Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin-
HP, 3Com, and H3C routers and switches contain a vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to access sensitive information on a targeted system.
The vulnerability is due to an unspecified error in the affected software. An unauthenticated, remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) IP version 4 (IPv4) and IP version 6 (IPv6) packets on UDP port 161 to the targeted system. When processed, the requests could allow the attacker to access sensitive information on the system.
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Details of this vulnerability are described in Alert 27254.
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HP has released security bulletin c03515685 at the following link: HPSBHF02819 SSRT100920
The affected products are listed in the HP advisory.
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Cisco IOS Software can provide effective means of exploit prevention using the following methods:
- Infrastructure access control lists (iACLs)
- Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF)
- IP source guard (IPSG)
Effective means of exploit prevention can also be provided by Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module (ASASM), and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers using the following methods:
- Transit access control lists (tACLs)
- Application layer protocol inspection
- uRPF
Cisco IOS NetFlow records can provide visibility into network-based exploitation attempts.
Cisco IOS Software, Cisco ASA, Cisco ASASM, Cisco FWSM firewalls, and Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module can provide visibility through syslog messages and counter values displayed in the output from show commands.
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Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluation and mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of this vulnerability. Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely to be successful. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams. Risk Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk Triage and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security evaluation and response processes.
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Caution: The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change, evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.
Specific information about mitigation and identification is available for these devices:
- Cisco IOS Routers and Switches
- Cisco IOS NetFlow and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow
- Cisco ASA, Cisco ASASM, and Cisco FWSM Firewalls
Cisco IOS Routers and Switches
Mitigation: Infrastructure Access Control Lists
To protect infrastructure devices and minimize the risk, impact, and effectiveness of direct infrastructure attacks, administrators are advised to deploy infrastructure access control lists (iACLs) to perform policy enforcement of traffic sent to infrastructure equipment. Administrators can construct an iACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic sent to infrastructure devices in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. For the maximum protection of infrastructure devices, deployed iACLs should be applied in the ingress direction on all interfaces to which an IP address has been configured. An iACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.
The iACL policy denies unauthorized SNMP IPv4 and IPv6 packets on UDP port 161 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 and 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 represent the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the hosts at 192.168.100.1 and 2001:DB8::100:1 are considered trusted sources that require access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic. Whenever possible, infrastructure address space should be distinct from the address space used for user and services segments. Using this addressing methodology will assist with the construction and deployment of iACLs.
Additional information about iACLs is in Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists.
ip access-list extended Infrastructure-ACL-Policy
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable port
! permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 161
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entry
!-- (ACE) can aid in identification of attacks
! deny udp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 161 !
!-- Explicit deny ACE for traffic sent to addresses configured within
!-- the infrastructure address space
! deny ip any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 !
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!
!-- Create the corresponding IPv6 iACL
! ipv6 access-list IPv6-Infrastructure-ACL-Policy !
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable port
! permit udp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 161 !
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entry
!-- (ACE) can aid in identification of attacks to global and
!-- link-local addresses
! deny udp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 161 !
!-- Permit other required traffic to the infrastructure address
!-- range and allow IPv6 neighbor discovery packets, which
!-- include neighbor solicitation packets and neighbor
!-- advertisement packets
! permit icmp any any nd-ns permit icmp any any nd-na !
!-- Explicit deny for all other IPv6 traffic to the global
!-- infrastructure address range
!
deny ipv6 any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic
!-- in accordance with existing security policies and configurations
! !
!-- Apply iACLs to interfaces in the ingress direction ! interface GigabitEthernet0/0 ip access-group Infrastructure-ACL-Policy in ipv6 traffic-filter IPv6-Infrastructure-ACL-Policy inNote that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the transmission of ICMP unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered traffic. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of increasing CPU utilization on the device. In Cisco IOS Software, ICMP unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by default. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the interface configuration commands no ip unreachables and no ipv6 unreachables . ICMP unreachable rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration commands ip icmp rate-limit unreachable interval-in-ms and ipv6 icmp error-interval interval-in-ms.
Identification: Infrastructure Access Control Lists
After the administrator applies the iACL to an interface, the show ip access-lists and show ipv6 access-list commands will identify the number of SNMP IPv4 and IPv6 packets on UDP port 161 that have been filtered on interfaces on which the iACL is applied. Administrators should investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show ip access-lists Infrastructure-ACL-Policy and show ipv6 access-list IPv6-Infrastructure-ACL-Policy follows:
router#show ip access-lists Infrastructure-ACL-Policy
Extended IP access list Infrastructure-ACL-Policy
10 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5060 (60 matches)
20 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5060 (9 matches)
30 deny ip any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 (17 matches)
router#Identification: Access List Logging
The log and log-input access control list (ACL) option will cause packets that match specific ACEs to be logged. The log-input option enables logging of the ingress interface in addition to the packet source and destination IP addresses and ports.
Caution: Access control list logging can be very CPU intensive and must be used with extreme caution. Factors that drive the CPU impact of ACL logging are log generation, log transmission, and process switching to forward packets that match log-enabled ACEs.
For Cisco IOS Software, the ip access-list logging interval interval-in-ms command can limit the effects of process switching induced by IPv4 ACL logging. The logging rate-limit rate-per-second [except loglevel] command limits the impact of log generation and transmission.
The CPU impact from ACL logging can be addressed in hardware on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers with Supervisor Engine 720 or Supervisor Engine 32 using optimized ACL logging.
For additional information about the configuration and use of ACL logging, reference the Understanding Access Control List Logging Cisco Security white paper.
Mitigation: Spoofing Protection
Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
Administrators can deploy and configure Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) as a protection mechanism against spoofing.
uRPF is configured at the interface level and can detect and drop packets that lack a verifiable source IP address. Administrators should not rely on uRPF to provide complete spoofing protection because spoofed packets may enter the network through a uRPF-enabled interface if an appropriate return route to the source IP address exists. Administrators are advised to take care to ensure that the appropriate uRPF mode (loose or strict) is configured during the deployment of this feature because it can drop legitimate traffic that is transiting the network. In an enterprise environment, uRPF may be enabled at the Internet edge and the internal access layer on the user-supporting Layer 3 interfaces.
Additional information is available in the Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding Loose Mode Feature Guide.
For additional information about the configuration and use of uRPF, reference the Understanding Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding Cisco Security white paper.
IP Source Guard
IP source guard (IPSG) is a security feature that restricts IP traffic on nonrouted, Layer 2 interfaces by filtering packets based on the DHCP snooping binding database and manually configured IP source bindings. Administrators can use IPSG to prevent attacks from an attacker who attempts to spoof packets by forging the source IP address and/or the MAC address. When properly deployed and configured, IPSG coupled with strict mode uRPF provides the most effective means of spoofing protection.
Additional information about the deployment and configuration of IPSG is available in Configuring DHCP Features and IP Source Guard.
Identification: Spoofing Protection Using Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
With uRPF properly deployed and configured throughout the network infrastructure, administrators can use the show cef interface type slot/port internal, show ip interface, show cef drop, show ip cef switching statistics feature, and show ip traffic commands to identify the number of packets that uRPF has dropped.
Note: Beginning with Cisco IOS Software Release 12.4(20)T, the command show ip cef switching has been replaced by show ip cef switching statistics feature.
Note: The show command | begin regex and show command | include regex command modifiers are used in the following examples to minimize the amount of output that administrators will need to parse to view the desired information. Additional information about command modifiers is in the show command sections of the Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference.
router#show cef interface GigabitEthernet 0/0 internal | include drop ip verify: via=rx (allow default), acl=0, drop=18, sdrop=0
IPv6 unicast RPF: via=rx acl=None, drop=10, sdrop=0 (if IPv6 applies)
router#Note: show cef interface type slot/port internal is a hidden command that must be fully entered at the command-line interface. Command completion is not available for it.
router#show cef drop CEF Drop Statistics Slot Encap_fail Unresolved Unsupported No_route No_adj ChkSum_Err
RP 27 0 0 18 0 0
router#
router#show ip interface GigabitEthernet 0/0 | begin verify IP verify source reachable-via RX, allow default, allow self-ping 18 verification drops 0 suppressed verification drops router#
router#show ipv6 interface GigabitEthernet 0/0 | section IPv6 verify IPv6 verify source reachable-via rx 0 verification drop(s) (process), 10 (CEF) 0 suppressed verification drop(s) (process), 0 (CEF) -- CLI Output Truncated -- router# router#show ip cef switching statistics feature IPv4 CEF input features:
Path Feature Drop Consume Punt Punt2Host Gave route
RP PAS uRPF 18 0 0 0 0
Total 18 0 0 0 0
-- CLI Output Truncated -- router#
router#show ipv6 cef switching statistics feature IPv6 CEF input features: Feature Drop Consume Punt Punt2Host Gave route
RP LES Verify Unicast R 10 0 0 0 0
Total 10 0 0 0 0
-- CLI Output Truncated -- router# router#show ip traffic | include RPF 18 no route, 18 unicast RPF, 0 forced drop
router#
router#show ipv6 traffic | include RPF 10 RPF drops, 0 RPF suppressed, 0 forced drop
router#In the preceding examples for show cef interface type slot/port internal, show cef drop, show ip interface type slot/port and show ipv6 interface type slot/port, show ip cef switching statistics feature and show ipv6 cef switching statistics feature, and show ip traffic and show ipv6 traffic, uRPF has dropped the following packets received globally on all interfaces with uRPF configured because of the inability to verify the source address of the IP packets within the forwarding information base of Cisco Express Forwarding.
- 18 IPv4 packets
- 10 IPv6 packets
Cisco IOS NetFlow and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow
Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS NetFlow
Administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of IPv4 traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerability described in this document. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit the vulnerability or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.
router#show ip cache flow IP packet size distribution (90784136 total packets): 1-32 64 96 128 160 192 224 256 288 320 352 384 416 448 480 .000 .698 .011 .001 .004 .005 .000 .004 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 512 544 576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608 .000 .001 .256 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 IP Flow Switching Cache, 4456704 bytes 1885 active, 63651 inactive, 59960004 added 129803821 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures Active flows timeout in 30 minutes Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds IP Sub Flow Cache, 402056 bytes 0 active, 16384 inactive, 0 added, 0 added to flow 0 alloc failures, 0 force free 1 chunk, 1 chunk added last clearing of statistics never Protocol Total Flows Packets Bytes Packets Active(Sec) Idle(Sec) -------- Flows /Sec /Flow /Pkt /Sec /Flow /Flow TCP-Telnet 11393421 2.8 1 48 3.1 0.0 1.4 TCP-FTP 236 0.0 12 66 0.0 1.8 4.8 TCP-FTPD 21 0.0 13726 1294 0.0 18.4 4.1 TCP-WWW 22282 0.0 21 1020 0.1 4.1 7.3 TCP-X 719 0.0 1 40 0.0 0.0 1.3 TCP-BGP 1 0.0 1 40 0.0 0.0 15.0 TCP-Frag 70399 0.0 1 688 0.0 0.0 22.7 TCP-other 47861004 11.8 1 211 18.9 0.0 1.3 UDP-DNS 582 0.0 4 73 0.0 3.4 15.4 UDP-NTP 287252 0.0 1 76 0.0 0.0 15.5 UDP-other 310347 0.0 2 230 0.1 0.6 15.9 ICMP 11674 0.0 3 61 0.0 19.8 15.5 IPv6INIP 15 0.0 1 1132 0.0 0.0 15.4 GRE 4 0.0 1 48 0.0 0.0 15.3 Total: 59957957 14.8 1 196 22.5 0.0 1.5 SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Pr SrcP DstP Pkts Gi0/0 192.168.10.201 Gi0/1 192.168.60.102 11 0984 00A1 1
Gi0/0 192.168.11.54 Gi0/1 192.168.60.158 11 0911 00A1 3 Gi0/1 192.168.150.60 Gi0/0 10.89.16.226 06 0016 12CA 1 Gi0/0 192.168.13.97 Gi0/1 192.168.60.28 11 0B3E 00A1 5
Gi0/0 192.168.10.17 Gi0/1 192.168.60.97 11 0B89 00A1 1 Gi0/0 10.88.226.1 Gi0/1 192.168.202.22 11 007B 007B 1 Gi0/0 192.168.12.185 Gi0/1 192.168.60.239 11 0BD7 00A1 1 Gi0/0 10.89.16.226 Gi0/1 192.168.150.60 06 12CA 0016 1In the preceding example, there are multiple flows for SNMP on UDP port 161 (hex value 00A1).
This traffic is sourced from and sent to addresses within the 192.168.60.0/24 address block, which is used by affected devices. The packets in these flows may be spoofed and may indicate an attempt to exploit this vulnerability. Administrators are advised to compare these flows to baseline utilization for SNMP traffic sent on UDP port 161 and also investigate the flows to determine whether they are sourced from untrusted hosts or networks.
As shown in the following example, to view only the traffic flows for SNMP packets on UDP port 161 (hex value 00A1), use the show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_11_.*00A1 command to display the related Cisco NetFlow records:
UDP Flows
router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_11_.*00A1 SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Pr SrcP DstP Pkts Gi0/0 192.168.12.110 Gi0/1 192.168.60.163 11 092A 00A1 6
Gi0/0 192.168.11.230 Gi0/1 192.168.60.20 11 0C09 00A1 1
Gi0/0 192.168.11.131 Gi0/1 192.168.60.245 11 0B66 00A1 18
Gi0/0 192.168.13.7 Gi0/1 192.168.60.162 11 0914 00A1 1
Gi0/0 192.168.41.86 Gi0/1 192.168.60.27 11 0B7B 00A1 2Identification: IPv6 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS NetFlow
Administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of IPv6 traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerability that is described in this document. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this vulnerability or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.
The following output is from a Cisco IOS device running Cisco IOS Software 12.4 mainline train. The command syntax will vary for different Cisco IOS Software trains.
router#show ipv6 flow cache IP packet size distribution (50078919 total packets): 1-32 64 96 128 160 192 224 256 288 320 352 384 416 448 480 .000 .990 .001 .008 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
512 544 576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000IP Flow Switching Cache, 475168 bytes
8 active, 4088 inactive, 6160 added
1092984 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
Inactive flows timeout in 15 secondsIP Sub Flow Cache, 33928 bytes
16 active, 1008 inactive, 12320 added, 6160 added to flow
0 alloc failures, 0 force free
1 chunk, 1 chunk addedSrcAddress InpIf DstAddress OutIf Prot SrcPrt DstPrt Packets
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0 2001:DB...28::20 Local 0x11 0x16C4 0x00A1 1464 2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0 2001:DB...28::21 Gi0/1 0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1191 2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0 2001:DB...134::3 Gi0/1 0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1191 2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0 2001:DB...128::4 Gi0/1 0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1192 2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0 2001:DB...128::3 Gi0/1 0x11 0x1610 0x00A1 1001
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0 2001:DB...128::4 Gi0/1 0x11 0x1634 0x00A1 1292
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0 2001:DB...128::3 Gi0/1 0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1155
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0 2001:DB...146::3 Gi0/1 0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1092
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0 2001:DB...144::4 Gi0/1 0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1193To permit display of the full 128-bit IPv6 address, use the terminal width 132 exec mode command.
In the preceding example, there are multiple IPv6 flows for SNMP on UDP port 161 (hex value 00A1).
The SNMP packets on UDP port 161 are sourced from and sent to addresses within the 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 address block that is used by affected devices. The packets in the UDP flows may be spoofed and could indicate an attempt to exploit this vulnerability. Administrators are advised to compare these flows to baseline utilization for SNMP traffic on UDP port 161 and also investigate the flows to determine whether they are sourced from untrusted hosts or networks.
UDP Flows
router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_11_.*00A1_ SrcAddress InpIf DstAddress OutIf Prot SrcPrt DstPrt Packets 2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0 2001:DB...28::20 Gi0/1 0x11 0x16C4 0x00A1 1464
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0 2001:DB...128::3 Gi0/1 0x11 0x1610 0x00A1 1001
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0 2001:DB...128::4 Gi0/1 0x11 0x1634 0x00A1 1292
router#Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow
Introduced in Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.2(31)SB2 and 12.4(9)T, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow improves original Cisco NetFlow by adding the capability to customize the traffic analysis parameters for the administrator's specific requirements. Original Cisco NetFlow uses a fixed seven tuples of IP information to identify a flow, whereas Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow allows the flow to be user defined. It facilitates the creation of more complex configurations for traffic analysis and data export by using reusable configuration components.
The following example output is from a Cisco IOS device that is running a version of Cisco IOS Software in the 15.1T train. Although the syntax will be almost identical for the 12.4T and 15.0 trains, it may vary slightly depending on the actual Cisco IOS release being used. In the following configuration, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will collect information on interface GigabitEthernet0/0 for incoming IPv4 flows based on source IPv4 address, as defined by the match ipv4 source address key field statement. Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will also include nonkey field information about source and destination IPv4 addresses, protocol, ports (if present), ingress and egress interfaces, and packets per flow.
!
!-- Configure key and nonkey fields
!-- in the user-defined flow record
! flow record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4 match ipv4 source address collect ipv4 protocol collect ipv4 destination address collect transport source-port collect transport destination-port collect interface input collect interface output collect counter packets !
!-- Configure the flow monitor to
!-- reference the user-defined flow
!-- record
! flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4 !
!-- Apply the flow monitor to the interface
!-- in the ingress direction
! interface GigabitEthernet0/0 ip flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 inputThe Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow flow output is as follows:
router#show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table Cache type: Normal Cache size: 4096 Current entries: 6 High Watermark: 1 Flows added: 9181 Flows aged: 9175 - Active timeout ( 1800 secs) 9000 - Inactive timeout ( 15 secs) 175 - Event aged 0 - Watermark aged 0 - Emergency aged 0 IPV4 SRC ADDR ipv4 dst addr trns src port trns dst port intf input intf output pkts ip prot ============== ============== ============= ============= ========== =========== ==== ======= 192.168.10.201 192.168.60.102 1456 161 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 1128 17 192.168.11.54 192.168.60.158 8475 161 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 2212 17 192.168.150.60 10.89.16.226 2567 443 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 13 6 192.168.10.17 192.168.60.97 4231 161 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 146 17 10.88.226.1 192.168.202.22 2678 443 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 8567 6 10.89.16.226 192.168.150.60 3562 80 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 4012 6To view only the SNMP packets on UDP port 161, use the show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table | include IPV4 DST ADDR |_17_.*161_ command to display the related NetFlow records.
For more information about Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow, refer to Flexible Netflow Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS Release 15.1M&T and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow Configuration Guide, Release 12.4T.
Identification: IPv6 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow
The following example output is from a Cisco IOS device that is running a version of Cisco IOS Software in the 15.1T train. Although the syntax will be almost identical for the 12.4T and 15.0 trains, it may vary slightly depending on the actual Cisco IOS release being used. In the following configuration, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will collect information on interface GigabitEthernet0/0 for incoming IPv6 flows based on the source IPv6 address, as defined by the match ipv6 source address key field statement. Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will also include nonkey field information about source and destination IPv6 addresses, protocol, ports (if present), ingress and egress interfaces, and packets per flow.!
!-- Configure key and nonkey fields
!-- in the user-defined flow record
! flow record FLOW-RECORD-ipv6 match ipv6 source address collect ipv6 protocol collect ipv6 destination address collect transport source-port collect transport destination-port collect interface input collect interface output collect counter packets !
!-- Configure the flow monitor to
!-- reference the user-defined flow
!-- record
! flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 record FLOW-RECORD-ipv6 !
!-- Apply the flow monitor to the interface
!-- in the ingress direction
! interface GigabitEthernet0/0 ipv6 flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 inputThe Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow flow output is as follows:
router#show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 cache format table Cache type: Normal Cache size: 4096 Current entries: 6 High Watermark: 2 Flows added: 539 Flows aged: 532 - Active timeout ( 1800 secs) 350 - Inactive timeout ( 15 secs) 182 - Event aged 0 - Watermark aged 0 - Emergency aged 0 IPV6 SRC ADDR ipv6 dst addr trns src port trns dst port intf input intf output pkts ip prot ================= ================ ============= ============= ========== =========== ==== ======= 2001:DB...06::201 2001:DB...28::20 123 123 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 17 17 2001:DB...06::201 2001:DB...28::20 1265 161 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 1237 17 2001:DB...06::201 2001:DB...28::20 1441 161 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 2346 17 2001:DB...06::201 2001:DB...28::20 1890 161 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 5009 17 2001:DB...06::201 2001:DB...28::20 2856 5060 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 486 17 2001:DB...06::201 2001:DB...28::20 3012 53 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 1016 17 2001:DB...06::201 2001:DB...28::20 2477 53 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 1563 17To permit display of the full 128-bit IPv6 address, use the terminal width 132 exec mode command.
To view only the SNMP packets on UDP port 161, use the show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 cache format table | include IPV6 DST ADDR|_17_.*161_ command to display the related Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow records.
Cisco ASA, Cisco ASASM, and Cisco FWSM Firewalls
Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists
To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy tACLs to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability when the attack originates from a trusted source address.
The tACL policy denies unauthorized SNMP IPv4 and IPv6 packets on UDP port 161 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 and 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the hosts at 192.168.100.1 and 2001:DB8::100:1 are considered trusted sources that require access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.
Additional information about tACLs is in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable port
! access-list tACL-Policy extended permit udp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 161
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific ACE
!-- can aid in identification of attacks
! access-list tACL-Policy extended deny udp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 161
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
! access-list tACL-Policy extended deny ip any any
!
!-- Create the corresponding IPv6 tACL
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable port
! ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy permit udp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 161 !
!-- The following vulnerability-specific ACE
!-- can aid in identification of attacks
! ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy deny udp any 2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 161 !
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
! ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy deny ip any any !
!-- Apply tACLs to interfaces in the ingress direction
! access-group tACL-Policy in interface outside access-group IPv6-tACL-Policy in interface outsideIdentification: Transit Access Control Lists
After the tACL has been applied to an interface, administrators can use the show access-list command to identify the number of SNMP IPv4 and IPv6 packets on UDP 161 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Example output for show access-list tACL-Policy and show access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy follows:
firewall#show access-list tACL-Policy # show access-list tACL-Policy access-list tACL-Policy; 3 elements; name hash: 0x3452703d access-list tACL-Policy line 1 extended permit udp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq snmp (hitcnt=0) 0xcaf3631f access-list tACL-Policy line 2 extended deny udp any 192.168.60.0
255.255.255.0 eq snmp (hitcnt=30) 0x446cdf70
access-list tACL-Policy line 3 extended deny ip any any (hitcnt=0) 0xfb7b3a57In the preceding example, access list tACL-Policy has dropped 30 SNMP packets on UDP port 161 received from an untrusted host or network. In addition, syslog message 106023 can provide valuable information, which includes the source and destination IP address, the source and destination port numbers, and the IP protocol for the denied packet.
firewall#show access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy; 3 elements; name hash: 0x566a4229
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 1 permit udp host 2001:db8::100:1
2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq snmp (hitcnt=0) 0xa71c462e
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 2 deny udp any
2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq snmp (hitcnt=20) 0xece82086
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 3 deny ip any any (hitcnt=0) 0xa6445d5dIn the preceding example, access list IPv6-tACL-Policy has dropped 20 SNMP packets on UDP port 161 received from an untrusted host or network. In addition, syslog message 106023 can provide valuable information, which includes the source and destination IP address, the source and destination port numbers, and the IP protocol for the denied packet.
In addition, syslog message 106023 can provide valuable information, which includes the source and destination IP address, the source and destination port numbers, and the IP protocol for the denied packet.
Identification: Firewall Access List Syslog Messages
Firewall syslog message 106023 will be generated for packets denied by an access control entry (ACE) that does not have the log keyword present. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA Series System Log Messages, Versions 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, and 8.7 - 106023.
Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is in Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module.
In the following example, the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerability that is described in this document. It is possible to use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.
Additional information about regular expression syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.
firewall#show logging | grep 106023 Oct 24 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.0.2.18/2944
dst inside:192.168.60.191/161 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Oct 24 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.0.2.200/2945
dst inside:192.168.60.33/161 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Oct 24 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.0.2.99/2946
dst inside:192.168.60.240/161 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Oct 24 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.0.2.100/2947
dst inside:192.168.60.115/161 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Oct 24 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.0.2.88/2949
dst inside:192.168.60.38/161 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Oct 24 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny udp src outside:192.0.2.175/2950
dst inside:192.168.60.250/161 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
firewall#In the preceding example, the messages logged for the tACL tACL-Policy show SNMP packets for UDP port 161 sent to the address block assigned to affected devices.
Additional information about syslog messages for Cisco ASA Series Adaptive Security Appliances is in Cisco ASA Series System Log Messages, Versions 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, and 8.7 . Additional information about syslog messages for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in the Analyzing Syslog Messages section of the Cisco ASASM CLI Configuration Guide. Additional information about syslog messages for the Cisco FWSM is in Catalyst 6500 Series Switch and Cisco 7600 Series Router Firewall Services Module Logging System Log Messages.
For additional information about investigating incidents using syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Cisco Security Intelligence Operations white paper.
Mitigation: Application Layer Protocol Inspection
Application layer protocol inspection is available beginning in software release 7.2(1) for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, software release 8.5 for the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module, and software release 4.0(1) for the Cisco Firewall Services Module. This advanced security feature performs deep packet inspection of traffic that transits the firewall. Administrators may construct an inspection policy for applications that require special handling through the configuration of inspection class maps and inspection policy maps, which are applied by means of a global or interface service policy.
Additional information about application layer protocol inspection is in the Getting Started With Application Layer Protocol Inspection section of the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Configuration Guide using the CLI, 8.4 and 8.6 and the Configuring Application Inspection section of the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module CLI Configuration Guide, 8.5.
Caution: Application layer protocol inspection will decrease firewall performance. Administrators are advised to test performance impact in a lab environment before this feature is deployed in production environments.
Simple Network Management Protocol Application Inspection
Using the SNMP application inspection engine on the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances and the Cisco Firewall Services Modules, administrators can configure a policy that prevents SNMPv1, SNMPv2, and SNMPv2c messages while allowing SNMPv3 messages to transit the firewall. The following SNMP application inspection uses the Modular Policy Framework (MPF) to create a policy for inspection of traffic on UDP port 161. The SNMP inspection policy will drop SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 connections.Caution: Restricting SNMP traffic to SNMP version 3 will disable any applications that depend on earlier versions of SNMP.
!
!-- Configure an access list to match source addresses that do not
!-- require SNMP v1, v2, and v2c access to the affected devices
!access-list authorized-snmp extended deny ip host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
access-list authorized-snmp extended permit ip any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0!
!-- Create a class map to deny unauthorized SNMPv1, SNMPv2, and SNMPv2c connections
! class-map snmp-map match access-list authorized-snmp!
!-- Configure an SNMP map to deny SNMPv1, SNMPv2, and SNMPv2c connections
! snmp-map SNMPv3_only deny version 1 deny version 2 deny version 2c !
!-- Add the above-configured SNMP map to the default
!-- policy "global_policy" and use it to
!-- inspect SNMP traffic that transits the firewall
!
policy-map global_policy
class snmp_map
inspect snmp SNMPv3_only
!
!-- By default, the policy "global_policy" is applied globally,
!-- which results in the inspection of traffic that enters the
!-- firewall from all interfaces
! service-policy global_policy globalAdditional information about SNMP application inspection and the MPF is in the SNMP Inspection section of the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Configuration Guide using the CLI, 8.4 and 8.6.
Identification: Application Layer Protocol Inspection
Firewall syslog message 416001 will be generated when an SNMP packet is dropped. The syslog message will identify the SNMP version of the dropped packet. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA Series System Log Messages, Versions 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, and 8.7 - 416001.
Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is in Monitoring - Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the Cisco FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module.
In the following example, the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Administrators can use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.
Simple Network Management Protocol Application Inspection
firewall# show logging | grep 416001 Oct 24 2012 22:03:49: %ASA-4-416001: Dropped UDP SNMP packet
from outside:192.168.60.63/32769 to inside:192.168.60.42/161;
version (2) is not allowed thru the firewall
Oct 24 2012 22:03:50: %ASA-4-416001: Dropped UDP SNMP packet
from outside:192.168.60.63/32769 to inside:192.168.60.42/161;
version (1) is not allowed thru the firewall
Oct 24 2012 22:03:51: %ASA-4-416001: Dropped UDP SNMP packet
from outside:192.168.60.63/32769 to inside:192.168.60.42/161;
version (1) is not allowed thru the firewall
Oct 24 2012 22:03:52: %ASA-4-416001: Dropped UDP SNMP packet
from outside:192.168.60.63/32769 to inside:192.168.60.42/161;
version (2) is not allowed thru the firewallWith SNMP inspection enabled, the show service-policy command will identify the number of SNMP packets inspected and dropped by this feature. The following example shows output for show service-policy:
firewall# show service-policy | include snmp
Inspect: snmp deny_SNMPv1_2, packet 236, drop 6, reset-drop 0 firewall#In the preceding example, 236 SNMP packets have been inspected and 6 SNMP packets have been dropped.
Mitigation: Spoofing Protection Using Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
Administrators can deploy and configure uRPF as a protection mechanism against spoofing.
uRPF is configured at the interface level and can detect and drop packets that lack a verifiable source IP address. Administrators should not rely on uRPF to provide complete spoofing protection because spoofed packets may enter the network through a uRPF-enabled interface if an appropriate return route to the source IP address exists. In an enterprise environment, uRPF may be enabled at the Internet edge and at the internal access layer on the user-supporting Layer 3 interfaces. Starting in release 12.(13)T, uRPF is also supported for IPv6.
For additional information about the configuration and use of uRPF, reference the Cisco Security Appliance Command Reference for ip verify reverse-path and the Understanding Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding Cisco Security white paper.
Identification: Spoofing Protection Using Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
Firewall syslog message 106021 will be generated for packets denied by uRPF. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA Series System Log Messages, Versions 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, and 8.7 - 106021.
Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is in Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module.
In the following example, the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerability that is described in this document. It is possible to use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.
Additional information about regular expression syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.
firewall#show logging | grep 106021 Oct 24 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-1-106021: Deny UDP reverse path check from
192.168.60.1 to 192.168.60.100 on interface outside
Oct 24 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-1-106021: Deny UDP reverse path check from
192.168.60.1 to 192.168.60.100 on interface outside
Oct 24 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-1-106021: Deny TCP reverse path check from
192.168.60.1 to 192.168.60.100 on interface outsideThe show asp drop command can also identify the number of packets that the uRPF feature has dropped, as shown in the following example:
firewall#show asp drop frame rpf-violated
Reverse-path verify failed 11 firewall#In the preceding example, uRPF has dropped 11 IP packets received on interfaces with uRPF configured. Absence of output indicates that the uRPF feature on the firewall has not dropped packets.
For additional information about debugging accelerated security path dropped packets or connections, reference the Cisco Security Appliance Command Reference for show asp drop.
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THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
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Show LessVersion Description Section Date 2 Updated application inspection CLI and clarified application inspection comments. 2012-October-31 14:10 GMT 1 Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin initial public release 2012-October-25 17:50 GMT
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Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
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The security vulnerability applies to the following combinations of products.
Primary Products IntelliShield Security Activity Bulletin Original Release (Base)
Associated Products
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THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE ALERTS AT ANY TIME.
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