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Updated:August 6, 2016

Document ID:1470489961693192

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Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin

Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Microsoft Security Bulletin Release for October 2012

Doc ID:

27124

First Published:

2012 October 9 17:42 GMT

Last Updated:

2012 October 25 20:07 GMT

Version:

CVE-2012-0182

CVE-2012-2520

CVE-2012-2528

More...

CVE-2012-0182

CVE-2012-2520

CVE-2012-2528

More...

Cisco Response

Microsoft announced seven security bulletins that address 20 vulnerabilities (13 of which are third-party and have been released in August 2012 as part of MS12-058) as part of the monthly security bulletin release on October 9, 2012. A summary of these bulletins is on the Microsoft website at http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-oct. This document provides identification and mitigation techniques that administrators can deploy on Cisco network devices.

The vulnerabilities that have a client software attack vector, can be exploited locally on the vulnerable device, require user interaction, or can be exploited using web-based attacks (these include but are not limited to cross-site scripting, phishing, and web-based e-mail threats) or e-mail attachments are in the following list:
- MS12-064
- MS12-065
- MS12-066
- MS12-067
- MS12-068
- MS12-070
The vulnerability that has a network mitigation is MS12-069. Cisco devices provide countermeasures for the vulnerability that has a network attack vector, which will be discussed in detail later in this document.

Information about affected and unaffected products is available in the respective Microsoft advisories and the Cisco Alerts that are referenced in Cisco Event Response: Microsoft Security Bulletin Release for October 2012.

In addition, multiple Cisco products use Microsoft operating systems as their base operating system. Cisco products that may be affected by the vulnerabilities described in the referenced Microsoft advisories are detailed in the "Associated Products" table in the "Product Sets" section.

Vulnerability Characteristics

MS12-066, Vulnerability in HTML Sanitization Component Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (2741517): This vulnerability has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2012-2520. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and requires user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow arbitrary code execution on behalf of the targeted user. The attack vector is the HTTP protocol using TCP port 80. Due to the nature of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities, no additional information will be presented in this bulletin.

For additional information about cross-site scripting attacks and the methods used to exploit these vulnerabilities, refer to the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin Understanding Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Threat Vectors.

MS12-069, Vulnerability in Kerberos Could Allow Denial of Service (2743555): This vulnerability has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2012-2551. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and without user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause the affected device to crash and result in a denial of service (DoS) condition. Repeated attempts to exploit this vulnerability could result in a sustained DoS condition. The attack vector is the Kerberos protocol using TCP or UDP port 88 packets. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability using spoofed packets

MS12-070, Vulnerability in SQL Server Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (2754849): This vulnerability has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2012-2552. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and requires user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow arbitrary code execution on behalf of the targeted user or information disclosure, which enables an attacker to learn information about the affected device. The attack vector is the HTTP protocol using TCP port 80. Due to the nature of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities, no additional information will be presented in this bulletin.

For additional information about cross-site scripting attacks and the methods used to exploit these vulnerabilities, refer to the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin Understanding Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Threat Vectors

Information about vulnerable, unaffected, and fixed software is available in the Microsoft Security Bulletin Summary for October 2012, which is available at the following link: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms12-oct

Vulnerability Overview

Information about vulnerable, unaffected, and fixed software is available in the Microsoft Security Bulletin Summary for October 2012, which is available at the following link: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-oct.

Mitigation Technique Overview

The vulnerabilities that have a client software attack vector, can be exploited locally on the vulnerable device, require user interaction, or can be exploited using web-based attacks (these include but are not limited to cross-site scripting, phishing, and web-based e-mail threats) or e-mail attachments are in the following list:
- MS12-064
- MS12-065
- MS12-066
- MS12-067
- MS12-068
- MS12-070
These vulnerabilities are mitigated most successfully at the endpoint through software updates, user education, desktop administration best practices, and endpoint protection software such as Cisco Security Agent Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) or antivirus products.

The vulnerability that has a network mitigation is MS12-069. Cisco devices provide countermeasures for this vulnerability. This section of the document provides an overview of these techniques.

Cisco IOS Software can provide effective means of exploit prevention using the following methods:
- Transit access control lists (tACLs)
- Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF)
- IP source guard (IPSG)
These protection mechanisms filter and drop, as well as verify the source IP address of, packets that are attempting to exploit the vulnerability that has a network attack vector.

The proper deployment and configuration of uRPF provides an effective means of protection against attacks that use packets with spoofed source IP addresses. Unicast RPF should be deployed as close to all traffic sources as possible.

The proper deployment and configuration of IPSG provides an effective means of protection against spoofed packets at the access layer.

Cisco IOS NetFlow records can provide visibility into network-based exploitation attempts.

Cisco IOS Software can provide visibility through syslog messages and counter values displayed in the output from show commands.

Effective use of Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) event actions provides visibility into and protection against attacks that attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities as discussed later in this document.

The Cisco Security Manager can also provide visibility through incidents, queries, and event reporting.

Risk Management

Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluation and mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of these vulnerabilities. Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely to be successful. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams. Risk Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk Triage and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security evaluation and response processes.

Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification

Caution: The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change, evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.

Specific information about mitigation and identification is available for these devices:

Cisco IOS Routers and Switches

Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists

For MS12-069, to protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy transit access control lists (tACLs) to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.

The tACL policy denies unauthorized Kerberos IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP or UDP port 88 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 and 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 represent the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the hosts at 192.168.100.1 and 2001:DB8::100:1 are considered trusted sources that require access to the affected devices. The tACL should be applied on the IOS devices that are closest to the affected devices (Microsoft Kerberos servers). Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.

Additional information about tACLs is available in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.

!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable port
!-- for MS12-069
!
!-- To prevent unwanted problems, special care should be taken to 
!-- identify and allow the endpoints (192.168.100.1 and 2001:DB8::100:1)
!-- that communicate with the Kerberos servers (192.168.60.0/24 and 
!-- 2001:DB8:1:60::/64)
!-- Depending on the deployment, these could be Cisco routers, Active 
!-- Directory Servers, hosts, and more.
!
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 88
access-list 150 permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 88
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries 
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks against MS12-069
!
access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 88
access-list 150 deny udp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 88
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in 
!-- accordance with existing security policies and configurations
!
permit ip any any
!
!-- Create the corresponding IPv6 tACL
!
ipv6  access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy
  !  
  !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
  !-- that require access on the vulnerable port
  !-- for MS12-069
  !
  !-- To prevent unwanted problems, special care should be taken to 
  !-- identify and allow the endpoints (192.168.100.1 and 2001:DB8::100:1)
  !-- that communicate with the Kerberos servers (192.168.60.0/24 and 
  !-- 2001:DB8:1:60::/64)
  !-- Depending on the deployment, these could be Cisco routers, Active 
  !-- Directory Servers, hosts, and more.
  !
  permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 88
  permit udp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 88
  !
  !-- The following vulnerability-specific ACEs can 
  !-- aid in identification of attacks to global and
  !-- link-local addresses
  !
  deny tcp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 88
  deny udp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 88
  !
  !-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in 
  !-- accordance with existing security policies and configurations
  !-- and allow IPv6 neighbor discovery packets, which
  !-- include neighbor solicitation packets and neighbor
  !-- advertisement packets
  !
  permit icmp any any nd-ns
  permit icmp any any nd-na
  ! 
  !-- Explicitly deny or permit all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic 
  !-- in accordance with existing security policies and configurations
  !
  permit ipv6 any any
  !
  !-- Apply tACLs to interfaces in the ingress direction
  !
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
 ip access-group 150 in
 ipv6 traffic-filter IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy in

Note that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the transmission of ICMP unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered traffic. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of increasing CPU utilization on the device. In Cisco IOS Software, ICMP unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by default. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the interface configuration commands no ip unreachables and no ipv6 unreachables. ICMP unreachable rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration commands ip icmp rate-limit unreachable interval-in-ms and ipv6 icmp error-interval interval-in-ms.

Identification: Transit Access Control Lists

After the administrator applies the tACL to an interface, show ip access-lists and show ipv6 access-list commands will identify the number of Kerberos IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP or UDP port 88 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show ip access-lists 150 and show ipv6 access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy follows:

router#show ip access-lists 150
Extended IP access list 150
    10 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 88
    20 permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 88
    30 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 88 (12 matches)
    40 deny udp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 88 (26 matches)
    50 permit ip any any
router#

In the preceding example, access list 150 has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

12 Kerberos packets on TCP port 88
26 Kerberos packets on UDP port 88

router#show ipv6 access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy 
IPv6 access list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy
    permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 88 (55 matches) sequence 10
    permit udp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 88 (59 matches) sequence 20
    deny tcp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 88 (30 matches) sequence 30
    deny udp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 88 (131 matches) sequence 40
    permit ipv6 any any (21 matches) sequence 50

In the preceding example, access list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

30 Kerberos packets on TCP port 88
131 Kerberos packets on UDP port 88

For additional information about investigating incidents using ACE counters and syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Cisco Security white paper.

Administrators can use Embedded Event Manager to provide instrumentation when specific conditions are met, such as ACE counter hits. The Cisco Security white paper Embedded Event Manager in a Security Context provides additional details about how to use this feature.

Identification: Access List Logging

The log and log-input access control list (ACL) option will cause packets that match specific ACEs to be logged. The log-input option enables logging of the ingress interface in addition to the packet source and destination IP addresses and ports.

Caution: Access control list logging can be very CPU intensive and must be used with extreme caution. Factors that drive the CPU impact of ACL logging are log generation, log transmission, and process switching to forward packets that match log-enabled ACEs.

For Cisco IOS Software, the ip access-list logging interval interval-in-ms command can limit the effects of process switching induced by IPv4 ACL logging. The logging rate-limit rate-per-second [except loglevel] command limits the impact of log generation and transmission.

The CPU impact from ACL logging can be addressed in hardware on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers with Supervisor Engine 720 or Supervisor Engine 32 using optimized ACL logging.

For additional information about the configuration and use of ACL logging, reference the Understanding Access Control List Logging Cisco Security white paper.

Mitigation: Spoofing Protection

Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding

The vulnerability described in this document (MS12-069) that has a network attack vector can be exploited by spoofed IP packets. Administrators can deploy and configure Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) as a protection mechanism against spoofing.

uRPF is configured at the interface level and can detect and drop packets that lack a verifiable source IP address. Administrators should not rely on uRPF to provide complete spoofing protection because spoofed packets may enter the network through a uRPF-enabled interface if an appropriate return route to the source IP address exists. Administrators are advised to take care to ensure that the appropriate uRPF mode (loose or strict) is configured during the deployment of this feature because it can drop legitimate traffic that is transiting the network. In an enterprise environment, uRPF may be enabled at the Internet edge and the internal access layer on the user-supporting Layer 3 interfaces.

Additional information is available in the Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding Loose Mode Feature Guide.

For additional information about the configuration and use of uRPF, reference the Understanding Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding Cisco Security white paper.

IP Source Guard

IP source guard (IPSG) is a security feature that restricts IP traffic on nonrouted, Layer 2 interfaces by filtering packets based on the DHCP snooping binding database and manually configured IP source bindings. Administrators can use IPSG to prevent attacks from an attacker who attempts to spoof packets by forging the source IP address and/or the MAC address. When properly deployed and configured, IPSG coupled with strict mode uRPF provides the most effective means of spoofing protection for the vulnerability described in this document (MS12-069) that has a network attack vector.

Additional information about the deployment and configuration of IPSG is available in Configuring DHCP Features and IP Source Guard.

Identification: Spoofing Protection Using Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding

With uRPF properly deployed and configured throughout the network infrastructure, administrators can use the show cef interface type slot/port internal, show ip interface, show cef drop, show ip cef switching statistics feature, and show ip traffic commands to identify the number of packets that uRPF has dropped.

Note: Beginning with Cisco IOS Software Release 12.4(20)T, the command show ip cef switching has been replaced by show ip cef switching statistics feature.

Note: The show command | begin regex and show command | include regex command modifiers are used in the following examples to minimize the amount of output that administrators will need to parse to view the desired information. Additional information about command modifiers is in the show commandsections of the Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference.

router#show cef interface GigabitEthernet 0/0 internal | include drop
  ip verify: via=rx (allow default), acl=0, drop=18, sdrop=0
  IPv6 unicast RPF: via=rx acl=None, drop=10, sdrop=0
router#

Note: show cef interface type slot/port internal is a hidden command that must be fully entered at the command-line interface. Command completion is not available for it.

router#show cef drop
CEF Drop Statistics
Slot  Encap_fail  Unresolved Unsupported    No_route      No_adj  ChkSum_Err
RP            27           0           0          18           0           0
router#

router#show ip interface GigabitEthernet 0/0 | begin verify

  IP verify source reachable-via RX, allow default, allow self-ping
  18 verification drops
  0 suppressed verification drops
router#
router#show ipv6 interface GigabitEthernet 0/0 | section IPv6 verify

  IPv6 verify source reachable-via rx 
  0 verification drop(s) (process), 10 (CEF)
  0 suppressed verification drop(s) (process), 0 (CEF)
  --      CLI Output Truncated       --  
router#

router#show ip cef switching statistics feature

IPv4 CEF input features:
Path   Feature                Drop    Consume       Punt  Punt2Host Gave route
RP PAS uRPF                     18          0          0          0          0
Total                           18          0          0          0          0
    --      CLI Output Truncated       --  
router#
router#show ipv6 cef switching statistics feature

IPv6 CEF input features:
Feature                       Drop   Consume   Punt   Punt2Host   Gave route
RP LES Verify Unicast R         10         0      0           0            0
Total                           10         0      0           0            0
    --      CLI Output Truncated       --  
router#

router#show ip traffic | include RPF
         18 no route, 18 unicast RPF, 0 forced drop
router#
router#show ipv6 traffic | include RPF
         10 RPF drops, 0 RPF suppressed, 0 forced drop
router#

In the preceding show cef interface type slot/port internal, show cef drop, show ip interface type slot/port and show ipv6 interface type slot/port, show ip cef switching statistics feature and show ipv6 cef switching statistics feature, and show ip traffic and show ipv6 traffic examples, uRPF has dropped the following packets received globally on all interfaces with uRPF configured because of the inability to verify the source address of the IP packets within the forwarding information base of Cisco Express Forwarding.

18 IPv4 packets
10 IPv6 packets

Cisco IOS NetFlow and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow

Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS NetFlow

For MS12-069, administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of IPv4 traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerability described in this document that has a network attack vector. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit the vulnerability or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.

router#show ip cache flow
IP packet size distribution (90784136 total packets):
   1-32   64   96  128  160  192  224  256  288  320  352  384  416  448  480
   .000 .698 .011 .001 .004 .005 .000 .004 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000

    512  544  576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
   .000 .001 .256 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

IP Flow Switching Cache, 4456704 bytes
  1885 active, 63651 inactive, 59960004 added
  129803821 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
  Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
  Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds
IP Sub Flow Cache, 402056 bytes
  0 active, 16384 inactive, 0 added, 0 added to flow
  0 alloc failures, 0 force free
  1 chunk, 1 chunk added
  last clearing of statistics never
Protocol         Total    Flows   Packets Bytes  Packets Active(Sec) Idle(Sec)
--------         Flows     /Sec     /Flow  /Pkt     /Sec     /Flow     /Flow
TCP-Telnet    11393421      2.8         1    48      3.1       0.0       1.4
TCP-FTP            236      0.0        12    66      0.0       1.8       4.8
TCP-FTPD            21      0.0     13726  1294      0.0      18.4       4.1
TCP-WWW          22282      0.0        21  1020      0.1       4.1       7.3
TCP-X              719      0.0         1    40      0.0       0.0       1.3
TCP-BGP              1      0.0         1    40      0.0       0.0      15.0
TCP-Frag         70399      0.0         1   688      0.0       0.0      22.7
TCP-other     47861004     11.8         1   211     18.9       0.0       1.3
UDP-DNS            582      0.0         4    73      0.0       3.4      15.4
UDP-NTP         287252      0.0         1    76      0.0       0.0      15.5
UDP-other       310347      0.0         2   230      0.1       0.6      15.9
ICMP             11674      0.0         3    61      0.0      19.8      15.5
IPv6INIP            15      0.0         1  1132      0.0       0.0      15.4
GRE                  4      0.0         1    48      0.0       0.0      15.3 
Total:        59957957     14.8         1   196     22.5       0.0       1.5

SrcIf         SrcIPaddress    DstIf         DstIPaddress    Pr SrcP DstP  Pkts
Gi0/0         192.168.10.201  Gi0/1         192.168.60.102  06 0984 0058     1
Gi0/0         192.168.11.54   Gi0/1         192.168.60.102  06 0911 0058     3
Gi0/1         192.168.150.60  Gi0/0         10.89.16.226    06 0016 12CA     1
Gi0/0         192.168.13.97   Gi0/1         192.168.60.102  11 0B3E 0058     5
Gi0/0         192.168.10.17   Gi0/1         192.168.60.102  11 0B89 0058     1

In the preceding example, there are multiple flows for Kerberos on TCP and UDP port 88 (hex value 58).

This traffic is sourced sent to addresses within the 192.168.60.0/24 address block, which is used by affected devices. The packets in these flows may be spoofed and may indicate an attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities. Administrators are advised to compare these flows to baseline utilization for Kerberos traffic sent on TCP or UDP port 88 and also investigate the flows to determine whether they are sourced from untrusted hosts or networks.

As shown in the following example, to view only the traffic flows for Kerberos packets on TCP port 88 (hex value 58), use the show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*0058 command to display the related Cisco NetFlow records:

TCP Flows

router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*0058
SrcIf         SrcIPaddress     DstIf         DstIPaddress    Pr SrcP DstP  Pkts
Gi0/0       192.168.10.201     Gi0/1       192.168.60.102    06 0984 0058     1
Gi0/0        192.168.11.54     Gi0/1       192.168.60.102    06 0911 0058     3

As shown in the following example, to view only the traffic flows for Kerberos packets on UDP port 88 (hex value 58), use the show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_11_.*0058 command to display the related Cisco NetFlow records:

UDP Flows

router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_11_.*0058
SrcIf         SrcIPaddress     DstIf         DstIPaddress    Pr SrcP DstP  Pkts
Gi0/0        192.168.13.97     Gi0/1       192.168.60.102    11 0B3E 0058     5
Gi0/0        192.168.10.17     Gi0/1       192.168.60.102    11 0B89 0058     1

Identification: IPv6 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS NetFlow

For MS12-069, administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of IPv6 traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this vulnerability or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.

The following output is from a Cisco IOS device running Cisco IOS Software 12.4 mainline train. The command syntax will vary for different Cisco IOS Software trains.

router#show ipv6 flow cache

IP packet size distribution (50078919 total packets):
   1-32  64   96  128  160  192  224  256  288  320  352  384  416  448  480
   .000 .990 .001 .008 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

    512  544  576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
   .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

IP Flow Switching Cache, 475168 bytes
  8 active, 4088 inactive, 6160 added
  1092984 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
  Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
  Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds

IP Sub Flow Cache, 33928 bytes
  16 active, 1008 inactive, 12320 added, 6160 added to flow
  0 alloc failures, 0 force free
  1 chunk, 1 chunk added

SrcAddress        InpIf    DstAddress         OutIf    Prot SrcPrt DstPrt Packets
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0    2001:DB...28::102  Local    0x11 0x16C4 0x0058 1464
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...28::21   Gi0/1    0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1191   
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::102 Gi0/1    0x06 0x160A 0x0058 1597
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::102 Gi0/1    0x11 0x1610 0x0058 1001  
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::102 Gi0/1    0x16 0x1634 0x0058 1292

To permit display of the full 128-bit IPv6 address, use the terminal width 132 exec mode command.

In the preceding example, there are multiple IPv6 flows for Kerberos on TCP and UDP port 88 (hex value 58).

The Kerberos packets on UDP port 88 are sent to addresses within the 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 address block that is used by affected devices. The packets in the UDP flows may be spoofed and could indicate an attempt to exploit this vulnerability. Administrators are advised to compare these flows to baseline utilization for Kerberos traffic on UDP port 58 and also investigate the flows to determine whether they are sourced from untrusted hosts.

As shown in the following example, to view only the Kerberos packets on TCP port 88 (hex value 58), use the [ show ipv6 flow cache | include SrcIf|_06_.*0058_ command to display the related Cisco NetFlow records:

TCP Flows

router#show ipv6 flow cache | include SrcIf|_06_.*0058
SrcAddress        InpIf    DstAddress         OutIf    Prot SrcPrt DstPrt Packets
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::102 Gi0/1    0x06 0x160A 0x0058 1597
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::102 Gi0/1    0x16 0x1634 0x0058 1292
router#

As shown in the following example, to view only the Kerberos packets on UDP port 88 (hex value 58), use the [ show ipv6 flow cache | include SrcIf|_11_.*0058 command to display the related Cisco NetFlow records:

UDP Flows

router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_11_.*0058
SrcAddress        InpIf   DstAddress         OutIf    Prot SrcPrt DstPrt Packets
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0   2001:DB...28::102  Local    0x11 0x16C4 0x0058 1464
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0   2001:DB...128::102 Gi0/1    0x11 0x1610 0x0058 1001   
router#

Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow

Introduced in Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.2(31)SB2 and 12.4(9)T, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow improves original Cisco NetFlow by adding the capability to customize the traffic analysis parameters for the administrator's specific requirements. Original Cisco NetFlow uses a fixed seven tuples of IP information to identify a flow, whereas Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow allows the flow to be user defined. It facilitates the creation of more complex configurations for traffic analysis and data export by using reusable configuration components.

For MS12-069, administrators can configure Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of IPv4 traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerability described in this document that has a network attack vector. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit the vulnerability or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.

The following example output is from a Cisco IOS device that is running a version of Cisco IOS Software in the 15.1T train. Although the syntax will be almost identical for the 12.4T and 15.0 trains, it may vary slightly depending on the actual Cisco IOS release being used. In the following configuration, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will collect information on interface GigabitEthernet0/0 for incoming IPv4 flows based on source IPv4 address, as defined by the match ipv4 source address key field statement. Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will also include nonkey field information about source and destination IPv4 addresses, protocol, ports (if present), ingress and egress interfaces, and packets per flow.

!
!-- Configure key and nonkey fields
!-- in the user-defined flow record
!
flow record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4
 match ipv4 source address
 collect ipv4 protocol
 collect ipv4 destination address
 collect transport source-port
 collect transport destination-port
 collect interface input
 collect interface output
 collect counter packets
!
!-- Configure the flow monitor to
!-- reference the user-defined flow 
!-- record
!
flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4
 record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4
!
!-- Apply the flow monitor to the interface
!-- in the ingress direction
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
 ip flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 input

The Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow flow output is as follows:

router#show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table
  Cache type:                               Normal
  Cache size:                                 4096
  Current entries:                               6
  High Watermark:                                1

  Flows added:                                   9181
  Flows aged:                                    9175
    - Active timeout      (  1800 secs)          9000
    - Inactive timeout    (    15 secs)           175
    - Event aged                                    0
    - Watermark aged                                0
    - Emergency aged                                0

IPV4 SRC ADDR  ipv4 dst addr  trns src port trns dst port intf input intf output pkts ip prot
============== ============== ============= ============= ========== =========== ==== =======
192.168.10.201 192.168.60.102         1456            88      Gi0/0        Gi0/1 1128       6
 192.168.11.54 192.168.60.102          123            88      Gi0/0        Gi0/1 2212      17
192.168.150.60   10.89.16.226         2567           443      Gi0/0        Gi0/1   13       6
 192.168.13.97 192.168.60.102         3451            80      Gi0/0        Gi0/1    1       6
 192.168.10.17 192.168.60.102         4231            88      Gi0/0        Gi0/1  146      17
   10.88.226.1 192.168.202.22         2678           443      Gi0/0        Gi0/1  567       6
  10.89.16.226 192.168.150.60         3562            80      Gi0/0        Gi0/1  312       6

To only view the Kerberos packets on TCP and UDP port 88, use the show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table | include IPV4 DST ADDR |_88_.*_(6|17)_ command to display the related NetFlow records.

For more information about Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow, refer to Flexible Netflow Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS Release 15.1M&T and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow Configuration Guide, Release 12.4T.

Identification: IPv6 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow

For MS12-069, administrators can configure Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of IPv6 traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerability described in this document that has a network attack vector. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit the vulnerability or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.

The following example output is from a Cisco IOS device that is running a version of Cisco IOS Software in the 15.1T train. Although the syntax will be almost identical for the 12.4T and 15.0 trains, it may vary slightly depending on the actual Cisco IOS release being used. In the following configuration, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will collect information on interface GigabitEthernet0/0 for incoming IPv6 flows based on the source IPv6 address, as defined by the match ipv6 source address key field statement. Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will also include nonkey field information about source and destination IPv6 addresses, protocol, ports (if present), ingress and egress interfaces, and packets per flow.

!
!-- Configure key and nonkey fields
!-- in the user-defined flow record
!
flow record FLOW-RECORD-ipv6
 match ipv6 source address
 collect ipv6 protocol
 collect ipv6 destination address
 collect transport source-port
 collect transport destination-port
 collect interface input
 collect interface output
 collect counter packets
!
!-- Configure the flow monitor to
!-- reference the user-defined flow 
!-- record
!
flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6
 record FLOW-RECORD-ipv6
!
!-- Apply the flow monitor to the interface
!-- in the ingress direction
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
  ipv6 flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 input

The Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow flow output is as follows:

router#show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 cache format table
  Cache type:                               Normal
  Cache size:                                 4096
  Current entries:                               6
  High Watermark:                                2

  Flows added:                                   539
  Flows aged:                                    532
    - Active timeout      (  1800 secs)          350
    - Inactive timeout    (    15 secs)          182
    - Event aged                                   0
    - Watermark aged                               0
    - Emergency aged                               0

IPV6 SRC ADDR     ipv6 dst addr     trns src port trns dst port intf input intf output pkts ip prot
================= ================= ============= ============= ========== =========== ==== =======
2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20           123           123      Gi0/0       Gi0/0   17      17
2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::102         1265            88      Gi0/0       Gi0/0 1237       6
2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::102         1441            88      Gi0/0       Gi0/0 2346       6
2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::102         1890            80      Gi0/0       Gi0/0 5009      17
2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20          3012            53      Gi0/0       Gi0/0 1016      17

To permit display of the full 128-bit IPv6 address, use the terminal width 132 exec mode command.

To view only the Kerberos on TCP and UDP port 88, use the show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 cache format table | include IPV6 DST ADDR|_88_.*_(6|17)_ command to display the related Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow records.

Cisco Intrusion Prevention System

Mitigation: Cisco IPS Signature Event Actions

Administrators can use the Cisco IPS appliances and services modules to provide threat detection and help prevent attempts to exploit several of the vulnerabilities described in this document. The following table provides an overview of CVE identifiers and the respective Cisco IPS signatures that will trigger events on potential attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities.

CVE ID	Signature Release	Signature ID	Signature Name	Enabled	Severity	Fidelity*
CVE-2012-0182	S673	1501/0	Microsoft Word PAPX Section Processing Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability	Yes	High	90
CVE-2012-0182	S673	1501/1	Microsoft Word PAPX Section Processing Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability	Yes	High	90
CVE-2012-2528	S673	1495/0	Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution	Yes	High	85
CVE-2012-2550	S673	1496/0	Microsoft Works 9 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability	Yes	High	90
CVE-2012-2552	S673	1498/0	Microsoft SQL Server Report Manager Reflected Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability	Yes	High	90

* Fidelity is also referred to as Signature Fidelity Rating (SFR) and is the relative measure of the accuracy of the signature (predefined). The value ranges from 0 through 100 and is set by Cisco Systems, Inc.

Administrators can configure Cisco IPS sensors to perform an event action when an attack is detected. The configured event action performs preventive or deterrent controls to help protect against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities listed in the preceding table.

Exploits that use spoofed IP addresses may cause a configured event action to inadvertently deny traffic from trusted sources.

Cisco IPS sensors are most effective when deployed in inline protection mode combined with the use of an event action. Automatic Threat Prevention for Cisco IPS 7.x and 6.x sensors that are deployed in inline protection mode provides threat prevention against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerability that is described in this document. Threat prevention is achieved through a default override that performs an event action for triggered signatures with a riskRatingValue greater than 90.

For additional information about the risk rating and threat rating calculation, reference Risk Rating and Threat Rating: Simplify IPS Policy Management.

Cisco IPS Signature Event Data

The following data has been compiled through remote monitoring services provided by the Cisco Remote Management Services team from a sample group of Cisco IPS sensors running Cisco IPS Signature Update version S673 or greater. The purpose of this data is to provide visibility into attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities released as part of the Microsoft October Security Update released on October 9, 2012. This data was gathered from events triggered on October 23, 2012.

CVE ID	Signature ID	Percentage of Sensors Reporting the Signature	Percentage of Sensors Reporting the Signature Among Top Ten Most-Seen Events
CVE-2012-0182	1501/0	0	0
CVE-2012-0182	1501/1	0	0
CVE-2012-2528	1495/0	0	0
CVE-2012-2550	1496/0	0	0
CVE-2012-2552	1498/0	0	0

Cisco Security Manager

Identification: Cisco Security Manager

Cisco Security Manager, Event Viewer

Beginning in software version 4.0, Cisco Security Manager can collect syslogs from Cisco firewalls and Cisco IPS devices and provides the Event Viewer, which can query for events that are related to the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.

Using the IPS Alert Events predefined view in the Event Viewer, the user can enter the search string

1501/0
1501/1
1495/0
1496/0
1498/0

in the event filter to return all captured events related to the Cisco IPS signature.

For more information about Cisco Security Manager Events, refer to the Filtering and Querying Events section of the Cisco Security Manager User Guide.

Cisco Security Manager Report Manager

Beginning in software version 4.1, Cisco Security Manager supports the Report Manager, the Cisco IPS event reporting feature. This feature allows an administrator to define reports based on Cisco IPS events of interest. Reports can be scheduled or users can run ad hoc reports as required.

Using the Report Manager, the user can define an IPS Top Signatures report for Cisco IPS devices of interest based on time-range and signature characteristics. When the Signature ID is set to

1501/0
1501/1
1495/0
1496/0
1498/0

Cisco Security Manager will generate a comprehensive report that ranks the count of the alerts fired for the signature of interest compared to the total sum of all signature alerts shown in the report.

For more information about Cisco Security Manager IPS Event Reporting refer to the Understanding IPS Top Reports section of the Cisco Security Manager User Guide.

Identification: Event Management System Partner Events

Cisco works with industry-leading Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) companies through the Cisco Developer Network. This partnership helps Cisco deliver validated and tested SIEM systems that address business concerns such as long-term log archiving and forensics, heterogeneous event correlation, and advanced compliance reporting. Security Information and Event Management partner products can be leveraged to collect events from Cisco devices and then query the collected events for the incidents created by a Cisco IPS signature or deny syslog messages from firewalls that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. The queries can be made by Sig ID and Syslog ID as shown in the following list:

1501/0 Microsoft Word PAPX Section Processing Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability
1501/1 Microsoft Word PAPX Section Processing Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability
1495/0 Microsoft Word Remote Code Execution
1496/0 Microsoft Works 9 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
1498/0 Microsoft SQL Server Report Manager Reflected Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability

For more information about SIEM partners, refer to the Security Management System website.

Additional Information

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

Related to This Bulletin

Microsoft Windows Kernel win32k.sys Driver Integer Overflow Vulnerability

Multiple Microsoft Products HTML Processing Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

Microsoft Word PAPX Section Processing Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability

Microsoft Word RTF File listid Use-After-Free Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

Microsoft Windows Kerberos Session Handling NULL Pointer Dereference Denial of Service Vulnerability

Microsoft Works DOC Heap Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

Microsoft SQL Server Report Manager Reflected Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability

Revision History

Version	Description	Date
3	IPS signature event data from Cisco Remote Management Services is available for IPS signatures from October 23, 2012.	2012-October-25 20:07 GMT
2	IPS signature event data from Cisco Remote Management Services is available for IPS signatures from October 16, 2012.	2012-October-17 16:48 GMT
1	This initial version of the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin addresses the Microsoft Security Bulletin Release for October 2012.	2012-October-09 17:42 GMT

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Cisco Security Procedures

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.

Related Information

Affected Products

The security vulnerability applies to the following combinations of products.

Primary Products
Microsoft, Inc.	Groove Server	2010 (Base, SP1)
	InfoPath	2007 (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3) \| 2010 (32-bit) (Base, SP1) \| 2010 (64-bit) (Base, SP1)
	Microsoft Office Communicator	2007 R2 (Base)
	Microsoft Office Compatibility Pack for Word, Excel, and PowerPoint 2007 File Formats	Original Release (SP2, SP3)
	Microsoft SQL Server Express Edition with Advanced Services	2005 (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3, SP4)
	Microsoft Works	9.0 (Base)
	Office SharePoint Server	2007 (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3) \| 2007 x64 Edition (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3) \| 2010 (Base, SP1)
	SQL Server	2005 (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3, SP4) \| 2005 (Itanium) (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3, SP4) \| 2005 (x64) (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3, SP4) \| 2008 (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3) \| 2008 (Itanium) (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3) \| 2008 (x64) (Base, SP1, SP2, SP3) \| 2008 R2 (Base, SP1) \| 2008 R2 (Itanium) (Base, SP1) \| 2008 R2 (x64) (Base, SP1) \| 2012 (Base) \| 2012 (x64) (Base)
	SQL Server Reporting Services (SSRS)	2000 (Base, SP1, SP2)
	Windows 7	for 32-bit systems (Base, SP1) \| for x64-based systems (Base, SP1)
	Windows Server 2003	Datacenter Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Datacenter Edition, 64-bit (Itanium) (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Datacenter Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Enterprise Edition (SP1, SP2) \| Enterprise Edition, 64-bit (Itanium) (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Enterprise Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Standard Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Standard Edition, 64-bit (Itanium) (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Standard Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Web Edition (Base, SP1, SP2)
	Windows Server 2008	Datacenter Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Datacenter Edition, 64-bit (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Itanium-Based Systems Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Enterprise Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Enterprise Edition, 64-bit (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Essential Business Server Standard (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Essential Business Server Premium (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Essential Business Server Premium, 64-bit (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Standard Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Standard Edition, 64-bit (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Web Server (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Web Server, 64-bit (Base, SP1, SP2)
	Windows Server 2008 R2	x64-Based Systems Edition (Base, SP1) \| Itanium-Based Systems Edition (Base, SP1)
	Windows SharePoint Services	3.0 (Base, SP1, SP2)
	Windows Vista	Home Basic (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Home Premium (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Business (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Enterprise (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Ultimate (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Home Basic x64 Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Home Premium x64 Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Business x64 Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Enterprise x64 Edition (Base, SP1, SP2) \| Ultimate x64 Edition (Base, SP1, SP2)
	Word	2003 (SP3) \| 2007 (SP2, SP3) \| 2010 (32-bit Edition, 64-bit Edition)
	Word Viewer	2007 (Base)
	SharePoint Foundation	2010 (Base, SP1)
	Office Web Apps	2010 (Base, SP1)
	Lync	2010 (Base)
	Lync Attendee	2010 (Base)
	Word Automation Services	2010 (Base)

Associated Products
Cisco	Cisco Broadband Troubleshooter	Original Release (Base) \| 3.1 (Base) \| 3.2 (Base)
	Cisco Building Broadband Service Manager (BBSM)	Original Release (Base) \| 2.5 (.1) \| 3.0 (Base) \| 4.0 (Base, .1) \| 4.2 (Base) \| 4.3 (Base) \| 4.4 (Base) \| 4.5 (Base) \| 5.0 (Base) \| 5.1 (Base) \| 5.2 (Base)
	Cisco CNS Network Registrar	2.5 (Base) \| 3.0 (Base) \| 3.5 (Base, .1) \| 5.0 (Base) \| 5.5 (Base, .13) \| 6.0 (.5, .5.2, .5.3, .5.4) \| 6.1 (Base, .1, .1.1, .1.2, .1.3, .1.4)
	Cisco Collaboration Server Dynamic Content Adapter (DCA)	Original Release (Base) \| 1.0 (Base) \| 2.0 (Base, (1)_SR2)
	Cisco Computer Telephony Integration (CTI) Option	4.7 ((0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4) \| 5.1 ((0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3) \| 6.0 ((0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4, (0)_SR5) \| 7.0 ((0)_SR1, (0)_SR2) \| 7.1 ((2), (3), (4), (5))
	Cisco Conference Connection	1.1 ((3), (3)spA) \| 1.2 (Base, (1), (2), (2)SR1, (2)SR2)
	Cisco E-mail Manager	Original Release (Base) \| 4.0 (Base, .5i, .6) \| 5.0 (Base, (0)_SR1, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4, (0)_SR5, (0)_SR6, (0)_SR7)
	Cisco Emergency Responder	1.1 (Base, (3), (4)) \| 1.2 (Base, (1), (1)SR1, (2), (2)sr1, (3)a, (3)SR1, (3a)SR2) \| 1.3 (Base, (1a), (2))
	Cisco Intelligent Contact Manager (ICM)	Original Release (Base) \| 4.6 ((2)_SR1, (2)_SR2, (2)_SR3, (2)_SR4, (2)_SR5, (2)_SR6) \| 5.0 ((0), (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4, (0)_SR5, (0)_SR7, (0)_SR8, (0)_SR9, (0)_SR10, (0)_SR11, (0)_SR12, (0)_SR13) \| 6.0 ((0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4, (0)_SR5, (0)_SR6, (0)_SR7, (0)_SR8, (0)_SR9, (0)_SR10) \| 7.0 ((0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4) \| 7.1 ((2), (3), (4), (5))
	Cisco Unified Contact Center	Enterprise Edition (Base, 4.6.2, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 7.1, 7.1.1, 7.1.3) \| Express Edition (Base, 2.0, 2.0.2, 2.1, 2.1.1a, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3b, 2.2.3b_spE, 3.0, 3.0.2, 3.0.3a_spA, 3.0.3a_spB, 3.0.3a_spC, 3.0.3a_spD, 3.1, 3.1(1)_SR1, 3.1(1)_SR2, 3.1(2)_SR1, 3.1(2)_SR2, 3.1(2)_SR3, 3.1(2)_SR4, 3.1(3)_SR2, 3.1(3)_SR3, 3.1(3)_SR4, 3.1(3)_SR5, 3.5, 3.5.1, 3.5(1)_SR1, 3.5(2)_SR1, 3.5(3), 3.5(3)_SR1, 3.5(3)_SR2, 3.5(3)_SR3, 3.5(4)_SR1, 3.5(4)_SR2, 4.0, 4.0(1)_SR1, 4.0(4)_SR1, 4.0(5)_SR1, 4.1, 4.1(1)_SR1, 4.5, 4.5(2)_SR1, 4.5(2)_SR2, 5.0(1)_SR1) \| Hosted Edition (Base, 4.6.2, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 7.1, 7.1.1, 7.1.3)
	Cisco Unified IP IVR	2.0 (.2) \| 2.1 (.1a, .2, .3) \| 2.2 ((5), .1, .2, .3b, .3b_spE, .5, .4) \| 3.0 (.1_spB, .2, .3a_spA, .3a_spB, .3a_spC, .3a_spD) \| 3.1 ((1)_SR2, (2)_SR1, (2)_SR2, (2)_SR3, (3)_SR1, (3)_SR2, (3)_SR3, (3)_SR4, (3)_SR5) \| 3.5 ((1)_SR1, (1)_SR2, (1)_SR3, (2)_SR1, (3)_SR1, (3)_SR2, (3)_SR3, (4)_SR1, (4)_SR2, .1, .3) \| 4.0 ((1)_SR1, (4)_SR1) \| 4.1 ((1)_SR1) \| 4.5 ((2)_SR1, (2)_SR2) \| 5.0 ((1)_SR1)
	Cisco IP Interoperability and Collaboration System (IPICS)	1.0 ((1.1))
	Cisco IP Queue Manager	2.2 (Base)
	Cisco IP/VC 3540 Application Server Module	3.2 (.0.1, .138) \| 3.5 (.0.8)
	Cisco IP/VC 3540 Rate Matching Module	3.0 (.9)
	Cisco Media Blender	Original Release (Base) \| 3.0 (Base) \| 4.0 (Base) \| 5.0 (Base, (0)_SR1, (0)_SR2)
	Cisco Networking Services for Active Directory	Original Release (Base)
	Cisco Outbound Option	Original Release (Base)
	Cisco Personal Assistant	1.0 (Base, (1)) \| 1.1 (Base) \| 1.3 (Base, .1, .2, .3, .4) \| 1.4 (Base, .2, .3, .4, .5, .6)
	Cisco Remote Monitoring Suite Option	1.0 (Base) \| 2.0 (Base, (0)_SR1)
	Cisco Secure Access Control Server (ACS) for Windows	2.6 (Base) \| 2.6.3.2 (Base) \| 2.6.4 (Base) \| 2.6.4.4 (Base) \| 3.0 (Base) \| 3.0.1 (Base) \| 3.0.1.40 (Base) \| 3.0.2 (Base) \| 3.0.3 (Base) \| 3.0.3.6 (Base) \| 3.0.4 (Base) \| 3.1.1 (Base) \| 3.1.1.27 (Base) \| 3.1.2 (Base) \| 3.2 (Base) \| 3.2.1 (Base) \| 3.2.3 (Base) \| 3.3.1 (Base) \| 3.3.2.2 (Base) \| 3.3.1.16 (Base) \| 3.3.3.11 (Base) \| 4.0 (Base) \| 4.0.1 (Base) \| 4.0.1.27 (Base) \| 4.1.1.23 (Base)
	Cisco Secure Access Control Server Solution Engine (ACSE)	3.1 (Base, .1) \| 3.2 (Base, .1.20, .2.5, .3) \| 3.3 (Base, .1, .1.16, .2.2, .3, .4, .4.12) \| 4.0 (Base, .1, .1.42, .1.44, .1.49) \| 4.1 (Base, .1.23, .1.23.3, .3, .3.12)
	Cisco Secure User Registration Tool (URT)	Original Release (Base) \| 1.2 (Base, .1) \| 2.0 (Base, .7, .8) \| 2.5 (Base, .1, .2, .3, .4, .5)
	Cisco SN 5420 Storage Router	1.1 (Base, .3, .4, .5, .7, .8) \| 2.1 (.1, .2)
	Cisco SN 5428-2 Storage Router	3.2 (.1, .2) \| 3.3 (.1, .2) \| 3.4 (.1) \| 3.5 (Base, .1, .2, .3, .4)
	Cisco Trailhead	Original Release (Base) \| 4.0 (Base)
	Cisco Unified Communications Manager	Original Release (Base) \| 1.0 (Base) \| 2.0 (Base) \| 3.0 (Base) \| 3.0.3(a) (Base) \| 3.1 (Base, .1, .2, .3a) \| 3.1(1) (Base) \| 3.1(2) (Base) \| 3.1(2)SR3 (Base) \| 3.1(3) (Base) \| 3.1(3)SR2 (Base) \| 3.1(3)SR4 (Base) \| 3.2 (Base) \| 3.2(3)SR3 (Base) \| 3.3 (Base) \| 3.3(2)SPc (Base) \| 3.3(3) (Base) \| 3.3(3)ES61 (Base) \| 3.3(3)SR3 (Base) \| 3.3(3)SR4a (Base) \| 3.3(3a) (Base) \| 3.3(4) (Base) \| 3.3(4)ES25 (Base) \| 3.3(4)SR2 (Base) \| 3.3(4c) (Base) \| 3.3(5) (Base) \| 3.3(5)ES24 (Base) \| 3.3(5)SR1 (Base) \| 3.3(5)SR1a (Base) \| 3.3(5)SR2 (Base) \| 3.3(5)SR2a (Base) \| 3.3(5)SR3 (Base) \| 3.3(59) (Base) \| 3.3(61) (Base) \| 3.3(63) (Base) \| 3.3(64) (Base) \| 3.3(65) (Base) \| 3.3(66) (Base) \| 3.3(67.5) (Base) \| 3.3(68.1) (Base) \| 3.3(71.0) (Base) \| 3.3(74.0) (Base) \| 3.3(78) (Base) \| 3.3(76) (Base) \| 4.0 (.1, .2) \| 4.0(2a)ES40 (Base) \| 4.0(2a)ES56 (Base) \| 4.0(2a)SR2b (Base) \| 4.0(2a)SR2c (Base) \| 4.1 (Base) \| 4.1(2) (Base) \| 4.1(2)ES33 (Base) \| 4.1(2)ES50 (Base) \| 4.1(2)SR1 (Base) \| 4.1(3) (Base) \| 4.1(3)ES (Base) \| 4.1(3)ES07 (Base) \| 4.1(3)ES24 (Base) \| 4.1(3)SR (Base) \| 4.1(3)SR1 (Base) \| 4.1(3)SR2 (Base) \| 4.1(3)SR3 (Base) \| 4.1(3)SR3b (Base) \| 4.1(3)SR3c (Base) \| 4.1(3)SR4 (Base) \| 4.1(3)SR4b (Base) \| 4.1(3)SR4d (Base) \| 4.1(3)SR5 (Base) \| 4.1(4) (Base) \| 4.1(9) (Base) \| 4.1(17) (Base) \| 4.1(19) (Base) \| 4.1(22) (Base) \| 4.1(23) (Base) \| 4.1(25) (Base) \| 4.1(26) (Base) \| 4.1(27.7) (Base) \| 4.1(28.2) (Base) \| 4.1(30.4) (Base) \| 4.1(36) (Base) \| 4.1(39) (Base) \| 4.2(1) (Base) \| 4.2(1)SR1b (Base) \| 4.2(1.02) (Base) \| 4.2(1.05.3) (Base) \| 4.2(1.06) (Base) \| 4.2(1.07) (Base) \| 4.2(3) (Base) \| 4.2(3)SR1 (Base) \| 4.2(3)SR2 (Base) \| 4.2(3.08) (Base) \| 4.2(3.2.3) (Base) \| 4.2(3.3) (Base) \| 4.2(3.13) (Base) \| 4.3(1) (Base) \| 4.3(1)SR (Base) \| 4.3(1.57) (Base)
	Cisco Unified Customer Voice Portal (CVP)	3.0 ((0), (0)SR1, (0)SR2) \| 3.1 ((0), (0)SR1, (0)SR2) \| 4.0 ((0), (1), (1)SR1, (2))
	Cisco Unified MeetingPlace	4.3 (Base) \| 5.3 (Base) \| 5.2 (Base) \| 5.4 (Base) \| 6.0 (Base)
	Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Express	1.1 (Base) \| 1.2 (Base) \| 2.0 (Base)
	Cisco Unity	Original Release (Base) \| 2.0 (Base) \| 2.1 (Base) \| 2.2 (Base) \| 2.3 (Base) \| 2.4 (Base) \| 2.46 (Base) \| 3.0 (Base, .1) \| 3.1 (Base, .2, .3, .5, .6) \| 3.2 (Base) \| 3.3 (Base) \| 4.0 (Base, .1, .2, .3, .3b, .4, .5) \| 4.1 (Base, .1) \| 4.2 (Base, .1, .1 ES27) \| 5.0 ((1)) \| 7.0 ((2))
	Cisco Unity Express	1.0.2 (Base) \| 1.1.1 (Base) \| 1.1.2 (Base) \| 2.0.1 (Base) \| 2.0.2 (Base) \| 2.1.1 (Base) \| 2.1.2 (Base) \| 2.1.3 (Base) \| 2.2.0 (Base) \| 2.2.1 (Base) \| 2.2.2 (Base) \| 2.3.0 (Base) \| 2.3.1 (Base)
	Cisco Wireless Control System (WCS) Software	1.0 (Base) \| 2.0 (Base, 44.14, 44.24) \| 2.2 (.0, .111.0) \| 3.0 (Base, .101.0, .105.0) \| 3.1 (Base, .20.0, .33.0, .35.0) \| 3.2 (Base, .23.0, .25.0, .40.0, .51.0, .64.0) \| 4.0 (Base, .1.0, .43.0, .66.0, .81.0, .87.0, .96.0, .97.0) \| 4.1 (Base, .83.0)
	CiscoWorks IP Telephony Environment Monitor (ITEM)	1.3 (Base) \| 1.4 (Base) \| 2.0 (Base)
	CiscoWorks LAN Management Solution (LMS)	1.3 (Base) \| 2.2 (Base) \| 2.5 (Base) \| 2.6 (Base)
	CiscoWorks QoS Policy Manager (QPM)	2.0 (Base, .1, .2, .3) \| 2.1 (.2) \| 3.0 (Base, .1) \| 3.1 (Base) \| 3.2 (Base, .1, .2, .3)
	CiscoWorks Routed WAN Management Solution (RWAN)	1.0 (Base) \| 1.1 (Base) \| 1.2 (Base) \| 1.3 (Base, .1)
	CiscoWorks Small Network Management Solution (SNMS)	1.0 (Base) \| 1.5 (Base)
	CiscoWorks VPN/Security Management Solution (VMS)	1.0 (Base) \| 2.0 (Base) \| 2.1 (Base) \| 2.2 (Base) \| 2.3 (Base)
	Cisco Collaboration Server	3.0 (Base) \| 3.01 (Base) \| 3.02 (Base) \| 4.0 (Base) \| 5.0 (Base)
	Cisco DOCSIS CPE Configurator	1.0 (Base) \| 1.1 (Base) \| 2.0 (Base)
	Cisco Unified IP Interactive Voice Response (IVR)	2.0 (Base) \| 2.1 (Base)
	Cisco Service Control Engine (SCE)	3.0 (Base) \| 3.1 (Base)
	Cisco Transport Manager	Original Release (Base) \| 2.0 (Base) \| 2.1 (Base) \| 2.2 (Base, .1) \| 3.0 (Base, .1, .2) \| 3.1 (Base) \| 3.2 (Base) \| 4.0 (Base) \| 4.1 (Base, .4, .6, .6.6.1) \| 4.6 (Base) \| 4.7 (Base) \| 5.0 (Base, .0.867.2, .1.873.2, .2, .2.92.1, .2.99.1, .2.105.1, .2.110.1) \| 6.0 (Base, .0.405.1, .0.407.1, .0.412.1) \| 7.0 (Base, .0.370.1, .0.372.1, .0.377.1, .0.389.1, .0.400.1, .395.1) \| 7.2 (Base, .0.199.1)
Microsoft, Inc.	Office SharePoint Server	2010

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