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Updated:August 6, 2016

Document ID:1470489971822200

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Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin

Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager Remote Command Execution Vulnerability

Doc ID:

27268

First Published:

2012 October 31 16:03 GMT

Version:

CVE-2012-5417

Cisco Response

Cisco Response

This Applied Mitigation Bulletin is a companion document to the PSIRT Security Advisory Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager Remote Command Execution Vulnerability and provides identification and mitigation techniques that administrators can deploy on Cisco network devices.

Vulnerability Characteristics

The Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager contains a vulnerability when it processes JBoss Application Server Remote Method Invocation (RMI) services packets. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and without end-user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow arbitrary code execution. The attack vector for exploitation is through Java RMI services over IPv4 and IPv6 packets using TCP ports 1099 and 9099.

This vulnerability has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2012-5417.

Vulnerability Overview

Information about vulnerable, unaffected, and fixed software is available in the Cisco Security Advisory, which is available at the following link: https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20121031-dcnm.

Mitigation Technique Overview

Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for this vulnerability. Administrators are advised to consider these protection methods to be general security best practices for affected devices and the traffic that transits the network. This section of the document provides an overview of these techniques.

Cisco IOS Software can provide effective means of exploit prevention using transit Access Control Lists (tACLs). This protection mechanism filters and drops packets that are attempting to exploit this vulnerability.

Effective exploit prevention can also be provided by the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module (ASASM), and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers using tACLs. This protection mechanism filters and drops packets that are attempting to exploit this vulnerability.

Cisco IOS Software, Cisco ASA, Cisco ASASM, Cisco FWSM firewalls, and Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module can provide visibility through syslog messages and counter values displayed in the output from show commands.

The Cisco Security Manager can also provide visibility through incidents, queries, and event reporting.

Risk Management

Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluation and mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of this vulnerability. Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely to be successful. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams. Risk Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk Triage and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security evaluation and response processes.

Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification

Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification

Caution:The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change, evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.

Specific information about mitigation and identification is available for these devices:
Cisco IOS Routers and Switches

Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists

To protect affected devices and minimize the risk, impact, and effectiveness of direct infrastructure attacks, administrators are advised to deploy transit access control lists (tACLs) to perform policy enforcement of traffic sent to infrastructure equipment. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic sent to affected devices in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. For the maximum protection of affected devices, deployed tACLs should be applied in the ingress direction on all interfaces to which an IP address has been configured. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability when the attack originates from a trusted source address.

The tACL policy denies unauthorized Java RMI services over IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP ports 1099 and 9099 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 and 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 are considered trusted sources that require access to the affected devices, and the hosts at 192.168.100.1 and 2001:DB8::100:1 represent the IP address space that is used by the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.

Additional information about tACLs is in Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists.
```
ip access-list extended Transit-ACL-Policy
  !
  !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources 
  !-- that require access on the vulnerable protocols and ports
  !
  permit tcp 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 host 192.168.100.1 eq 1099
  permit tcp 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 host 192.168.100.1 eq 9099
  !
  !-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
  !-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks
  !
  deny tcp any host 192.168.100.1 eq 1099
  deny tcp any host 192.168.100.1 eq 9099
  !
  !--  Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
  !--  with existing security policies and configurations
  !
  !--  Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
  !
  deny ip any any  
!
!-- Create the corresponding IPv6 tACL 
!
ipv6  access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy
  !
  !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources 
  !-- that require access on the vulnerable protocols and ports
  !
  permit tcp 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 1099
  permit tcp 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 9099
  !
  !-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
  !-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks to global and
  !-- link-local addresses
  !
  deny tcp any host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 1099
  deny tcp any host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 9099
  !
  !-- Permit other required traffic to the infrastructure address
  !-- range and allow IPv6 neighbor discovery packets, which
  !-- include neighbor solicitation packets and neighbor
  !-- advertisement packets
  !
  permit icmp any any nd-ns
  permit icmp any any nd-na
  !
  !--  Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
  !--  with existing security policies and configurations
  !
  !--  Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
  !
  deny ipv6 any any
  !
  !-- Apply tACLs to interfaces in the ingress direction 
  !
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
 ip access-group Transit-ACL-Policy in
 ipv6 traffic-filter IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy in
```
Note that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the transmission of ICMP unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered traffic. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of increasing CPU utilization on the device. In Cisco IOS Software, ICMP unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by default. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the interface configuration commands no ip unreachables and no ipv6 unreachables. ICMP unreachable rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration commands ip icmp rate-limit unreachable interval-in-ms and ipv6 icmp error-interval interval-in-ms.

Identification: Transit Access Control Lists

After the administrator applies the tACL to an interface, the show ip access-lists and show ipv6 access-list commands will identify the number of Java RMI services over IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP ports 1099 and 9099 that have been filtered on interfaces on which the tACL is applied. Administrators should investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Example output for show ip access-lists Transit-ACL-Policy and show ipv6 access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy follows:
```
router#show ip access-lists Transit-ACL-Policy
Extended IP access list Transit-ACL-Policy
    10 permit tcp 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 host 192.168.100.1 eq 1099 (60 matches)
    20 permit tcp 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 host 192.168.100.1 eq 9099 (41 matches)
    30 deny tcp any host 192.168.100.1 eq 1099 (9 matches)
    40 deny tcp any host 192.168.100.1 eq 9099 (18 matches)
    50 deny ip any any (17 matches)
router#
```
In the preceding example, access list Transit-ACL-Policy has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:
- 9 Java RMI services packets on TCP port 1099 for ACE line 30
- 18 Java RMI services packets on TCP port 9099 for ACE line 40
```
router#show ipv6 access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy 
IPv6 access list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy
    permit tcp 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 1099 (71 matches) sequence 10
    permit tcp 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 9099 (85 matches) sequence 20
    deny tcp any host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 1099 (58 matches) sequence 30
    deny tcp any host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 9099 (81 matches) sequence 40
    permit icmp any any nd-ns (80 matches) sequence 50
    permit icmp any any nd-na (80 matches) sequence 60
    deny ipv6 any any sequence 70
```
In the preceding example, access list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy has dropped the following:
- 58 Java RMI services packets on TCP port 1099 for ACE line 30
- 81 Java RMI services packets on TCP port 9099 for ACE line 40
For additional information about investigating incidents using ACE counters and syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Cisco Security white paper.

Administrators can use Embedded Event Manager to provide instrumentation when specific conditions are met, such as ACE counter hits. The Cisco Security white paper Embedded Event Manager in a Security Context provides additional details about how to use this feature.

Identification: Access List Logging

The log and log-input access control list (ACL) option will cause packets that match specific ACEs to be logged. The log-input option enables logging of the ingress interface in addition to the packet source and destination IP addresses and ports.

Caution: Access control list logging can be very CPU intensive and must be used with extreme caution. Factors that drive the CPU impact of ACL logging are log generation, log transmission, and process switching to forward packets that match log-enabled ACEs.

For Cisco IOS Software, the ip access-list logging interval interval-in-ms command can limit the effects of process switching induced by IPv4 ACL logging. The logging rate-limit rate-per-second [except loglevel] command limits the impact of log generation and transmission.

The CPU impact from ACL logging can be addressed in hardware on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers with Supervisor Engine 720 or Supervisor Engine 32 using optimized ACL logging.

For additional information about the configuration and use of ACL logging, reference the Understanding Access Control List Logging Cisco Security white paper.

Cisco IOS NetFlow and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow

Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS NetFlow

Administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of IPv4 traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this vulnerability or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.
```
router#show ip cache flow
IP packet size distribution (90784136 total packets):
   1-32   64   96  128  160  192  224  256  288  320  352  384  416  448  480
   .000 .698 .011 .001 .004 .005 .000 .004 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000

    512  544  576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
   .000 .001 .256 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

IP Flow Switching Cache, 4456704 bytes
  1885 active, 63651 inactive, 59960004 added
  129803821 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
  Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
  Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds
IP Sub Flow Cache, 402056 bytes
  0 active, 16384 inactive, 0 added, 0 added to flow
  0 alloc failures, 0 force free
  1 chunk, 1 chunk added
  last clearing of statistics never
Protocol         Total    Flows   Packets Bytes  Packets Active(Sec) Idle(Sec)
--------         Flows     /Sec     /Flow  /Pkt     /Sec     /Flow     /Flow
TCP-Telnet    11393421      2.8         1    48      3.1       0.0       1.4
TCP-FTP            236      0.0        12    66      0.0       1.8       4.8
TCP-FTPD            21      0.0     13726  1294      0.0      18.4       4.1
TCP-WWW          22282      0.0        21  1020      0.1       4.1       7.3
TCP-X              719      0.0         1    40      0.0       0.0       1.3
TCP-BGP              1      0.0         1    40      0.0       0.0      15.0
TCP-Frag         70399      0.0         1   688      0.0       0.0      22.7
TCP-other     47861004     11.8         1   211     18.9       0.0       1.3
UDP-DNS            582      0.0         4    73      0.0       3.4      15.4
UDP-NTP         287252      0.0         1    76      0.0       0.0      15.5
UDP-other       310347      0.0         2   230      0.1       0.6      15.9
ICMP             11674      0.0         3    61      0.0      19.8      15.5
IPv6INIP            15      0.0         1  1132      0.0       0.0      15.4
GRE                  4      0.0         1    48      0.0       0.0      15.3 
Total:        59957957     14.8         1   196     22.5       0.0       1.5

SrcIf         SrcIPaddress    DstIf         DstIPaddress    Pr SrcP DstP  Pkts
Gi0/0         192.168.10.201  Gi0/1         192.168.100.1   06 1984 044B     1
Gi0/0         192.168.11.54   Gi0/1         192.168.100.1   06 2911 238B     3
Gi0/1         192.168.150.60  Gi0/0         10.89.16.226    06 0016 12CA     1
router#
```
In the preceding example, there are multiple flows for Java RMI services packets on TCP ports 1099 (hex value 044B) and 9099 (hex value 238B).

As shown in the following example, to view only the Java RMI services packets on TCP ports 1099 (hex value 044B) and 9099 (hex value 238B), use the show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*(044B|238B)_ command to display the related Cisco NetFlow records:
TCP Flows
```
router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*(044B|238B)_
SrcIf         SrcIPaddress     DstIf         DstIPaddress    Pr SrcP DstP  Pkts
Gi0/0         192.168.10.201   Gi0/1         192.168.100.1   06 1984 044B     1
Gi0/0         192.168.11.54    Gi0/1         192.168.100.1   06 2911 238B     3
router#
```
Identification: IPv6 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS NetFlow

Administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of IPv6 traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerability that are described in this document. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this vulnerability or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.

The following output is from a Cisco IOS device running Cisco IOS Software 12.4 mainline train. The command syntax will vary for different Cisco IOS Software trains.
```
router#show ipv6 flow cache

IP packet size distribution (50078919 total packets):
   1-32  64   96  128  160  192  224  256  288  320  352  384  416  448  480
   .000 .990 .001 .008 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
```
```
    512  544  576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
   .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
```
```
IP Flow Switching Cache, 475168 bytes
  8 active, 4088 inactive, 6160 added
  1092984 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
  Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
  Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds
```
```
IP Sub Flow Cache, 33928 bytes
  16 active, 1008 inactive, 12320 added, 6160 added to flow
  0 alloc failures, 0 force free
  1 chunk, 1 chunk added
```
```
SrcAddress        InpIf    DstAddress       OutIf    Prot SrcPrt DstPrt Packets
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0   2001:DB8::100:1   Gi0/1    0x06 0x16C4 0x044B 1464
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0  2001:DB...28::21   Gi0/1    0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1191
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0   2001:DB8::100:1   Gi0/1    0x06 0x1610 0x238B 221 
```
To permit display of the full 128-bit IPv6 address, use the terminal width 132 exec mode command.

In the preceding example, there are multiple IPv6 flows for RMI Protocol paclets on TCP ports 1099 (hex value 044B) and 9099 (hex value 238B).

As shown in the following example, to view only the Java RMI services packets on TCP ports 1099 (hex value 044B) and 9099 (hex value 238B), use the show ipv6 flow cache | include SrcIf|_06_.*(044B|238B)_ command to display the related Cisco NetFlow records:

TCP Flows
```
router#show ipv6 flow cache | include SrcIf|_06_.*(044B|238B)_
SrcAddress        InpIf    DstAddress       OutIf    Prot SrcPrt DstPrt Packets
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0   2001:DB8::100:1   Gi0/1    0x06 0x16C4 0x044B 1464
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0   2001:DB8::100:1   Gi0/1    0x06 0x1610 0x238B 221 
router# 
```
Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco Flexible NetFlow

Introduced in Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.2(31)SB2 and 12.4(9)T, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow improves original Cisco NetFlow by adding the capability to customize the traffic analysis parameters for the administrator's specific requirements. Original Cisco NetFlow uses a fixed seven tuples of IP information to identify a flow, whereas Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow allows the flow to be user defined. It facilitates the creation of more complex configurations for traffic analysis and data export by using reusable configuration components.

The following example output is from a Cisco IOS device that is running a version of Cisco IOS Software in the 15.1T train. Although the syntax will be almost identical for the 12.4T and 15.0 trains, it may vary slightly depending on the actual Cisco IOS release being used. In the following configuration, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will collect information on interface GigabitEthernet0/0 for incoming IPv4 flows based on source IPv4 address, as defined by the match ipv4 source address key field statement. Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will also include nonkey field information about source and destination IPv4 addresses, protocol, ports (if present), ingress and egress interfaces, and packets per flow.
```
!
!-- Configure key and nonkey fields
!-- in the user-defined flow record
!
flow record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4
 match ipv4 source address
 collect ipv4 protocol
 collect ipv4 destination address
 collect transport source-port
 collect transport destination-port
 collect interface input
 collect interface output
 collect counter packets
!
!-- Configure the flow monitor to
!-- reference the user-defined flow 
!-- record
!
flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4
 record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4
!
!-- Apply the flow monitor to the interface
!-- in the ingress direction
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
 ip flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 input
```
The Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow flow output is as follows:
```
router#show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table
  Cache type:                               Normal
  Cache size:                                 4096
  Current entries:                               6
  High Watermark:                                1

  Flows added:                                   9181
  Flows aged:                                    9175
    - Active timeout      (  1800 secs)          9000
    - Inactive timeout    (    15 secs)           175
    - Event aged                                    0
    - Watermark aged                                0
    - Emergency aged                                0

IPV4 SRC ADDR    ipv4 dst addr    trns src port  trns dst port  intf input  intf output   pkts    ip prot
===============  ===============  =============  =============  ==========  ===========  =======  =======
 192.168.10.201    192.168.100.1           1456           1099       Gi0/0        Gi0/1     1128       6
 192.168.10.17     192.168.100.1           4231           9099       Gi0/0        Gi0/1      146       6
   10.88.226.1    192.168.202.22           2678            443       Gi0/0        Gi0/1    10567       6
```
To only view the Java RMI services packets on TCP ports 1099 and 9099, use the show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table | include IPV4 DST ADDR |_(1099|9099)_.*_6_ command to display the related NetFlow records.

For more information about Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow, refer to Flexible Netflow Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS Release 15.1M&T and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow Configuration Guide, Release 12.4T.

Identification: IPv6 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow
The following example output is from a Cisco IOS device that is running a version of Cisco IOS Software in the 15.1T train. Although the syntax will be almost identical for the 12.4T and 15.0 trains, it may vary slightly depending on the actual Cisco IOS release being used. In the following configuration, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will collect information on interface GigabitEthernet0/0 for incoming IPv6 flows based on the source IPv6 address, as defined by the match ipv6 source address key field statement. Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will also include nonkey field information about source and destination IPv6 addresses, protocol, ports (if present), ingress and egress interfaces, and packets per flow.
```
!
!-- Configure key and nonkey fields
!-- in the user-defined flow record
!
flow record FLOW-RECORD-ipv6
 match ipv6 source address
 collect ipv6 protocol
 collect ipv6 destination address
 collect transport source-port
 collect transport destination-port
 collect interface input
 collect interface output
 collect counter packets
!
!-- Configure the flow monitor to
!-- reference the user-defined flow 
!-- record
!
flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6
 record FLOW-RECORD-ipv6
!
!-- Apply the flow monitor to the interface
!-- in the ingress direction
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
  ipv6 flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 input
```
The Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow flow output is as follows:
```
router#show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 cache format table
  Cache type:                               Normal
  Cache size:                                 4096
  Current entries:                               6
  High Watermark:                                2

  Flows added:                                   539
  Flows aged:                                    532
    - Active timeout      (  1800 secs)          350
    - Inactive timeout    (    15 secs)          182
    - Event aged                                   0
    - Watermark aged                               0
    - Emergency aged                               0

IPV6 SRC ADDR       ipv6 dst addr       trns src port  trns dst port  intf input   intf output   pkts   ip prot
==================  ==================  =============  =============  ===========  ============  =====  =======
 2001:DB...06::201    2001:DB...28::20            123            123        Gi0/0        Gi0/0     17     17
 2001:DB...06::201     2001:DB8::100:1           1265           1099        Gi0/0     Gi0/1::1   1237      6
 2001:DB...06::201     2001:DB8::100:1           1441           9099        Gi0/0     Gi0/1::1   2346      6
```
To permit display of the full 128-bit IPv6 address, use the terminal width 132 exec mode command.

To view only the Java RMI services packets on TCP ports 1099 and 9099, use the show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 cache format table | include IPV6 DST ADDR|_(1099|9099)_.*_6_ command to display the related Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow records.

Cisco ASA, Cisco ASASM, and Cisco FWSM Firewalls

Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists

To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy tACLs to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability when the attack originates from a trusted source address.

The tACL policy denies unauthorized Java RMI services over IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP ports 1099 and 9099 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 and 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 are considered trusted sources that require access to the affected devices, and the hosts at 192.168.100.1 and 2001:DB8::100:1 represent the IP address space that is used by the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.

Additional information about tACLs is in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.
```
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources 
!-- that require access on the vulnerable protocols and ports
!
access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
      host 192.168.100.1 eq 1099
access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
      host 192.168.100.1 eq 9099
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks
!
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any host 192.168.100.1 eq 1099
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any host 192.168.100.1 eq 9099
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny ip any any
!
!-- Create the corresponding IPv6 tACL
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources 
!-- that require access on the vulnerable protocols and ports
!
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy permit tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64
          host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 1099
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy permit tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64
          host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 9099
!
!--  The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!--  (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks
!
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy deny tcp any host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 1099
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy deny tcp any host 2001:DB8::100:1 eq 9099
!
!--  Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!--  with existing security policies and configurations
!
!--  Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy deny ip any any
!
!--  Apply tACLs to interfaces in the ingress direction
!
access-group tACL-Policy in interface outside
access-group IPv6-tACL-Policy in interface outside
```
Identification: Transit Access Control Lists

After the tACL has been applied to an interface, administrators can use the show access-list command to identify the number of RMI IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP ports 1099 and 9099 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Example output for show access-list tACL-Policy and show access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy follows:
```
firewall#show access-list tACL-Policy
access-list tACL-Policy; 5 elements; name hash: 0x3452703d
access-list tACL-Policy line 1 extended permit tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
     host 192.168.100.1 eq 1099 (hitcnt=31)
access-list tACL-Policy line 2 extended permit tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
     host 192.168.100.1 eq 9099 (hitcnt=61)
access-list tACL-Policy line 3 extended deny tcp any 
     host 192.168.100.1 eq 1099 (hitcnt=8)
access-list tACL-Policy line 4 extended deny tcp any 
     host 192.168.100.1 9099 (hitcnt=14)
access-list tACL-Policy line 5 extended deny ip any any (hitcnt=8)
```
In the preceding example, access list tACL-Policy has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:
- 8 Java RMI services packets on TCP port 1099 for ACE line 3
- 14 Java RMI services packets on TCP port 9099 for ACE line 4
```
firewall#show access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy                 
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy; 5 elements; name hash: 0x566a4229
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 1 permit tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64
     host 2001:db8::100:1 eq 1099 (hitcnt=59) 
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 2 permit tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64 
     host 2001:db8::100:1 eq 9099 (hitcnt=28) 
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 3 deny tcp any 
     host 2001:db8::100:1 eq 1099 (hitcnt=47)
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 4 deny tcp any 
     host 2001:db8::100:1 eq 9099 (hitcnt=33) 
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 5 deny ip any any (hitcnt=27)
```
In the preceding example, access list IPv6-tACL-Policy has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:
- 47 Java RMI services packets on TCP port 1099 for ACE line 3
- 33 Java RMI services packets on TCP port 9099 for ACE line 4
In addition, syslog message 106023 can provide valuable information, which includes the source and destination IP address, the source and destination port numbers, and the IP protocol for the denied packet.

Identification: Firewall Access List Syslog Messages

Firewall syslog message 106023 will be generated for packets denied by an access control entry (ACE) that does not have the log keyword present. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Message, 8.2 - 106023.

Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is in Monitoring - Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module.

In the following example, the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerability that are described in this document. It is possible to use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.

Additional information about regular expression syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.
```
firewall#show logging | grep 106023
  Oct 21 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.18/2944 
         dst inside:192.168.100.1/9099 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
  Oct 21 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.175/2950 
         dst inside:192.168.100.1/1099 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
  Oct 31 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:2001:db8:d::a85e:172/2952
         dst inside:2001:db8::100:1/1099 by access-group "IPv6-tACL-Policy"
```
In the preceding example, the messages logged for the tACL tACL-Policy and IPv6-tACL-Policy show Java RMI services packets for TCP ports 1099 and 9099 sent to the address block assigned to affected devices.

Additional information about syslog messages for Cisco ASA Series Adaptive Security Appliances is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Messages, 8.2. Additional information about syslog messages for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in the Analyzing Syslog Messages section of theCisco ASASM CLI Configuration Guide. Additional information about syslog messages for the Cisco FWSM is in Catalyst 6500 Series Switch and Cisco 7600 Series Router Firewall Services Module Logging System Log Messages.

For additional information about investigating incidents using syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Cisco Security white paper.

Cisco Security Manager

Identification: Cisco Security Manager

Cisco Security Manager, Event Viewer

Beginning in software version 4.0, Cisco Security Manager can collect syslogs from Cisco firewalls and Cisco IPS devices and provides the Event Viewer, which can query for events that are related to the vulnerability that are described in this document.

Using the following filters in the Firewall Denied Events predefined view in the Event Viewer provides all captured Cisco firewall access list deny syslog messages that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerability that are described in this document.
- Use the Destination event filter to filter network objects that contain the IP address space that is used by the affected devices (for example, IPv4 address range 192.168.60.0/24 and IPv6 address range 2001:DB8:1:60::/64)
- Use the Destination Service event filter to filter objects that contain TCP pors 1099 and 9099.
An Event Type ID filter can be used with the Firewall Denied Events predefined view in the Event Viewer to filter the syslog ID ASA-4-106023 (ACL deny) to provide all captured Cisco firewall deny syslog messages that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerability that are described in this document:

For more information about Cisco Security Manager Events, refer to the Filtering and Querying Events section of the Cisco Security Manager User Guide.

Cisco Security Manager Report Manager

Beginning in software version 4.1, Cisco Security Manager supports the Report Manager, the Cisco IPS event reporting feature. This feature allows an administrator to define reports based on Cisco IPS events of interest. Reports can be scheduled or users can run ad hoc reports as required.

Also in the Report Manager, the Top Services report can be used with the following configuration to generate a report of events that indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerability that are described in this document:
- Use the Destination IP network filter to filter network objects that contain the IP address space that is used by the affected devices (for example, IPv4 address range 192.168.60.0/24 and IPv6 address range 2001:DB8:1:60::/64)
- Set an action of Deny on the Criteria settings page
Identification: Event Management System Partner Events

Cisco works with industry-leading Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) companies through the Cisco Developer Network. This partnership helps Cisco deliver validated and tested SIEM systems that address business concerns such as long-term log archiving and forensics, heterogeneous event correlation, and advanced compliance reporting. Security Information and Event Management partner products can be leveraged to collect events from Cisco devices and then query the collected events for the incidents created by deny syslog messages from firewalls that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerability that are described in this document. The queries can be made by Syslog ID ASA-4-106023 (ACL deny).

For more information about SIEM partners, refer to the Security Management System website.

Additional Information

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

Related to This Bulletin

Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager Remote Command Execution Vulnerability

Revision History

Version	Description	Section	Date
1	Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin initial public release.		2012-October-31 16:03 GMT
1	Alert History Initial Release		2012-October-31 16:03 GMT

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Cisco Security Procedures

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.

Related Information

Related Information

Affected Products

The security vulnerability applies to the following combinations of products.

Primary Products
Cisco	Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager (DCNM)	4.1 (.(2), .(3), .(4), .(5)) \| 4.2 (.(1), .(3)) \| 5.0 ((2), (3)) \| 5.1 ((1), (2), (3u)) \| 5.2 ((1), (2), (2a), (2b), (2c), (2e)) \| 6.1 (Base, (1))

Associated Products

Legal Disclaimer

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE ALERTS AT ANY TIME.

A standalone copy or paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL is an uncontrolled copy and may lack important information or contain factual errors. The information in this document is intended for end users of Cisco products

Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager Remote Command Execution Vulnerability

Available Languages

Bias-Free Language

Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin

Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager Remote Command Execution Vulnerability

Cisco Response

Cisco Response

Vulnerability Characteristics

Vulnerability Overview

Mitigation Technique Overview

Risk Management

Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification

Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification

Cisco IOS Routers and Switches

Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists

Identification: Transit Access Control Lists

Identification: Access List Logging

Cisco IOS NetFlow and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow

Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS NetFlow

Identification: IPv6 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS NetFlow

Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco Flexible NetFlow

Identification: IPv6 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow

Cisco ASA, Cisco ASASM, and Cisco FWSM Firewalls

Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists

Identification: Transit Access Control Lists

Identification: Firewall Access List Syslog Messages

Cisco Security Manager

Identification: Cisco Security Manager

Cisco Security Manager, Event Viewer

Cisco Security Manager Report Manager

Identification: Event Management System Partner Events

Additional Information

Related to This Bulletin

Revision History

Alert History

Cisco Security Procedures

Related Information

Related Information

Affected Products

Legal Disclaimer

Related to This Bulletin