limits the impact of log generation and transmission.

  The CPU impact from ACL logging can be addressed in hardware on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers with Supervisor Engine 720 or Supervisor Engine 32 using optimized ACL logging.

  For additional information about the configuration and use of ACL logging, reference the Understanding Access Control List Logging Cisco Security white paper.

  Cisco IOS NetFlow and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow

  Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS NetFlow

  For MS12-053 and MS12-054 administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of IPv4 traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities described in this document that have a network attack vector. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.

  router#show ip cache flow
  IP packet size distribution (90784136 total packets):
     1-32   64   96  128  160  192  224  256  288  320  352  384  416  448  480
     .000 .698 .011 .001 .004 .005 .000 .004 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000
  
      512  544  576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
     .000 .001 .256 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
  
  IP Flow Switching Cache, 4456704 bytes
    1885 active, 63651 inactive, 59960004 added
    129803821 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
    Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
    Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds
  IP Sub Flow Cache, 402056 bytes
    0 active, 16384 inactive, 0 added, 0 added to flow
    0 alloc failures, 0 force free
    1 chunk, 1 chunk added
    last clearing of statistics never
  Protocol         Total    Flows   Packets Bytes  Packets Active(Sec) Idle(Sec)
  --------         Flows     /Sec     /Flow  /Pkt     /Sec     /Flow     /Flow
  TCP-Telnet    11393421      2.8         1    48      3.1       0.0       1.4
  TCP-FTP            236      0.0        12    66      0.0       1.8       4.8
  TCP-FTPD            21      0.0     13726  1294      0.0      18.4       4.1
  TCP-WWW          22282      0.0        21  1020      0.1       4.1       7.3
  TCP-X              719      0.0         1    40      0.0       0.0       1.3
  TCP-BGP              1      0.0         1    40      0.0       0.0      15.0
  TCP-Frag         70399      0.0         1   688      0.0       0.0      22.7
  TCP-other     47861004     11.8         1   211     18.9       0.0       1.3
  UDP-DNS            582      0.0         4    73      0.0       3.4      15.4
  UDP-NTP         287252      0.0         1    76      0.0       0.0      15.5
  UDP-other       310347      0.0         2   230      0.1       0.6      15.9
  ICMP             11674      0.0         3    61      0.0      19.8      15.5
  IPv6INIP            15      0.0         1  1132      0.0       0.0      15.4
  GRE                  4      0.0         1    48      0.0       0.0      15.3 
  Total:        59957957     14.8         1   196     22.5       0.0       1.5
  
  SrcIf         SrcIPaddress    DstIf         DstIPaddress    Pr SrcP DstP  Pkts
  Gi0/0         192.168.10.201  Gi0/1         192.168.60.102  11 0984 00A1     1
  Gi0/0         192.168.12.185  Gi0/1         192.168.60.239  06 01BD 0BD7    40
  Gi0/0         192.168.17.60   Gi0/1         192.168.60.28   06 008B 4850     6
  Gi0/1         192.168.150.60  Gi0/0         10.89.16.226    06 0016 12CA     1
  Gi0/0         10.88.226.1     Gi0/1         192.168.202.22  11 007B 007B     1
  Gi0/0         192.168.10.201  Gi0/1         192.168.60.102  06 0984 101D    19
  Gi0/0         192.168.11.54   Gi0/1         192.168.60.158  06 0911 0D3D     3
  Gi0/0         192.168.11.54   Gi0/1         192.168.60.158  11 0911 00A1     3

  In the preceding example, there are multiple flows for RDP on TCP port 3389 (hex value 0D3D), and SMB on TCP port 139 (hex value 008B) and port 445 (hex value 01BD).

  As shown in the following example, to view only the traffic flows for RDP packets on TCP port 3389 (hex value 0D3D), and SMB packets on TCP port 139 (hex value 008B) and TCP port 445 (hex value 01BD), use the show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*(0D3D|008B|01BD)_ command to display the related Cisco NetFlow records: TCP Flows

  router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*(0D3D|008B|01BD)_
  	SrcIf         SrcIPaddress     DstIf         DstIPaddress    Pr SrcP DstP  Pkts
  	Gi0/0         192.168.12.110   Gi0/1         192.168.60.163  06 092A 0D3D     6
  	Gi0/0         192.168.41.86    Gi0/1         192.168.60.27   06 008B 0B7B     2
  	Gi0/0         192.168.41.90    Gi0/1         192.168.60.87   06 077B 0D3D     4
  	Gi0/0         192.168.11.101   Gi0/1         192.168.60.24   06 01BD 1F66    28

  Identification: IPv6 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS NetFlow

  For MS12-053 and MS12-054 administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of IPv6 traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.

  The following output is from a Cisco IOS device running Cisco IOS Software 12.4 mainline train. The command syntax will vary for different Cisco IOS Software trains.

  router#show ipv6 flow cache
  
  IP packet size distribution (50078919 total packets):
     1-32  64   96  128  160  192  224  256  288  320  352  384  416  448  480
     .000 .990 .001 .008 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

      512  544  576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
     .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

  IP Flow Switching Cache, 475168 bytes
    8 active, 4088 inactive, 6160 added
    1092984 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
    Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
    Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds

  IP Sub Flow Cache, 33928 bytes
    16 active, 1008 inactive, 12320 added, 6160 added to flow
    0 alloc failures, 0 force free
    1 chunk, 1 chunk added

  SrcAddress        InpIf    DstAddress       OutIf    Prot SrcPrt DstPrt Packets
  2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0    2001:DB...28::20 Local    0x06 0x16C4 0x0D3D 1464
  2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...28::21 Gi0/1    0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1281
  2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...134::3 Gi0/1    0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1191
  2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::4 Gi0/1    0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1192    
  2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::2 Gi0/1    0x06 0x01BD 0x160A 1597
  2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::3 Gi0/1    0x06 0x008B 0x1610 1001  
  2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::4 Gi0/1    0x06 0x1634 0x101D 1292
  2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::3 Gi0/1    0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1155
  2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...146::3 Gi0/1    0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1092
  2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...144::4 Gi0/1    0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1193 

  To permit display of the full 128-bit IPv6 address, use the terminal width 132 exec mode command.

  In the preceding example, there are multiple IPv6 flows for RDP on TCP port 3389 (hex value 0D3D), SMB on TCP port 139 (hex value 008B), and port 445 (hex value 01BD).

  As shown in the following example, to view only the RDP packets on TCP port 3389 (hex value 0D3D), and SMB packets on TCP port 139 (hex value 008B) and TCP port 445 (hex value 01BD), use the show ipv6 flow cache | include SrcIf|_PrHex_.*(0D3D|008B|01BD)_ command to display the related Cisco NetFlow records:

  TCP Flows

  router#show ipv6 flow cache | include SrcIf|_PrHex_.*(0D3D|008B|01BD)_
  SrcAddress        InpIf    DstAddress       OutIf    Prot SrcPrt DstPrt Packets
  2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::2 Gi0/1    0x06 0x160A 0x0D3D 1007
  2001:DB...6A:5BA7 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::4 Gi0/1    0x06 0x01BD 0x160A 2308
  2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::6 Gi0/1    0x06 0x008B 0x160A 1886
  router#

  Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow

  Introduced in Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.2(31)SB2 and 12.4(9)T, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow improves original Cisco NetFlow by adding the capability to customize the traffic analysis parameters for the administrator''s specific requirements. Original Cisco NetFlow uses a fixed seven tuples of IP information to identify a flow, whereas Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow allows the flow to be user defined. It facilitates the creation of more complex configurations for traffic analysis and data export by using reusable configuration components.

  For MS12-053 and MS12-054 administrators can configure Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of IPv4 traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities described in this document that have a network attack vector. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.

  The following example output is from a Cisco IOS device that is running a version of Cisco IOS Software in the 15.1T train. Although the syntax will be almost identical for the 12.4T and 15.0 trains, it may vary slightly depending on the actual Cisco IOS release being used. In the following configuration, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will collect information on interface GigabitEthernet0/0 for incoming IPv4 flows based on source IPv4 address, as defined by the match ipv4 source address key field statement. Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will also include nonkey field information about source and destination IPv4 addresses, protocol, ports (if present), ingress and egress interfaces, and packets per flow.

  !
  !-- Configure key and nonkey fields
  !-- in the user-defined flow record
  !
  flow record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4
   match ipv4 source address
   collect ipv4 protocol
   collect ipv4 destination address
   collect transport source-port
   collect transport destination-port
   collect interface input
   collect interface output
   collect counter packets
  !
  !-- Configure the flow monitor to
  !-- reference the user-defined flow 
  !-- record
  !
  flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4
   record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4
  !
  !-- Apply the flow monitor to the interface
  !-- in the ingress direction
  !
  interface GigabitEthernet0/0
   ip flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 input

  The Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow flow output is as follows:

  router#show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table
    Cache type:                               Normal
    Cache size:                                 4096
    Current entries:                               6
    High Watermark:                                1
  
    Flows added:                                   9181
    Flows aged:                                    9175
      - Active timeout      (  1800 secs)          9000
      - Inactive timeout    (    15 secs)           175
      - Event aged                                    0
      - Watermark aged                                0
      - Emergency aged                                0
  
  IPV4 SRC ADDR  ipv4 dst addr  trns src port trns dst port intf input intf output pkts ip prot
  ============== ============== ============= ============= ========== =========== ==== =======
  192.168.10.201 192.168.60.102         1456            80      Gi0/0        Gi0/1 1128       6
   192.168.11.54 192.168.60.158          445          5123      Gi0/0        Gi0/1   97       6
  192.168.150.60   10.89.16.226         2567           512      Gi0/0        Gi0/1   13       6
   192.168.11.54 192.168.60.158          139          4443      Gi0/0        Gi0/1  242       6
  192.168.150.60   10.89.16.226         2567           443      Gi0/0        Gi0/1   13       6
   192.168.13.97  192.168.60.28         3451          4125      Gi0/0        Gi0/1    1       6
   192.168.10.17  192.168.60.97         4231          3389      Gi0/0        Gi0/1  146       6
     10.88.226.1 192.168.202.22         2678           161      Gi0/0        Gi0/1  567      17
    10.89.16.226 192.168.150.60         3562           161      Gi0/0        Gi0/1  312      17

  To view only the RDP on TCP port 3389, and SMB on TCP port 139 and TCP port 445, use the show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table | include IPV4 DST ADDR|_(3389|139|445)_.*_6_ command to display the related NetFlow records.

  For more information about Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow, refer to Flexible Netflow Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS Release 15.1M&T and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow Configuration Guide, Release 12.4T.

  Identification: IPv6 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow

  For MS12-053 and MS12-054 administrators can configure Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of IPv6 traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities described in this document that have a network attack vector. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.

  The following example output is from a Cisco IOS device that is running a version of Cisco IOS Software in the 15.1T train. Although the syntax will be almost identical for the 12.4T and 15.0 trains, it may vary slightly depending on the actual Cisco IOS release being used. In the following configuration, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will collect information on interface GigabitEthernet0/0 for incoming IPv6 flows based on the source IPv6 address, as defined by the match ipv6 source address key field statement. Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will also include nonkey field information about source and destination IPv6 addresses, protocol, ports (if present), ingress and egress interfaces, and packets per flow.

  !
  !-- Configure key and nonkey fields
  !-- in the user-defined flow record
  !
  flow record FLOW-RECORD-ipv6
   match ipv6 source address
   collect ipv6 protocol
   collect ipv6 destination address
   collect transport source-port
   collect transport destination-port
   collect interface input
   collect interface output
   collect counter packets
  !
  !-- Configure the flow monitor to
  !-- reference the user-defined flow 
  !-- record
  !
  flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6
   record FLOW-RECORD-ipv6
  !
  !-- Apply the flow monitor to the interface
  !-- in the ingress direction
  !
  interface GigabitEthernet0/0
    ipv6 flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 input

  The Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow flow output is as follows:

  router#show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 cache format table
    Cache type:                               Normal
    Cache size:                                 4096
    Current entries:                               6
    High Watermark:                                2
  
    Flows added:                                   539
    Flows aged:                                    532
      - Active timeout      (  1800 secs)          350
      - Inactive timeout    (    15 secs)          182
      - Event aged                                   0
      - Watermark aged                               0
      - Emergency aged                               0
  
  IPV6 SRC ADDR     ipv6 dst addr     trns src port trns dst port intf input intf output pkts ip prot
  ================= ================= ============= ============= ========== =========== ==== =======
  2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20           123           123      Gi0/0       Gi0/0   17      17
  2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20           139          1265      Gi0/0       Gi0/0 1237       6
  2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20           445          1441      Gi0/0       Gi0/0 2346       6
  2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20          1890          3389      Gi0/0       Gi0/0 5009       6
  2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20          2856          5060      Gi0/0       Gi0/0  486      17
  2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20          3012            53      Gi0/0       Gi0/0 1016      17
  2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20          2477            53      Gi0/0       Gi0/0 1563      17

  To permit display of the full 128-bit IPv6 address, use the terminal width 132 exec mode command.

  To view only the RDP on TCP port 3389, and SMB on TCP port 139 and TCP port 445, use the show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 cache format table | include IPV6 DST ADDR|_(3389|139|445)_.*_6_ command to display the related Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow records.

  Cisco ASA, Cisco ASASM, and Cisco FWSM Firewalls

  Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists

  For MS12-053 and MS12-054 to protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy transit access control lists (tACLs) to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.

  The tACL-Policy policy denies unauthorized RDP IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP port 3389 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 and 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the hosts at 192.168.100.1 and 2001:DB8::100:1 are considered trusted sources that require access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.

  The tACL-Policy-Egress policy denies unauthorized SMB over IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP ports 139 and 445 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 and 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the hosts at 192.168.100.1 and 2001:DB8::100:1 are considered trusted sources that require access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.

  Additional information about tACLs is in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.

  !
  !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted
  !-- sources that require access on the vulnerable
  !-- ports and protocols for MS12-053
  !
  access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 
       192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 3389
  !
  !-- The following vulnerability-specific ACEs
  !-- can aid in identification of attacks
  !
  access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 3389
  !
  !-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
  !-- with existing security policies and configurations
  !
  !-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
  !
  access-list tACL-Policy extended deny ip any any
  !
  !-- Create the corresponding IPv6 tACL
  !
  !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted
  !-- sources that require access on the vulnerable
  !-- ports and protocols for MS12-053
  !
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1
            2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 3389
  !
  !--  The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
  !--  (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks
  !
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy deny tcp any 2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 3389
  !
  !--  Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
  !--  with existing security policies and configurations
  !
  !--  Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
  !
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy deny ip any any
  !
  !--  Apply tACLs to interfaces in the ingress direction
  !
  access-group tACL-Policy in interface outside
  access-group IPv6-tACL-Policy in interface outside

  
  

  !
  !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted
  !-- sources that require access on the vulnerable
  !-- ports and protocols for MS12-054
  !
  access-list tACL-Policy-Egress extended permit tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 
       host 192.168.100.1 eq 139
  access-list tACL-Policy-Egress extended permit tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 
       host 192.168.100.1 eq 445
  !
  !-- The following vulnerability-specific ACEs
  !-- can aid in identification of attacks
  !
  access-list tACL-Policy-Egress extended deny tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 any eq 139
  access-list tACL-Policy-Egress extended deny tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 any eq 445
  !
  !-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
  !-- with existing security policies and configurations
  !
  !-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
  !
  access-list tACL-Policy-Egress extended deny ip any any
  !
  !-- Create the corresponding IPv6 tACL
  !
  !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted
  !-- sources that require access on the vulnerable
  !-- ports and protocols for MS12-054
  !
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress permit tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64
             host 2001:db8:1:100::1 eq 139
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress permit tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64
             host 2001:db8:1:100::1 eq 445
  !
  !--  The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
  !--  (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks
  !
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress deny tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64 any eq 139
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress deny tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64 any eq 445
  !
  !--  Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
  !--  with existing security policies and configurations
  !
  !--  Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
  !
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress deny ip any any
  !
  !--  Apply tACLs to interfaces in the ingress direction
  !
  access-group tACL-Policy-Egress in interface inside
  access-group IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress in interface inside

  Identification: Transit Access Control Lists

  After the tACLs have been applied to an interface, administrators can use the show access-list command to identify the number of RDP IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP port 3389, and SMB IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP port 139 and TCP port 445 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show access-list tACL-Policy, show access-list tACL-Policy-Egress, show access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy, and show access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress follows:

  firewall#show access-list tACL-Policy
  access-list tACL-Policy; 3 elements; name hash: 0x847bce3d
  access-list tACL-Policy line 1 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 
       192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 3389 (hitcnt=72)
  access-list tACL-Policy line 2 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 
       255.255.255.0 eq 3389 (hitcnt=14)
  access-list tACL-Policy line 3 extended deny ip any any (hitcnt=59)

  In the preceding example, access list tACL-Policy has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

  • 14 RDP packets on TCP port 3389 for ACE line 2

  firewall#show access-list tACL-Policy-Egress
  access-list tACL-Policy-Egress; 5 elements; name hash: 0x47502853
  access-list tACL-Policy-Egress line 1 extended permit tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 
       host 192.168.100.1 eq netbios-ssn (hitcnt=20)
  access-list tACL-Policy-Egress line 2 extended permit tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 
       host 192.168.100.1 eq 445 (hitcnt=30)
  access-list tACL-Policy-Egress line 3 extended deny tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 
       any eq netbios-ssn (hitcnt=57)
  access-list tACL-Policy-Egress line 4 extended deny tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 
       any eq 445 (hitcnt=27)
  access-list tACL-Policy-Egress line 5 extended deny ip any any (hitcnt=120)

  In the preceding example, access list tACL-Policy-Egress has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

  • 57 SMB packets on TCP port 139 for ACE line 3
  • 27 SMB packets on TCP port 445 for ACE line 4

  firewall#show access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy                 
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy; 5 elements; name hash: 0xafe832d8
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 1 permit tcp host 2001:db8:1:100::1 
       2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 3389 (hitcnt=9) 
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 2 deny tcp any 
       2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 3389 (hitcnt=19) 
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 4 deny ip any any (hitcnt=7)

  In the preceding example, access list IPv6-tACL-Policy has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

  • 19 RDP packets on TCP port 3389 for ACE line 2

  firewall#show access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress                 
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress; 5 elements; name hash: 0x342aba4c
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress line 1 permit tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64 
       host 2001:db8:1:100::1 eq netbios-ssn (hitcnt=20) 
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress line 2 permit tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64 
       host 2001:db8:1:100::1 eq 445 (hitcnt=22)
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress line 3 deny tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64 
       any eq netbios-ssn (hitcnt=18)
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress line 4 deny tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64 
       any eq 445 (hitcnt=43) 
  ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress line 5 deny ip any any (hitcnt=13)

  In the preceding example, access list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

  • 18 SMB packets on TCP port 139 for ACE line 3
  • 43 SMB packets on TCP port 445 for ACE line 4

  In addition, syslog message 106023 can provide valuable information, which includes the source and destination IP address, the source and destination port numbers, and the IP protocol for the denied packet.

  Identification: Firewall Access List Syslog Messages

  Firewall syslog message 106023 will be generated for packets denied by an access control entry (ACE) that does not have the log keyword present. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Message, 8.2 - 106023.

  Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is in Monitoring - Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module.

  In the following example, the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. It is possible to use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.

  Additional information about regular expression syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.

  firewall#show logging | grep 106023
    Jun 12 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.18/2944 
           dst inside:192.168.60.191/3389 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
    Jun 12 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src inside:192.168.60.38/2945 
           dst outside:192.0.2.200/139 by access-group "tACL-Policy-Egress"
    Jun 12 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.100/2947 
           dst inside:192.168.60.115/3389 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
    Jun 12 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src inside:192.168.60.38/2949 
           dst outside:192.0.2.88/445 by access-group "tACL-Policy-Egress"
    Jun 12 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:2001:db8:d::a85e:172/2951
           dst inside:2001:db8:1:60::134/3389 by access-group "IPv6-tACL-Policy"
  firewall#

  In the preceding example, the messages logged for the tACL tACL-Policy show RDP packets for TCP port 3389, SMB packets for TCP ports 139 and 445 sent to the address block assigned to affected devices.

  Additional information about syslog messages for Cisco ASA Series Adaptive Security Appliances is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Messages, 8.2. Additional information about syslog messages for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in the Analyzing Syslog Messages section of the Cisco ASASM CLI Configuration Guide. Additional information about syslog messages for the Cisco FWSM is in Catalyst 6500 Series Switch and Cisco 7600 Series Router Firewall Services Module Logging System Log Messages.

  For additional information about investigating incidents using syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Cisco Cisco Security white paper.

  Additional information about tACLs is available in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.

  Application layer protocol inspection is available beginning in software release 7.2(1) for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, software release 8.5 for the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module, and in software release 4.0(1) for the Cisco Firewall Services Module. This advanced security feature performs deep packet inspection of traffic that transits the firewall. Administrators may construct an inspection policy for applications that require special handling through the configuration of inspection class maps and inspection policy maps, which are applied by means of a global or interface service policy.

  Additional information about application layer protocol inspection is in the Configuring Application Layer Protocol Inspection section of the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Configuration Guide using the CLI, 8.2 and the Configuring Application Inspection section of the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module CLI Configuration Guide, 8.5.

  Caution: Application layer protocol inspection will decrease firewall performance. Administrators are advised to test performance impact in a lab environment before this feature is deployed in production environments.

  HTTP Application Inspection

  For MS12-060 by using the HTTP inspection engine on the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances, Cisco 6500 Series ASA Services Modules, and the Cisco Firewall Services Module, administrators can configure regular expressions (regexes) for pattern matching and construct inspection class maps and inspection policy maps. These methods can help protect against specific vulnerabilities, such as the one described in this document, and other threats that may be associated with HTTP traffic. The following HTTP application inspection configuration uses the Cisco Modular Policy Framework (MPF) to create a policy for inspection of traffic on TCP ports 80, 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326, which are the default ports for the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable. The HTTP application inspection policy will drop connections where the HTTP response body contains any of the regexes that are configured to match the ActiveX control that is associated with these vulnerabilities.

  Caution: The configured regexes can match text strings at any location in the body of an HTML response. Care should be taken to ensure that legitimate business applications that use matching text strings without calling the ActiveX control are not affected. Additional information about regex syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.

  Additional information about ActiveX exploits and mitigations that leverage Cisco firewall technologies is available in the Preventing ActiveX Exploits with Cisco Firewall Application Layer Protocol Inspection Cisco Security white paper.

  !
  !-- Configure regexes for the ActiveX Class ID 
  !-- "1EFB6596-857C-11D1-B16A-00C0F0283628" 
  !-- that is typically used to exploit
  !-- the vulnerability associated with MS12-060
  !
   
  regex MS12-060_1 "1[Ee][Ff][Bb]6596[-]857[Cc][-]11[Dd]1[-]
                    [Bb]16[Aa][-]00[Cc]0[Ff]0283628"
  
  ! 
  !-- Configure a regex class to match on the regular  
  !-- expressions that are configured above
  !
  
  class-map type regex match-any MS12-060_regex_class
   match regex MS12-060_1
  
  !
  !-- Configure an object group for the default ports that 
  !-- are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable, which 
  !-- are TCP ports 80 (www), 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, 
  !-- and 24326
  !
  object-group service WEBPORTS tcp
   port-object eq www 
   port-object eq 3128 
   port-object eq 8000 
   port-object eq 8010 
   port-object eq 8080 
   port-object eq 8888 
   port-object eq 24326 
  !
  !-- Configure an access list that uses the WEBPORTS object 
  !-- group, which will be used to match TCP packets that 
  !-- are destined to the #WEBPORTS variable that is used 
  !-- by a Cisco IPS device
  !
  access-list Webports_ACL extended permit tcp any any object-group WEBPORTS 
  !
  !-- Configure a class that uses the above-configured
  !-- access list to match TCP packets that are destined
  !-- to the ports that are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS
  !-- variable
  !
  class-map Webports_Class
   match access-list Webports_ACL
  !
  !-- Configure an HTTP application inspection policy that  
  !-- identifies, drops, and logs connections that contain   
  !-- the regexes that are configured above
  ! 
  policy-map type inspect http MS_Aug_2012_policy
   parameters
  !
  !-- "body-match-maximum" indicates the maximum number of 
  !-- characters in the body of an HTTP message that
  !-- should be searched in a body match. The default value is
  !-- 200 bytes. A large number such as shown here may have an
  !-- impact on system performance.  Administrators are advised
  !-- to test performance impact in a lab environment before 
  !-- this command is deployed in production environments
  !
    body-match-maximum 1380
   match response body regex class MS12-060_regex_class
    drop-connection log
  !
  !-- Add the above-configured "Webports_Class" that matches 
  !-- TCP packets that are destined to the default ports  
  !-- that are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable to  
  !-- the default policy "global_policy" and use it to 
  !-- inspect HTTP traffic that transits the firewall
  ! 
  policy-map global_policy
   class Webports_Class
    inspect http MS_Aug_2012_policy 
  !
  !-- By default, the policy "global_policy" is applied 
  !-- globally, which results in the inspection of 
  !-- traffic that enters the firewall from all interfaces 
  !
  service-policy global_policy global

  For additional information about the configuration and use of object groups, reference the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Configuration Guide using the CLI, 8.2 for Configuring Object Groups and the Configuring Objects and Access Lists section of the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module CLI Configuration Guide, 8.5.

  Additional information about HTTP application inspection and the MPF is in the HTTP Inspection Overview section of the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Configuration Guide using the CLI, 8.2.

  Identification: Application Layer Protocol Inspection

  Firewall syslog message 415007 will be generated when an HTTP message body matches a user-defined regular expression. The syslog message will identify the corresponding HTTP class and HTTP policy and indicate the action applied to the HTTP connection. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Message, 8.2 - 415007.

  Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is in Monitoring - Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module.

  In the following example, the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Administrators can use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.

  Additional information about regular expression syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.

  HTTP Application Inspection

  firewall#show logging | grep 415007
    Aug 14 2021 14:35:54: %ASA-5-415007: HTTP - matched Class 22: 
           MS12-060_regex_class in policy-map MS_Aug_2012_policy, Body matched - 
           Dropping connection from outside:192.0.2.63/2130 to 
           inside:192.168.60.85/80

  With HTTP application inspection enabled, the show service-policy inspect protocol command will identify the number of HTTP packets that are inspected and dropped by this feature. The following example shows output for show service-policy inspect http:

  firewall# show service-policy inspect http
  Global policy: 
    Service-policy: global_policy
      Class-map: inspection_default
      Class-map: Webports_Class
        Inspect: http MS_Aug_2012_policy, packet 5025, drop 20, reset-drop 0
         protocol violations
            packet 0        
         match response body regex class MS12-060_regex_class
           drop-connection log, packet 13

  In the preceding example, 5025 HTTP packets have been inspected and 13 HTTP packets have been dropped.

  Cisco ACE

  Mitigation: Application Protocol Inspection

  Application protocol inspection is available for the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module. This advanced security feature performs deep packet inspection of traffic that transits the Cisco ACE device. Administrators can construct an inspection policy for applications that require special handling through the configuration of inspection class maps and inspection policy maps, which are applied via a global or interface service policy.

  Additional information about application protocol inspection is in the Configuring Application Protocol Inspection section of the Cisco ACE 4700 Series Appliance Security Configuration Guide.

  HTTP Deep Packet Inspection

  To conduct HTTP deep packet inspection for MS12-060 administrators can configure regular expressions (regexes) for pattern matching and construct inspection class maps and inspection policy maps. These methods can help protect against specific vulnerabilities, such as the one described in this document, and other threats that may be associated with HTTP traffic. The following HTTP application protocol inspection configuration inspects traffic on TCP ports 80, 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326, which are the default ports for the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable. The HTTP application protocol inspection policy will drop connections where the HTTP content contains any of the regexes that are configured to match the ActiveX control that is associated with these vulnerabilities.

  Caution: The configured regexes can match text strings at any location in the content of an HTML packet. Care should be taken to ensure that legitimate business applications that use matching text strings without calling the ActiveX control are not affected.

  Additional information about ActiveX exploits and mitigations that leverage the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module is available in the Preventing ActiveX Exploits with Cisco Application Control Engine Application Layer Protocol Inspection Cisco Security white paper.

      
  ! 
  !-- Configure an HTTP application inspection class that
  !-- looks for HTTP packets that contain the regexes for the
  !-- ActiveX Class ID 
  !-- "33FDA1EA-80DF-11d2-B263-00A0C90D6111" 
  !-- and ActiveX Class ID
  !-- "476c391c-3e0d-11d2-b948-00c04fa32195" 
  !-- that are associated with these vulnerabilities
  ! 
  !-- Configure an HTTP application inspection class that
  !-- looks for HTTP packets that contain a combination of
  !-- the .dvr-ms file extension and the malicious library 
  !-- file encdec.dll that is typically used to exploit
  !-- this vulnerability
  ! 
  class-map type http inspect match-any MS12-060_class
    match content "1[Ee][Ff][Bb]6596[-]857[Cc][-]11[Dd]1[-]
                    [Bb]16[Aa][-]00[Cc]0[Ff]0283628"
  !
  !-- Configure an HTTP application inspection policy that
  !-- identifies, resets, and logs connections that contain
  !-- the regexes that are configured above
  !
  policy-map type inspect http all-match MS_Aug_2012
    class MS12-060_class
  !
  !-- Configure an access list that matches TCP packets
  !-- that are destined to the #WEBPORTS variable that is
  !-- used by a Cisco IPS device
  !
  access-list WEBPORTS line 8 extended permit tcp any any eq www 
  access-list WEBPORTS line 16 extended permit tcp any any eq 3128 
  access-list WEBPORTS line 24 extended permit tcp any any eq 8000 
  access-list WEBPORTS line 32 extended permit tcp any any eq 8010 
  access-list WEBPORTS line 40 extended permit tcp any any eq 8080 
  access-list WEBPORTS line 48 extended permit tcp any any eq 8888 
  access-list WEBPORTS line 56 extended permit tcp any any eq 24326 
  !
  !-- Configure a Layer 4 class that uses the above-configured
  !-- access list to match TCP packets that are destined
  !-- to the ports that are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS
  !-- variable
  !
  class-map match-all L4_http_class
    match access-list WEBPORTS
  !
  !-- Configure a Layer 4 policy that applies the HTTP application
  !-- inspection policy configured above to TCP packets that
  !-- are destined to the ports that are used by the Cisco IPS
  !-- #WEBPORTS variable
  !
  policy-map multi-match L4_MS_Aug_2012
    class L4_http_class
      inspect http policy MS_Aug_2012
  !
  !-- Apply the configuration globally across all interfaces,
  !-- which results in the inspection of all traffic that enters
  !-- the ACE
  !
  service-policy input L4_MS_Aug_2012

  Identification: Application Protocol Inspection

  HTTP Deep Packet Inspection

  Cisco ACE Application Control Engine syslog message 415007 will be generated when an HTTP message body matches a user-defined regular expression. The syslog message will identify the corresponding HTTP class and HTTP policy and indicate the action applied to the HTTP connection. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ACE 4700 Series Appliance System Message Guide - System Message 415007.

  ACE/Admin# show logging | include 415007
  Aug 14 2012 15:26:43: %ACE-5-415007: HTTP - matched MS12-060 in policy-map 
       L4_MS_Aug_2012, Body matched - Resetting connection from 
       vlan130:192.0.2.94/1776 to vlan206:192.168.60.63/80 Connection 0x3a 

  When HTTP deep packet inspection is enabled, the show service-policy policyname detail command will identify the number of HTTP connections that are inspected and dropped by this feature. The following example shows output for show service-policy L4_MS_Aug_2012 detail:

  ACE/Admin# show service-policy L4_MS_Aug_2012 detail
  
  Status     : ACTIVE
  Description: -----------------------------------------
  Context Global Policy:
    service-policy: L4_MS_Aug_2012
      class: L4_http_class
        inspect http:
          L7 inspect policy : MS_Aug_2012
          Url Logging: DISABLED
          curr conns       : 0         , hit count        : 1         
          dropped conns    : 0         
          client pkt count : 3         , client byte count: 589                   
          server pkt count : 3         , server byte count: 547                   
          conn-rate-limit      : 0         , drop-count : 0         
          bandwidth-rate-limit : 0         , drop-count : 0         
          L4 policy stats:
            Total Req/Resp: 4          , Total Allowed: 2         
            Total Dropped : 2          , Total Logged : 0         
          L7 Inspect policy : MS_Aug_2012      
            class/match : MS12-060_class
              Inspect action :
                 reset log
              Total Inspected      : 2          , Total Matched: 1         
              Total Dropped OnError: 0     

  In the preceding example, 4 HTTP connections have been inspected and 2 HTTP connections have been dropped.
  
  Additional information about HTTP Deep Packet Inspection and Application Protocol Inspection is in the Configuring Application Protocol Inspection section of the Cisco ACE 4700 Series Appliance Security Configuration Guide.

  Cisco Intrusion Prevention System

  CAUTION

  Administrators using Cisco IOS IPS are advised that a resolved defect, Cisco bug ID CSCtz27137 (registered customers only), may cause a Cisco IOS router to crash if the installed signature package is upgraded to S639 or later. This crash may occur regardless of whether the signature package is upgraded manually, automatically, or through Cisco Configuration Professional or Cisco Security Manager. This defect affects Cisco IOS Software trains 12.4T, 15.0M, and 15.1M. A fixed release of Cisco IOS Software must be installed prior to upgrading the IPS signatures. This issue is fixed in Cisco IOS Software releases 15.2(4)M, 15.1(3)T4, 15.2(3)T1, 15.1(4)M5, 12.4(24)T8, and later.

  Mitigation: Cisco IPS Signature Event Actions

  Administrators can use the Cisco IPS appliances and services modules to provide threat detection and help prevent attempts to exploit several of the vulnerabilities described in this document. The following table provides an overview of CVE identifiers and the respective Cisco IPS signatures that will trigger events on potential attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities.

  CVE ID	Signature Release	Signature ID	Signature Name	Enabled	Severity	Fidelity*	Notes
  CVE-2012-2523	S662	1371/0	Microsoft Internet Explorer Integer Overflow Remote Code Execution	Yes	High	90
  CVE-2012-1856	S662	1380/0	MSCOMCTL ActiveX Control Remote Code Execution Vulnerability	Yes	High	80
  CVE-2012-1526	S662	1385/0	Microsoft Windows IE Layout Memory Corruption	Yes	High	90
  CVE-2012-2521	S662	1372/0	Microsoft Internet Explorer Asynchronous NULL Object Access Remote Code Execution	Yes	High	90
  CVE-2012-2522	S662	1367/0	Microsoft Internet Explorer Remote Code Execution	Yes	High	85
  CVE-2012-2526	S662	1379/0	Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Protocol Vulnerability	Yes	High	90
  CVE-2012-1850	S662	1364/0	Microsoft Remote Administration Protocol Read Access Violation Vulnerability	Yes	High	85
  CVE-2012-1851	S662	1382/0	Microsoft Windows Print Spooler Service Format String Vulnerability	Yes	High	90
  CVE-2012-1852	S662	1384/0	Microsoft Remote Administration Protocol Heap Overflow	Yes	High	90
  CVE-2012-1853	S662	1381/0	Microsoft Networking Vulnerability	Yes	High	90

  * Fidelity is also referred to as Signature Fidelity Rating (SFR) and is the relative measure of the accuracy of the signature (predefined). The value ranges from 0 through 100 and is set by Cisco Systems, Inc.

  Administrators can configure Cisco IPS sensors to perform an event action when an attack is detected. The configured event action performs preventive or deterrent controls to help protect against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities listed in the preceding table.

  Exploits that use spoofed IP addresses may cause a configured event action to inadvertently deny traffic from trusted sources.]

  Cisco IPS sensors are most effective when deployed in inline protection mode combined with the use of an event action. Automatic Threat Prevention for Cisco IPS 7.x and 6.x sensors that are deployed in inline protection mode provides threat prevention against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerability that is described in this document. Threat prevention is achieved through a default override that performs an event action for triggered signatures with a riskRatingValue greater than 90.

  For additional information about the risk rating and threat rating calculation, reference Risk Rating and Threat Rating: Simplify IPS Policy Management.

  Cisco Security Manager

  Identification: Cisco Security Manager

  Cisco Security Manager, Event Viewer

  Beginning in software version 4.0, Cisco Security Manager can collect syslogs from Cisco firewalls and Cisco IPS devices and provides the Event Viewer, which can query for events that are related to the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.

  Using the IPS Alert Events predefined view in the Event Viewer, the user can enter the search string 1371/0, 1380/0, 1385/0, 1372/0, 1367/0, 1379/0, 1364/0, 1382/0, 1384/0, 1381/0 in the event filter to return all captured events related to Cisco IPS signatures:

  • 1371/0
  • 1380/0
  • 1385/0
  • 1372/0
  • 1367/0
  • 1379/0
  • 1364/0
  • 1382/0
  • 1384/0
  • 1381/0

  Using the following filters in the Firewall Denied Events predefined view in the Event Viewer provides all captured Cisco firewall access list deny syslog messages that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.

  • Use the Destination event filter to filter network objects that contain the IP address space that is used by the affected devices (for example, IPv4 address range 192.168.60.0/24 and IPv6 address range 2001:DB8:1:60::/64)
  • Use the Destination Service event filter to filter objects that contain
    • TCP port 3389
    • TCP port 139
    • TCP port 445

  An Event Type ID filter can be used with the Firewall Denied Events predefined view in the Event Viewer to filter the syslog IDs shown in the following list to provide all captured Cisco firewall deny syslog messages that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document:

  • ASA-4-106023 (ACL deny)
  • ASA-4-415006 (HTTP inspection)
  • ASA-4-415007 (HTTP inspection)

  For more information about Cisco Security Manager Events, refer to the Filtering and Querying Events section of the Cisco Security Manager User Guide.

  Cisco Security Manager Report Manager

  Beginning in software version 4.1, Cisco Security Manager supports the Report Manager, the Cisco IPS event reporting feature. This feature allows an administrator to define reports based on Cisco IPS events of interest. Reports can be scheduled or users can run ad hoc reports as required.

  Using the Report Manager, the user can define an IPS Top Signatures report for Cisco IPS devices of interest based on time-range and signature characteristics. When the Signature ID is set to

  • 1371/0
  • 1380/0
  • 1385/0
  • 1372/0
  • 1367/0
  • 1379/0
  • 1364/0
  • 1382/0
  • 1384/0
  • 1381/0

  Cisco Security Manager will generate a comprehensive report that ranks the count of the alerts fired for the signature of interest compared to the total sum of all signature alerts shown in the report.

  Also in the Report Manager, the Top Services report can be used with the following configuration to generate a report of events that indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document:

  • Use the Destination IP network filter to filter network objects that contain the IP address space that is used by the affected devices (for example, IPv4 address range 192.168.60.0/24 and IPv6 address range 2001:DB8:1:60::/64)
  • Set an action of Deny on the Criteria settings page

  For more information about Cisco Security Manager IPS Event Reporting refer to the Understanding IPS Top Reports section of the Cisco Security Manager User Guide.

  Identification: Event Management System Partner Events

  Cisco works with industry-leading Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) companies through the Cisco Developer Network. This partnership helps Cisco deliver validated and tested SIEM systems that address business concerns such as long-term log archiving and forensics, heterogeneous event correlation, and advanced compliance reporting. Security Information and Event Management partner products can be leveraged to collect events from Cisco devices and then query the collected events for the incidents created by a Cisco IPS signature or deny syslog messages from firewalls that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. The queries can be made by Sig ID and Syslog ID as shown in the following list:

  • 1371/0 Microsoft Internet Explorer Integer Overflow Remote Code Execution
  • 1380/0 MSCOMCTL ActiveX Control Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
  • 1385/0 Microsoft Windows IE Layout Memory Corruption
  • 1372/0 Microsoft Internet Explorer Asynchronous NULL Object Access Remote Code Execution
  • 1367/0 Microsoft Internet Explorer Remote Code Execution
  • 1379/0 Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Protocol Vulnerability
  • 1364/0 Microsoft Remote Administration Protocol Read Access Violation Vulnerability
  • 1382/0 Microsoft Windows Print Spooler Service Format String Vulnerability
  • 1384/0 Microsoft Remote Administration Protocol Heap Overflow
  • 1381/0 Microsoft Networking Vulnerability
  • ASA-4-415006 (HTTP inspection)
  • ASA-4-106023 (ACL deny)

  For more information about SIEM partners, refer to the Security Management System website.

  Cisco IPS Signature Event Data

  The following data has been compiled through remote monitoring services provided by the Cisco Remote Management Services team from a sample group of Cisco IPS sensors running Cisco IPS Signature Update version S662 or greater. The purpose of this data is to provide visibility into attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities released as part of the Microsoft August Security Update released on August 14, 2012. This data was gathered from events triggered on August 22, 2012.

  CVE ID	Signature ID	Percentage of Sensors Reporting the Signature	Percentage of Sensors Reporting the Signature Among Top Ten Most-Seen Events
  CVE-2012-2523	1371/0	0%	0%
  CVE-2012-1856	1380/0	0%	0%
  CVE-2012-1526	1385/0	0%	0%
  CVE-2012-2521	1372/0	0%	0%
  CVE-2012-2522	1367/0	0%	0%
  CVE-2012-2526	1379/0	0%	0%
  CVE-2012-1850	1364/0	0%	0%
  CVE-2012-1851	1382/0	0%	0%
  CVE-2012-1852	1384/0	0%	0%
  CVE-2012-1853	1381/0	0%	0%

Additional Information

• THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

Revision History

• Version	Description	Section	Date
  3	IPS signature event data from Cisco Remote Management Services is available for IPS signatures from August 22, 2012.		2012-August-22 20:30 GMT
  2	IPS signature event data from Cisco Remote Management Services is available for IPS signatures from August 17, 2012.		2012-August-18 01:46 GMT
  1	This initial version of the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin addresses the Microsoft Security Bulletin Release for August 2012.		2012-August-14 18:23 GMT

  Show Less

Cisco Security Procedures

• Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.

Related Information

• • Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletins
  • Cisco Security
  • Cisco Security IntelliShield Alert Manager Service
  • Cisco Guide to Harden Cisco IOS Devices
  • Understanding Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Threat Vectors
  • Cisco IOS NetFlow - Home Page on Cisco.com
  • Cisco IOS NetFlow White Papers
  • NetFlow Performance Analysis
  • Cisco Network Foundation Protection White Papers
  • Cisco Network Foundation Protection Presentations
  • A Security-Oriented Approach to IP Addressing
  • Cisco Firewall Products - Home Page on Cisco.com
  • Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module
  • Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Module Documentation
  • Cisco Intrusion Prevention System
  • Cisco IPS Signature Downloads
  • Cisco IPS Signature Search Page
  • Cisco Security Manager
  • Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)

Affected Products

• The security vulnerability applies to the following combinations of products.
  
  

  Primary Products
  Microsoft, Inc.	Commerce Server	2002 (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3, SP4) | 2007 (Base, SP1, SP2) | 2009 (Base) | 2009 R2 (Base)
  	Internet Explorer	6.0 (Base, SP1, SP2) | 7.0 (Base) | 8.0 (Base) | 9.0 (Base)
  	Office	2003 (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3) | 2007 (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3) | 2010 (Base, SP1)
  	SQL Server	2000 (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3, SP3a, SP4) | 2005 (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3, SP4) | 2005 (Itanium) (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3, SP4) | 2005 (x64) (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3, SP4) | 2008 (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3) | 2008 (Itanium) (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3) | 2008 (x64) (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3) | 2008 R2 (Base) | 2008 R2 (Itanium) (Base) | 2008 R2 (x64) (Base)
  	Visual FoxPro	8.0 (Base, SP1) | 9.0 (Base, SP1, SP2)
  	Windows 7	for 32-bit systems (Base, SP1) | for x64-based systems (Base, SP1)
  	Windows Server 2003	Datacenter Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) | Datacenter Edition, 64-bit (Itanium) (Base, SP1, SP2) | Datacenter Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) (Base, SP1, SP2) | Enterprise Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) | Enterprise Edition, 64-bit (Itanium) (Base, SP1, SP2) | Enterprise Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) (Base, SP1, SP2) | Standard Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) | Standard Edition, 64-bit (Itanium) (Base, SP1, SP2) | Standard Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) (Base, SP1, SP2) | Web Edition (Base, SP1, SP2)
  	Windows Server 2008	Datacenter Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) | Datacenter Edition, 64-bit (Base, SP1, SP2) | Itanium-Based Systems Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) | Enterprise Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) | Enterprise Edition, 64-bit (Base, SP1, SP2) | Essential Business Server Standard (Base, SP1, SP2) | Essential Business Server Premium (Base, SP1, SP2) | Essential Business Server Premium, 64-bit (Base, SP1, SP2) | Standard Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) | Standard Edition, 64-bit (Base, SP1, SP2) | Web Server (Base, SP1, SP2) | Web Server, 64-bit (Base, SP1, SP2)
  	Windows Server 2008 R2	x64-Based Systems Edition (Base, SP1) | Itanium-Based Systems Edition (Base, SP1)
  	Windows Vista	Home Basic (Base, SP1, SP2) | Home Premium (Base, SP1, SP2) | Business (Base, SP1, SP2) | Enterprise (Base, SP1, SP2) | Ultimate (Base, SP1, SP2) | Home Basic x64 Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) | Home Premium x64 Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) | Business x64 Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) | Enterprise x64 Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) | Ultimate x64 Edition (Base, SP1, SP2)
  	Visual Basic Runtime	6.0 (Base)

  
  
  

  Associated Products
  Cisco	Cisco Broadband Troubleshooter	Original Release (Base) | 3.1 (Base) | 3.2 (Base)
  	Cisco Building Broadband Service Manager (BBSM)	Original Release (Base) | 2.5 (.1) | 3.0 (Base) | 4.0 (Base, .1) | 4.2 (Base) | 4.3 (Base) | 4.4 (Base) | 4.5 (Base) | 5.0 (Base) | 5.1 (Base) | 5.2 (Base)
  	Cisco CNS Network Registrar	2.5 (Base) | 3.0 (Base) | 3.5 (Base, .1) | 5.0 (Base) | 5.5 (Base, .13) | 6.0 (.5, .5.2, .5.3, .5.4) | 6.1 (Base, .1, .1.1, .1.2, .1.3, .1.4)
  	Cisco Collaboration Server Dynamic Content Adapter (DCA)	Original Release (Base) | 1.0 (Base) | 2.0 (Base, (1)_SR2)
  	Cisco Computer Telephony Integration (CTI) Option	4.7 ((0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4) | 5.1 ((0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3) | 6.0 ((0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4, (0)_SR5) | 7.0 ((0)_SR1, (0)_SR2) | 7.1 ((2), (3), (4), (5))
  	Cisco Conference Connection	1.1 ((3), (3)spA) | 1.2 (Base, (1), (2), (2)SR1, (2)SR2)
  	Cisco E-mail Manager	Original Release (Base) | 4.0 (Base, .5i, .6) | 5.0 (Base, (0)_SR1, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4, (0)_SR5, (0)_SR6, (0)_SR7)
  	Cisco Emergency Responder	1.1 (Base, (3), (4)) | 1.2 (Base, (1), (1)SR1, (2), (2)sr1, (3)a, (3)SR1, (3a)SR2) | 1.3 (Base, (1a), (2))
  	Cisco Intelligent Contact Manager (ICM)	Original Release (Base) | 4.6 ((2)_SR1, (2)_SR2, (2)_SR3, (2)_SR4, (2)_SR5, (2)_SR6) | 5.0 ((0), (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4, (0)_SR5, (0)_SR7, (0)_SR8, (0)_SR9, (0)_SR10, (0)_SR11, (0)_SR12, (0)_SR13) | 6.0 ((0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4, (0)_SR5, (0)_SR6, (0)_SR7, (0)_SR8, (0)_SR9, (0)_SR10) | 7.0 ((0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4) | 7.1 ((2), (3), (4), (5))
  	Cisco Unified Contact Center	Enterprise Edition (Base, 4.6.2, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 7.1, 7.1.1, 7.1.3) | Express Edition (Base, 2.0, 2.0.2, 2.1, 2.1.1a, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3b, 2.2.3b_spE, 3.0, 3.0.2, 3.0.3a_spA, 3.0.3a_spB, 3.0.3a_spC, 3.0.3a_spD, 3.1, 3.1(1)_SR1, 3.1(1)_SR2, 3.1(2)_SR1, 3.1(2)_SR2, 3.1(2)_SR3, 3.1(2)_SR4, 3.1(3)_SR2, 3.1(3)_SR3, 3.1(3)_SR4, 3.1(3)_SR5, 3.5, 3.5.1, 3.5(1)_SR1, 3.5(2)_SR1, 3.5(3), 3.5(3)_SR1, 3.5(3)_SR2, 3.5(3)_SR3, 3.5(4)_SR1, 3.5(4)_SR2, 4.0, 4.0(1)_SR1, 4.0(4)_SR1, 4.0(5)_SR1, 4.1, 4.1(1)_SR1, 4.5, 4.5(2)_SR1, 4.5(2)_SR2, 5.0(1)_SR1) | Hosted Edition (Base, 4.6.2, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 7.1, 7.1.1, 7.1.3)
  	Cisco Unified IP IVR	2.0 (.2) | 2.1 (.1a, .2, .3) | 2.2 ((5), .1, .2, .3b, .3b_spE, .5, .4) | 3.0 (.1_spB, .2, .3a_spA, .3a_spB, .3a_spC, .3a_spD) | 3.1 ((1)_SR2, (2)_SR1, (2)_SR2, (2)_SR3, (3)_SR1, (3)_SR2, (3)_SR3, (3)_SR4, (3)_SR5) | 3.5 ((1)_SR1, (1)_SR2, (1)_SR3, (2)_SR1, (3)_SR1, (3)_SR2, (3)_SR3, (4)_SR1, (4)_SR2, .1, .3) | 4.0 ((1)_SR1, (4)_SR1) | 4.1 ((1)_SR1) | 4.5 ((2)_SR1, (2)_SR2) | 5.0 ((1)_SR1)
  	Cisco IP Interoperability and Collaboration System (IPICS)	1.0 ((1.1))
  	Cisco IP Queue Manager	2.2 (Base)
  	Cisco IP/VC 3540 Application Server Module	3.2 (.0.1, .138) | 3.5 (.0.8)
  	Cisco IP/VC 3540 Rate Matching Module	3.0 (.9)
  	Cisco Media Blender	Original Release (Base) | 3.0 (Base) | 4.0 (Base) | 5.0 (Base, (0)_SR1, (0)_SR2)
  	Cisco Networking Services for Active Directory	Original Release (Base)
  	Cisco Outbound Option	Original Release (Base)
  	Cisco Personal Assistant	1.0 (Base, (1)) | 1.1 (Base) | 1.3 (Base, .1, .2, .3, .4) | 1.4 (Base, .2, .3, .4, .5, .6)
  	Cisco Remote Monitoring Suite Option	1.0 (Base) | 2.0 (Base, (0)_SR1)
  	Cisco Secure Access Control Server (ACS) for Windows	2.6 (Base) | 2.6.3.2 (Base) | 2.6.4 (Base) | 2.6.4.4 (Base) | 3.0 (Base) | 3.0.1 (Base) | 3.0.1.40 (Base) | 3.0.2 (Base) | 3.0.3 (Base) | 3.0.3.6 (Base) | 3.0.4 (Base) | 3.1.1 (Base) | 3.1.1.27 (Base) | 3.1.2 (Base) | 3.2 (Base) | 3.2.1 (Base) | 3.2.3 (Base) | 3.3.1 (Base) | 3.3.2.2 (Base) | 3.3.1.16 (Base) | 3.3.3.11 (Base) | 4.0 (Base) | 4.0.1 (Base) | 4.0.1.27 (Base) | 4.1.1.23 (Base)
  	Cisco Secure Access Control Server Solution Engine (ACSE)	3.1 (Base, .1) | 3.2 (Base, .1.20, .2.5, .3) | 3.3 (Base, .1, .1.16, .2.2, .3, .4, .4.12) | 4.0 (Base, .1, .1.42, .1.44, .1.49) | 4.1 (Base, .1.23, .1.23.3, .3, .3.12)
  	Cisco Secure User Registration Tool (URT)	Original Release (Base) | 1.2 (Base, .1) | 2.0 (Base, .7, .8) | 2.5 (Base, .1, .2, .3, .4, .5)
  	Cisco SN 5420 Storage Router	1.1 (Base, .3, .4, .5, .7, .8) | 2.1 (.1, .2)
  	Cisco SN 5428-2 Storage Router	3.2 (.1, .2) | 3.3 (.1, .2) | 3.4 (.1) | 3.5 (Base, .1, .2, .3, .4)
  	Cisco Trailhead	Original Release (Base) | 4.0 (Base)
  	Cisco Unified Communications Manager	Original Release (Base) | 1.0 (Base) | 2.0 (Base) | 3.0 (Base) | 3.0.3(a) (Base) | 3.1 (Base, .1, .2, .3a) | 3.1(1) (Base) | 3.1(2) (Base) | 3.1(2)SR3 (Base) | 3.1(3) (Base) | 3.1(3)SR2 (Base) | 3.1(3)SR4 (Base) | 3.2 (Base) | 3.2(3)SR3 (Base) | 3.3 (Base) | 3.3(2)SPc (Base) | 3.3(3) (Base) | 3.3(3)ES61 (Base) | 3.3(3)SR3 (Base) | 3.3(3)SR4a (Base) | 3.3(3a) (Base) | 3.3(4) (Base) | 3.3(4)ES25 (Base) | 3.3(4)SR2 (Base) | 3.3(4c) (Base) | 3.3(5) (Base) | 3.3(5)ES24 (Base) | 3.3(5)SR1 (Base) | 3.3(5)SR1a (Base) | 3.3(5)SR2 (Base) | 3.3(5)SR2a (Base) | 3.3(5)SR3 (Base) | 3.3(59) (Base) | 3.3(61) (Base) | 3.3(63) (Base) | 3.3(64) (Base) | 3.3(65) (Base) | 3.3(66) (Base) | 3.3(67.5) (Base) | 3.3(68.1) (Base) | 3.3(71.0) (Base) | 3.3(74.0) (Base) | 3.3(78) (Base) | 3.3(76) (Base) | 4.0 (.1, .2) | 4.0(2a)ES40 (Base) | 4.0(2a)ES56 (Base) | 4.0(2a)SR2b (Base) | 4.0(2a)SR2c (Base) | 4.1 (Base) | 4.1(2) (Base) | 4.1(2)ES33 (Base) | 4.1(2)ES50 (Base) | 4.1(2)SR1 (Base) | 4.1(3) (Base) | 4.1(3)ES (Base) | 4.1(3)ES07 (Base) | 4.1(3)ES24 (Base) | 4.1(3)SR (Base) | 4.1(3)SR1 (Base) | 4.1(3)SR2 (Base) | 4.1(3)SR3 (Base) | 4.1(3)SR3b (Base) | 4.1(3)SR3c (Base) | 4.1(3)SR4 (Base) | 4.1(3)SR4b (Base) | 4.1(3)SR4d (Base) | 4.1(3)SR5 (Base) | 4.1(4) (Base) | 4.1(9) (Base) | 4.1(17) (Base) | 4.1(19) (Base) | 4.1(22) (Base) | 4.1(23) (Base) | 4.1(25) (Base) | 4.1(26) (Base) | 4.1(27.7) (Base) | 4.1(28.2) (Base) | 4.1(30.4) (Base) | 4.1(36) (Base) | 4.1(39) (Base) | 4.2(1) (Base) | 4.2(1)SR1b (Base) | 4.2(1.02) (Base) | 4.2(1.05.3) (Base) | 4.2(1.06) (Base) | 4.2(1.07) (Base) | 4.2(3) (Base) | 4.2(3)SR1 (Base) | 4.2(3)SR2 (Base) | 4.2(3.08) (Base) | 4.2(3.2.3) (Base) | 4.2(3.3) (Base) | 4.2(3.13) (Base) | 4.3(1) (Base) | 4.3(1)SR (Base) | 4.3(1.57) (Base)
  	Cisco Unified Customer Voice Portal (CVP)	3.0 ((0), (0)SR1, (0)SR2) | 3.1 ((0), (0)SR1, (0)SR2) | 4.0 ((0), (1), (1)SR1, (2))
  	Cisco Unified MeetingPlace	4.3 (Base) | 5.3 (Base) | 5.2 (Base) | 5.4 (Base) | 6.0 (Base)
  	Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Express	1.1 (Base) | 1.2 (Base) | 2.0 (Base)
  	Cisco Unity	Original Release (Base) | 2.0 (Base) | 2.1 (Base) | 2.2 (Base) | 2.3 (Base) | 2.4 (Base) | 2.46 (Base) | 3.0 (Base, .1) | 3.1 (Base, .2, .3, .5, .6) | 3.2 (Base) | 3.3 (Base) | 4.0 (Base, .1, .2, .3, .3b, .4, .5) | 4.1 (Base, .1) | 4.2 (Base, .1, .1 ES27) | 5.0 ((1)) | 7.0 ((2))
  	Cisco Unity Express	1.0.2 (Base) | 1.1.1 (Base) | 1.1.2 (Base) | 2.0.1 (Base) | 2.0.2 (Base) | 2.1.1 (Base) | 2.1.2 (Base) | 2.1.3 (Base) | 2.2.0 (Base) | 2.2.1 (Base) | 2.2.2 (Base) | 2.3.0 (Base) | 2.3.1 (Base)
  	Cisco Wireless Control System (WCS) Software	1.0 (Base) | 2.0 (Base, 44.14, 44.24) | 2.2 (.0, .111.0) | 3.0 (Base, .101.0, .105.0) | 3.1 (Base, .20.0, .33.0, .35.0) | 3.2 (Base, .23.0, .25.0, .40.0, .51.0, .64.0) | 4.0 (Base, .1.0, .43.0, .66.0, .81.0, .87.0, .96.0, .97.0) | 4.1 (Base, .83.0)
  	CiscoWorks IP Telephony Environment Monitor (ITEM)	1.3 (Base) | 1.4 (Base) | 2.0 (Base)
  	CiscoWorks LAN Management Solution (LMS)	1.3 (Base) | 2.2 (Base) | 2.5 (Base) | 2.6 (Base)
  	CiscoWorks QoS Policy Manager (QPM)	2.0 (Base, .1, .2, .3) | 2.1 (.2) | 3.0 (Base, .1) | 3.1 (Base) | 3.2 (Base, .1, .2, .3)
  	CiscoWorks Routed WAN Management Solution (RWAN)	1.0 (Base) | 1.1 (Base) | 1.2 (Base) | 1.3 (Base, .1)
  	CiscoWorks Small Network Management Solution (SNMS)	1.0 (Base) | 1.5 (Base)
  	CiscoWorks VPN/Security Management Solution (VMS)	1.0 (Base) | 2.0 (Base) | 2.1 (Base) | 2.2 (Base) | 2.3 (Base)
  	Cisco Collaboration Server	3.0 (Base) | 3.01 (Base) | 3.02 (Base) | 4.0 (Base) | 5.0 (Base)
  	Cisco DOCSIS CPE Configurator	1.0 (Base) | 1.1 (Base) | 2.0 (Base)
  	Cisco Unified IP Interactive Voice Response (IVR)	2.0 (Base) | 2.1 (Base)
  	Cisco Service Control Engine (SCE)	3.0 (Base) | 3.1 (Base)
  	Cisco Transport Manager	Original Release (Base) | 2.0 (Base) | 2.1 (Base) | 2.2 (Base, .1) | 3.0 (Base, .1, .2) | 3.1 (Base) | 3.2 (Base) | 4.0 (Base) | 4.1 (Base, .4, .6, .6.6.1) | 4.6 (Base) | 4.7 (Base) | 5.0 (Base, .0.867.2, .1.873.2, .2, .2.92.1, .2.99.1, .2.105.1, .2.110.1) | 6.0 (Base, .0.405.1, .0.407.1, .0.412.1) | 7.0 (Base, .0.370.1, .0.372.1, .0.377.1, .0.389.1, .0.400.1, .395.1) | 7.2 (Base, .0.199.1)
  Microsoft, Inc.	Windows 7	for 32-bit systems | for x64-based systems
  	Windows Server 2003	Datacenter Edition | Datacenter Edition, 64-bit (Itanium) | Datacenter Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) | Enterprise Edition | Enterprise Edition, 64-bit (Itanium) | Enterprise Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) | Standard Edition | Standard Edition, 64-bit (Itanium) | Standard Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) | Web Edition
  	Windows Server 2008	Datacenter Edition | Datacenter Edition, 64-bit | Itanium-Based Systems Edition | Enterprise Edition | Enterprise Edition, 64-bit | Essential Business Server Standard | Essential Business Server Premium | Essential Business Server Premium, 64-bit | Standard Edition | Standard Edition, 64-bit | Web Server | Web Server, 64-bit
  	Windows Server 2008 R2	x64-Based Systems Edition | Itanium-Based Systems Edition
  	Windows Vista	Home Basic | Home Premium | Business | Enterprise | Ultimate | Home Basic x64 Edition | Home Premium x64 Edition | Business x64 Edition | Enterprise x64 Edition | Ultimate x64 Edition