Cisco Security Advisory
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CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N/E:X/RL:X/RC:X
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A vulnerability in the health check RPM of Cisco IOS XR Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to access the Redis instance that is running within the NOSi container.
This vulnerability exists because the health check RPM opens TCP port 6379 by default upon activation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by connecting to the Redis instance on the open port. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to write to the Redis in-memory database, write arbitrary files to the container filesystem, and retrieve information about the Redis database. Given the configuration of the sandboxed container that the Redis instance runs in, a remote attacker would be unable to execute remote code or abuse the integrity of the Cisco IOS XR Software host system.
Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are workarounds that address this vulnerability.
This advisory is available at the following link:
https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-iosxr-redis-ABJyE5xK
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Vulnerable Products
At the time of publication, this vulnerability affected Cisco 8000 Series Routers if they were running a vulnerable release of Cisco IOS XR Software and had the health check RPM installed and active.
For information about which Cisco software releases were vulnerable at the time of publication, see the Fixed Software section of this advisory. See the Details section in the bug ID(s) at the top of this advisory for the most complete and current information.
Determine the Device Configuration
To determine if the device is in a vulnerable state, issue the run docker ps CLI command. If the output returns a docker container with the name NOSi, as shown in the following example, the device is considered vulnerable:
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000#run docker ps Wed May 18 04:54:52.502 UTC CONTAINER ID IMAGE COMMAND CREATED STATUS PORTS NAMES 54307e434f29 nosi:latest "docker-entrypoint.s…" 9 seconds ago Up 8 seconds NOSi RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000#Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
Only products listed in the Vulnerable Products section of this advisory are known to be affected by this vulnerability.
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There are workarounds that address this vulnerability:
Option 1: This is the preferred method. Disable health check and explicitly disable the use cases.
To effectively disable health check, enter the following commands exactly as shown:
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000(config)#no healthcheck enable
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000(config)#healthcheck use-case asic-reset disable
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000(config)#healthcheck use-case packet-drop disable
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000(config)#commit
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000#Then remove the health check RPM from the device:
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000#install package remove xr-healthcheck
Wed May 18 05:00:08.060 UTCInstall remove operation 5.2.2 has started
Install operation will continue in the background
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000#
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000#install apply restart
Wed May 18 05:01:08.842 UTC
Install apply operation 5.2 has started
Install operation will continue in the background
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000#
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000#show install request
User request: install apply restart
Operation ID: 7.4
State: Success since 2024-02-28 14:06:40 UTC
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000#install commit
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000#Option 2: Use an Infrastructure Access Control List (iACLs) to block port 6379.
To protect infrastructure devices and minimize the risk, impact, and effectiveness of direct infrastructure attacks, administrators are advised to deploy infrastructure access control lists (iACLs) to perform policy enforcement of traffic sent to infrastructure equipment. Administrators can construct an iACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic sent to infrastructure devices in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. For the maximum protection of infrastructure devices, deployed iACLs should be applied in the ingress direction on all interfaces to which an IP address has been configured. An iACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability when the attack originates from a trusted source address.
The iACL policy denies unauthorized Redis communications packets on TCP port 6379 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access before denying all unauthorized traffic. Whenever possible, infrastructure address space should be distinct from the address space used for user and services segments. Using this addressing methodology will assist with the construction and deployment of iACLs.
ipv4 access-list Infrastructure-ACL-Policy ! !-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries !-- (ACEs) can drop Redis Database communication packets ! deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 6379 ! !-- Explicit deny ACE for traffic sent to addresses configured !-- within the infrastructure address space ! deny ip any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 ! !-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in !-- accordance with existing security policies and configurations ! !-- Apply iACL to interfaces in the ingress direction
! interface GigabitEthernet0/0 ipv4 access-group Infrastructure-ACL-Policy inFor additional information about iACLs, see Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists.
While these workarounds have been deployed and were proven successful in a test environment, customers should determine the applicability and effectiveness in their own environment and under their own use conditions. Customers should be aware that any workaround or mitigation that is implemented may negatively impact the functionality or performance of their network based on intrinsic customer deployment scenarios and limitations. Customers should not deploy any workarounds or mitigations before first evaluating the applicability to their own environment and any impact to such environment.
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When considering software upgrades, customers are advised to regularly consult the advisories for Cisco products, which are available from the Cisco Security Advisories page, to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, customers are advised to contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their contracted maintenance providers.
Fixed Releases
At the time of publication, the release information in the following table(s) was accurate. See the Details section in the bug ID(s) at the top of this advisory for the most complete and current information.
Cisco IOS XR Release First Fixed Release 7.2 and earlier Not affected 7.3.15, 7.3.16, 7.3.1, and 7.3.2 Not affected 7.3.3 SMU ID: 8000-7.3.3.CSCwb82689 and 7.3.4 7.4 Not affected 7.5.1 Not affected 7.5.2 Not affected 7.6 Not affected Note: SMU ID: 8000-7.3.3.CSCwb82689 needs to be installed using the following steps; otherwise, the old docker container may still be active and not address this vulnerability.
- Install SMU ID: 8000-7.3.3.CSCwb82689:
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:ios#show install active summary Fri Mar 1 05:46:02.751 UTC Active Packages: XR: 183 All: 1347 Label: 7.3.3 Software Hash: fd6561ecb682a5cd3b7fcc31b6606292 Optional Packages Version ---------------------------------------------------- --------------------------- xr-8000-mcast 7.3.3v1.0.0-1 xr-8000-netflow 7.3.3v1.0.0-1 xr-bgp 7.3.3v1.0.0-1 xr-healthcheck 7.3.3v1.0.1-1 xr-ipsla 7.3.3v1.0.0-1 xr-is-is 7.3.3v1.0.0-1 xr-lldp 7.3.3v1.0.0-1 xr-mcast 7.3.3v1.0.0-1 xr-mpls-oam 7.3.3v1.0.0-1 xr-netflow 7.3.3v1.0.0-1 xr-ospf 7.3.3v1.0.0-1 xr-perfmgmt 7.3.3v1.0.0-1 xr-track 7.3.3v1.0.0-1 Active Fixes (count: 1): CSCwb82689: xr-healthcheckNOSi is still running the old container, which exposes the redis port.
[node0_RP0_CPU0:~]$docker ps CONTAINER ID IMAGE COMMAND CREATED STATUS PORTS NAMES f25f8f89bcc1 nosi:latest "docker-entrypoint.s…" 5 minutes ago Up 5 minutes NOSi [node0_RP0_CPU0:~]$docker exec -it NOSi ps x PID TTY STAT TIME COMMAND 10 ts/0 Sl 0:00 redis-server 0.0.0.0:6379 - Stop and remove the old docker container and remove the old docker image:
[node0_RP0_CPU0:~]$docker ps CONTAINER ID IMAGE COMMAND CREATED STATUS PORTS NAMES f25f8f89bcc1 nosi:latest "docker-entrypoint.s…" 7 minutes ago Up 7 minutes NOSi [node0_RP0_CPU0:~]$docker stop NOSi NOSi [node0_RP0_CPU0:~]$docker rm NOSi NOSi [node0_RP0_CPU0:~]$docker images REPOSITORY TAG IMAGE ID CREATED SIZE nosi latest 1dbc91432c6c 2 years ago 840MB [node0_RP0_CPU0:~]$docker image rm 1dbc91432c6c Untagged: nosi:latest Deleted: sha256:1dbc91432c6cde1c00dabf456b6007649af719ea091b3557a333842cdb458b65 .
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. Deleted: sha256:87c8a1d8f54f3aa4e05569e8919397b65056aa71cdf48b7f061432c98475eee9 - Restart processes:
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:ios#process restart appmgr
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:ios#process restart hcmgrThe NOsi container came up with a new image.
[node0_RP0_CPU0:~]$docker ps CONTAINER ID IMAGE COMMAND CREATED STATUS PORTS NAMES c64285f9f2ef nosi:latest "docker-entrypoint.s…" 2 seconds ago Up 1 second NOSi [node0_RP0_CPU0:~]$docker exec -it NOSi ps x PID TTY STAT TIME COMMAND 10 pts/0 Sl 0:00 redis-server *:0 - Install commit:
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000#install commit
RP/0/RP0/CPU0:8000#
The Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) validates only the affected and fixed release information that is documented in this advisory.
- Install SMU ID: 8000-7.3.3.CSCwb82689:
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In May 2022, the Cisco PSIRT became aware of attempted exploitation of this vulnerability in the wild. Cisco strongly recommends that customers apply suitable workaround or upgrade to a fixed software release to remediate this vulnerability.
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This vulnerability was found during the resolution of a Cisco TAC support case.
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To learn about Cisco security vulnerability disclosure policies and publications, see the Security Vulnerability Policy. This document also contains instructions for obtaining fixed software and receiving security vulnerability information from Cisco.
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Show LessVersion Description Section Status Date 1.2 Updated workaround information and added directions for installing the SMU. Workarounds and Fixed Releases Final 2024-MAR-15 1.1 Added SMU to the Fixed Releases section. Fixed Releases Final 2022-JUN-01 1.0 Initial public release. — Final 2022-MAY-20
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