CSCwc69661引入的MRA服务的Expressway流量 服务器证书验证故障排除

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简介

本文档介绍链接到Cisco Bug ID <u>CSCwc6961</u>的Expressway版本X14.2.0及更高版本上的行为更改。 通过此更改,Expressway平台上的流量服务器执行移动和远程访问(MRA)服务的Cisco Unified Communication Manager(CUCM)、Cisco Unified Instant Messaging & Presence(IM&P)和Unity服 务器节点的证书验证。在Expressway平台上升级后,此更改可能会导致MRA登录失败。

先决条件

要求

Cisco 建议您了解以下主题:

- Expressway基本配置
- MRA基本配置

使用的组件

本文档中的信息基于X14.2及更高版本上的Cisco Expressway。

本文档中的信息都是基于特定实验室环境中的设备编写的。本文档中使用的所有设备最初均采用原 始(默认)配置。如果您的网络处于活动状态,请确保您了解所有命令的潜在影响。

背景信息

安全超文本传输协议(HTTPS)是一种使用传输层安全(TLS)加密通信的安全通信协议。它通过使用在 TLS握手过程中交换的TLS证书来创建此安全通道。这样,它就实现了两个目的:身份验证(了解 您连接的远程方)和隐私(加密)。身份验证可防止中间人攻击,并且隐私可防止攻击者窃听和篡 改通信。

TLS(证书)验证在看到身份验证时执行,并允许您确保已连接到正确的远程方。验证包括两个单 独的项目:

1.受信任证书颁发机构(CA)链

2.主题备用名称(SAN)或公用名称(CN)

可信CA链

为了使Expressway-C信任CUCM/IM&P/Unity发送的证书,它需要能够建立从该证书到其信任的顶级(根)证书颁发机构(CA)的链接。此类链接是将实体证书链接到根CA证书的证书层次结构,称为 信任链。为了能够验证此类信任链,每个证书包含两个字段:Issuer(或"Issued by")和 Subject(或"Issued To")。

服务器证书(例如CUCM发送到Expressway-C的那个)在"Subject"字段中通常在CN中具有其完全 限定域名(FQDN):

Issuer: DC=lab, DC=vngtp, CN=vngtp-ACTIVE-DIR-CA

Subject: C=BE, ST=Flamish-Brabant, L=Diegem, O=Cisco, OU=TAC, CN=cucm.vngtp.lab CUCM cucm.vngtp.lab的服务器证书示例。它在"主题"(Subject)字段的CN属性中具有FQDN,同时 还具有其他属性,例如国家(C)、州(ST)、位置(L)。.我们还可以看到服务器证书由名为vngtp-ACTIVE-DIR-CA的CA分发(颁发)。

顶级CA(根CA)也可以颁发证书来标识自己。在这样的根CA证书中,我们看到颁发者和使用者具有相同的值:

Issuer: DC=lab, DC=vngtp, CN=vngtp-ACTIVE-DIR-CA Subject: DC=lab, DC=vngtp, CN=vngtp-ACTIVE-DIR-CA 它是根CA分发的用于标识自己的证书。

在典型情况下,根CA不会直接颁发服务器证书。相反,它们会为其他CA颁发证书。这些其它CA然 后称为中间CA。反过来,中间CA可以直接为其他中间CA颁发服务器证书或证书。我们可能会遇到 中间的CA 1颁发服务器证书,而中间的CA 1又从中间的CA 2获得证书,以此类推。直到最终中间 CA直接从根CA获取其证书:

Server certificate : Issuer: DC=lab, DC=vngtp, CN=vngtp-intermediate-CA-1 Subject: C=BE, ST=Flamish-Brabant, L=Diegem, O=Cisco, OU=TAC, CN=cucm.vngtp.lab Intermediate CA 1 certificate : Issuer: DC=lab, DC=vngtp, CN=vngtp-intermediate-CA-2 Subject: DC=lab, DC=vngtp, CN=vngtp-intermediate-CA-1 Intermediate CA 2 certificate : Issuer: DC=lab, DC=vngtp, CN=vngtp-intermediate-CA-3 Subject: DC=lab, DC=vngtp, CN=vngtp-intermediate-CA-2 ...
Intermediate CA n certificate :
Issuer: DC=lab, DC=vngtp, CN=vngtp-ACTIVE-DIR-CA
Subject: DC=lab, DC=vngtp, CN=vngtp-intermediate-CA-n
Root CA certificate :
Issuer: DC=lab, DC=vngtp, CN=vngtp-ACTIVE-DIR-CA
Subject: DC=lab, DC=vngtp, CN=vngtp-ACTIVE-DIR-C

现在,为了让Expressway-C信任CUCM发送的服务器证书,它需要能够从该服务器证书构建信任链 ,直到根CA证书。为此,我们需要在Expressway-C的信任存储中上传根CA证书和所有中间CA证 书(如果有,如果根CA直接颁发CUCM的服务器证书则不会出现这种情况)。

注意:虽然Issuer和Subject字段易于以易于阅读的方式构建信任链,但Expressway-C和 CUCM在证书中不使用这些字段。相反,它们使用"X509v3授权密钥标识符"和"X509v3主题密 钥标识符"字段构建信任链。这些密钥包含更准确的证书标识符,然后使用Subject/Issuer字段 :可以有2个具有相同Subject/Issuer字段的证书,但其中一个证书已过期,另一个证书仍然有 效。它们都有不同的X509v3主题密钥标识符,因此Expressway/CUCM仍可确定正确的信任链 。

SAN或CN检查

第1步检查信任库,但拥有信任库中的CA签名的证书的任何人在此时都是有效的。这显然是不够的 。因此,另外会进行检查,以验证您专门连接的服务器是否正确。它根据发出请求的地址执行此操 作。

在浏览器中也会发生同样的操作,因此让我们通过一个示例来了解这一点。如果浏览到 https://www.cisco.com,您会在输入的URL旁边看到一个锁图标,这意味着它是受信任连接。这既 基于CA信任链(来自第一部分),也基于SAN或CN检查。如果我们打开证书(通过浏览器单击锁 定图标),您会看到"公用名"(在"Issued to:"字段中看到)设置为<u>www.cisco.com</u>,并且完全对应 于要连接的地址。这样可以确保我们连接到正确的服务器(因为我们信任签署证书并在分发证书之 前执行验证的CA)。

Certificate	×		
eneral Details Certification Path		CISCO	Products and Service
Certificate Information			
This certificate is intended for the following purpose(s): • Ensures the identity of a remote computer • Proves your identity to a remote computer • 2.16.840.1.113839.0.6.3 • 2.23.140.1.2.2			
* Refer to the certification authority's statement for details.			
Issued to: www.cisco.com			
Issued by: HydrantID Server CA O1			
Valid from 2/16/2022 to 2/16/2023			
	The second		

当我们查看证书的详细信息(尤其是SAN条目)时,我们会看到该详细信息与某些其他FQDN一样 :

Certificate		×
General Details Certific	ation Path	
Show: <all></all>	~	
Field	Value	^
Certificate Policies	[1]Certificate Policy:	
CRL Distribution P	. [1]CRL Distribution	
Subject Alternativ	DNS Name=cisco-i	
Subject Key Identi	. b18ceccd49a5dfd74	
Enhanced Key Usag	e Server Authenticatio	
SCT List	v1, adf7befa7cff10c	
Key Usage	Digital Signature, Ke	
Thumbprint	0dddb6ce30b00bd7	
		~
DNS Name=cisco-imag	ges.cisco.com	^
DNS Name=cisco.com		
DNS Name=www-01.0	isco.com	
DNS Name=www-th	risco.com	
DNS Name=www.cisco	o.com	
DNS Name=www.med	liafiles-cisco.com	
DNS Name=www.stati	c-cisco.com	
DNS Name=www1.cis	co.com	~
	CdB Descelles	Course File
	Copy to File	
		OK

这意味着,例如,当我们请求连接到<u>https://www1.cisco.com</u>时,它也会显示为安全连接,因为它包 含在SAN条目中。

Cisco - Netw	rking, Cloud, and C × +
$\leftarrow \ \ \rightarrow \ \ G$	www1.cisco.com
	cisco

但是,如果我们不浏览<u>https://www.cisco.com</u>,而是直接浏览到IP地址(<u>https://72.163.4.161</u>),则不 会显示安全连接,因为它确实信任签名它的CA,但是提供给我们的证书不包含我们用于连接到服务 器的地址(72.163.4.161)。



在浏览器中,您可以绕过此设置,但它是可以在TLS连接上启用的设置,不允许绕行。因此,您的 证书必须包含远程方计划用于连接它的正确CN或SAN名称。

行为更改

MRA服务严重依赖通过到CUCM/IM&P/Unity服务器的Expressway上的几个HTTPS连接,以便正确 进行身份验证并收集特定于登录客户端的正确信息。此通信通常发生在端口8443和6972上。

低于X14.2.0的版本

在低于X14.2.0的版本中,Expressway-C上处理这些安全HTTPS连接的流量服务器不会验证远程端 提供的证书。这可能导致中间人攻击。在MRA配置上,当您将任一CUCM / IM&P / Unity服务器添 加到Configuration > Unified Communications > Unified CM servers / IM and Presence Service nodes / Unity Connection servers下,则有一个选项可用于通过"TLS验证模式"配置到"开"进行 TLS证书验证。配置选项和相关信息框以示例形式显示,表示它确实验证了SAN中的FQDN或 IP,以及证书的有效性以及证书是否由受信任CA签名。

Cisco Expressway-C

Status >	System >	Configuration >	Applications >	Users >	Maintenance >
Unified C	CM servers				You are here: Configuration >
Unified Cl	M server lookup]		
Unified CM	publisher address		cucmpub.vngtp.lal	b	
Username			* administrator		í
Password			*		(Ì)
TLS verify	mode		On 🗸 (i)		
Deploymen	it		Default deployme	ent 🖌 i	
AES GCM	support		Off v (i)		
SIP UPDAT	E for session refre	sh	Off v i		
ICE Passth	rough support		Off v (i		

×

Save Delete Cancel

Information

If TLS verify mode is enabled, the Unified CM system's FQDN or IP address must be contained within the X.509 certificate presented by that system (in either the Subject Common Name or the Subject Alternative Name attributes of the certificate). The certificate itself must also be valid and signed by a trusted certificate authority.

Default: On

此TLS证书验证检查仅在发现CUCM/IM&P/Unity服务器时完成,而不是在MRA登录期间查询各种服务器时完成。此配置的第一个缺点是,它仅验证您添加的发布者地址。它不会验证用户节点上的证书是否设置正确,因为它从发布者节点的数据库中检索用户节点信息(FQDN或IP)。此配置的第二个缺点是,由于连接信息可能不同于Expressway-C配置中的发布方地址,因此通告给MRA客户端的内容可能不同。例如,在CUCM上,在**System > Server**下,可以使用IP地址(例如10.48.36.215)向外通告服务器,然后由MRA客户端使用(通过代理的Expressway连接),但您可以在Expressway-C上使用FQDN cucm.steven.lab添加CUCM。因此,假设CUCM的tomcat证书包含cucm.steven.lab作为SAN条目而不是IP地址,则将"TLS验证模式"设置为"打开"的发现成功,但来自MRA客户端的实际通信可以针对不同的FQDN或IP,从而无法通过TLS验证。

X14.2.0及更高版本

从X14.2.0版本开始,Expressway服务器会对通过流量服务器发出的每个HTTPS请求执行TLS证书 验证。这意味着在发现CUCM/IM&P/Unity节点期间,当"TLS验证模式"设置为"关闭"时,它也会执行 此操作。如果验证失败,则TLS握手不会完成,并且请求失败,这可能导致功能丢失,例如冗余或 故障转移问题或完全登录失败。此外,如果将"TLS验证模式"设置为"开",则不能保证所有连接都能 正常运行,如以下示例所述。

除了默认的TLS验证,X14.2中还引入了一个更改,它通告了密码列表的不同的首选顺序。这可能会 导致软件升级后出现意外的TLS连接,因为在升级之前,它请求从CUCM(或任何具有单独的 ECDSA算法证书的其他产品)获取Cisco Tomcat或Cisco CallManager证书,但在升级之后,它请 求获取ECDSA变体。Cisco Tomcat-ECDSA或Cisco CallManager-ECDSA证书可以由其他CA签名 ,也可以仅由自签名证书签名(默认)。

在此场景中,TLS验证有两种可能失败,稍后将详细介绍:

1.签署远程证书的CA不受信任

a.自签名证书

b.由未知CA签名的证书

2.证书中不包含连接地址(FQDN或IP)

故障排除场景

下面的场景显示实验室环境中的类似场景,其中Expressway从X14.0.7升级到X14.2后,MRA登录 确实失败。这些场景在日志中有相似之处,但分辨率不同。日志仅通过MRA登录之前开始并在 MRA登录失败之后停止的诊断日志记录(从**维护>诊断>诊断日志记录**)收集。未为其启用其他调试日 志记录。

1.签署远程证书的CA不受信任

远程证书可以由未包含在Expressway-C的信任存储中的CA进行签名,也可以是未添加到 Expressway-C服务器的信任存储中的自签名证书(本质上也是CA)。

在本例中,您会发现,发往CUCM(10.48.36.215 - cucm.steven.lab)的请求在端口8443(200 OK响 应)上得到正确处理,但是在TFTP连接的端口6972上引发错误(502响应)。

===Success connection on 8443===

2022-07-11T18:55:25.910+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[18242]: UTCTime="2022-07-11 16:55:25,910" Module="network.http.trafficserver" Level="INFO": Detail="Receive Request" Txn-id="189" TrackingID="6af9a674-9ebc-41ea-868e-90e7309a758c" Src-ip="127.0.0.1" Src-port="35764" Last-viaaddr="" Msg="GET

http://vcs_control.steven.lab:8443/c3RldmVuLmxhYi9odHRwcy9jdWNtLnN0ZXZlbi5sYWIvODQ0Mw/cucmuds/user/emusk/devices HTTP/1.1"

2022-07-11T18:55:25.917+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[18242]: Event="Request Allowed" Detail="Access allowed" Reason="In allow list" Username="emusk" Deployment="1" Method="GET" Request="https://cucm.steven.lab:8443/cucm-uds/user/emusk/devices"

Rule="https://cucm.steven.lab:8443/cucm-uds/user/" Match="prefix" Type="Automatically generated rule for CUCM server" UTCTime="2022-07-11 16:55:25,916"

2022-07-11T18:55:25.917+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[18242]: UTCTime="2022-07-11 16:55:25,916" Module="network.http.trafficserver" Level="INFO": Detail="Sending Request" Txn-id="189"

```
TrackingID="6af9a674-9ebc-41ea-868e-90e7309a758c" Dst-ip="10.48.36.215" Dst-port="8443" Msg="GET
/cucm-uds/user/emusk/devices HTTP/1.1"
2022-07-11T18:55:25.955+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[18242]: UTCTime="2022-07-11 16:55:25,955"
Module="network.http.trafficserver" Level="INFO": Detail="Receive Response" Txn-id="189"
TrackingID="" Src-ip="10.48.36.215" Src-port="8443" Msg="HTTP/1.1 200 "
2022-07-11T18:55:25.956+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[18242]: UTCTime="2022-07-11 16:55:25,955"
Module="network.http.trafficserver" Level="INFO": Detail="Sending Response" Txn-id="189"
TrackingID="" Dst-ip="127.0.0.1" Dst-port="35764" Msg="HTTP/1.1 200 "
===Failed connection on 6972===
2022-07-11T18:55:26.000+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[18242]: UTCTime="2022-07-11 16:55:26,000"
Module="network.http.trafficserver" Level="INFO": Detail="Receive Request" Txn-id="191"
TrackingID="bb0c8492-8c15-4537-a7d1-082dde781dbd" Src-ip="127.0.0.1" Src-port="35766" Last-via-
addr=" Msg="GET
http://vcs_control.steven.lab:8443/c3RldmVuLmxhYi9odHRwcy9jdWNtLnN0ZXZlbi5sYWIvNjk3Mg/CSFemusk.c
nf.xml HTTP/1.1"
2022-07-11T18:55:26.006+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[18242]: UTCTime="2022-07-11 16:55:26,006"
Module="network.http.trafficserver" Level="INFO": Detail="Sending Request" Txn-id="191"
```

TrackingID="bb0c8492-8c15-4537-a7d1-082dde781dbd" Dst-ip="10.48.36.215" Dst-port="6972" Msg="GET
/CSFemusk.cnf.xml HTTP/1.1"
2022-07-11T18:55:26.016+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[18242]: UTCTime="2022-07-11 16:55:26,016"
Module="network.http.trafficserver" Level="INFO": Detail="Sending Request" Txn-id="191"
TrackingID="bb0c8492-8c15-4537-a7d1-082dde781dbd" Dst-ip="10.48.36.215" Dst-port="6972" Msg="GET
/CSFemusk.cnf.xml HTTP/1.1"
2022-07-11T18:55:26.016+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[18242]: [ET_NET 0] WARNING: Core server

certificate verification failed for (cucm.steven.lab). Action=Terminate Error=self signed certificate server=cucm.steven.lab(10.48.36.215) depth=0

2022-07-11T18:55:26.016+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[18242]: [ET_NET 0] ERROR: SSL connection failed for 'cucm.steven.lab': error:1416F086:SSL

routines:tls_process_server_certificate:certificate verify failed

2022-07-11T18:55:26.024+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[18242]: UTCTime="2022-07-11 16:55:26,024" Module="network.http.trafficserver" Level="INFO": Detail="Sending Response" Txn-id="191" TrackingID="" Dst-ip="127.0.0.1" Dst-port="35766" Msg="HTTP/1.1 **502 connect failed**"

"certificate verify failed"错误表示Expressway-C无法验证TLS握手的事实。原因显示在警告行上,因 为它表示自签名证书。如果深度显示为0,则为自签名证书。当深度大于0时,这意味着它有一个证 书链,因此由未知CA签名(从Expressway-C的角度而言)。

当我们查看在文本日志中提及的时间戳处收集的pcap文件时,您可以看到CUCM将带有CN的证书 显示为cucm-ms.steven.lab(和cucm.steven.lab作为SAN),由steven-DC-CA签署,并发送到端 口8443上的Expressway-C。 eth0_diagnostic_logging_tcpdump00_vcsc_2022-07-11_16_55_44.pcap

	op port#+8443					
No.	Time	Source	Src port Destination	Dent port Protocol	DSCP VLAN	Length Drfs
5	4691 2022-07-11 16:55:25.916680	10.48.36.46	35622 10.48.36.215	\$443 TCP	CSB	74 35622 + 8443 [SYN] Seq+0 Win+64240 Len+0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSV81=878570435 TSecr+0 WS=128
	4692 2022-07-11 16:55:25.916953	10.48.36.215	8443 10.48.36.46	35622 TCP	CS0	74 8443 → 35622 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 ACk=1 Win=28960 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=343633230 TSecr=878570435 WS=128
	4693 2022-07-11 16:55:25.916973	10.48.36.46	35622 10.48.36.215	8443 TCP	C58	66 35622 → 8443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64256 Len=0 TSval=878570435 TSecr=343633230
	4694 2022-07-11 16:55:25.917832	10.48.36.46	35622 10.48.36.215	8443 TLSV1.2	cse	583 Client Hello
1	4695 2022-07-11 16:55:25.938356	10.48.36.215	8443 10.48.36.46	35622 TLSV1.2	CS0	1514 Server Hello
	4696 2022-07-11 16:55:25.938390	10.48.36.46	35622 10.48.36.215	8443 TCP	C50	b6 3562 * Sets [dck] Septils Ackside initiation [15/81-8785/85/95/ 1562*84953251
1	4697 2022-07-11 16:55:25.958409	10.48.50.215	3445 18,48,56,46	55622 TLSV1.2	CSB	1470 Certificate, Server Key Extrange, Server Hello Done 66 Dista - Aud 1671 Can-Ste Sch-1950 Vin-2008 Lan-A TSub-2005TAMET Tearn-M0600161
	4690 2022-07-11 16:55:25.950419	10.40.26.46	25522 10.40.26.215	6443 TL Sv1 2	csa	60 Stat V avid (mkr) schola (nhar Car, Enryward Mandhak Matsana
	4700 2022-07-11 16:55:25.943034	10.48.36.215	\$443 10.45.36.46	35622 TLSV1.2	cse	200 New Section Ticket, Change Capiter Spect Encypted Handhake Heisage
	4701 2022-07-11 16:55:25.943051	10.45.36.46	35622 10.48.36.215	8443 TCP	cse	66 35622 + 8443 [ACK] Seque64 ACk=3095 kin=64128 Lene0 TSval=878570461 TSecr=343633256
	4702 2022-07-11 16:55:25.943277	10.48.36.46	35622 10.48.36.215	8443 TLSv1.2	cse	2543 Application Data
	4703 2022-07-11 16:55:25.943476	10.48.36.215	8443 10.48.36.46	35622 TCP	C50	66 8443 + 35622 [ACK] Seq=3095 Ack=3121 Win=35072 Len=0 TSval=343633256 TSecr=878570462
	4707 2022-07-11 16:55:25.954796	10.48.36.215	8443 10.48.36.46	35622 TCP	CSB	1514 8443 + 35622 [ACK] Seq=3095 Ack=3121 Win=35072 Len=1448 TSval=343633268 TSecr=878570462 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
	4708 2022-07-11 16:55:25.954842	10.48.36.46	35622 10.48.36.215	8443 TCP	CS0	66 35622 + 8443 [ACK] Seq=3121 Ack=4543 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=878570473 TSecr=343633268
	4709 2022-07-11 16:55:25.954061	10.48.36.215	8443 10.48.36.46	35622 TLSv1.2	cse	1257 Application Data
	4710 2022-07-11 16:55:25.954873	10.48.36.46	35622 10.48.36.215	8443 TCP	C58	66 35622 + 8443 [ACK] Seq=3121 Ack=5734 Win=63488 Len=0 TSval=878570473 TSecr=343633268
	4711 2022-07-11 16:55:25.955712	10.48.36.46	35622 10.48.36.215	8443 TLSv1.2	CSB	97 Encrypted Alert
	4712 2022-07-11 16:55:25.955750	10.48.36.46	35622 10.48.36.215	\$443 TCP	CS0	66 35622 + 8443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=3152 Ack=5734 Hin=64128 Len=0 TSval=878570474 TSecr=343633268
	4714 2022-07-11 16:55:25.956123	10.48.36.215	8443 10.48.36.46	35622 TLSV1.2	CS0	97 Encrypted Alert
1	4715 2022-07-11 16:55:25.956170	10.48.36.46	35622 10.48.36.215	8443 TCP	C50	54 35622 + 8443 [RST] Sequ3153 Winx0 Lenx0
	4716 2022-07-11 16:55:25.956232	10.48.36.215	8443 10.48.36.46	35622 TCP	C58	66 8443 → 35622 [FIN, ACK] Seq=5765 Ack=3153 Win=35072 Len=0 TSval=343633269 TSecr=878570474
	4/17 2022-07-11 10:55:25-956252	10.48.30.46	35622 10.48.36.215	8443 TCP	C28	54 55622 + 8443 [K51] 5EQ+3153 HIR+0 LER+0
	 signedcertificate vision: v3 (2) serialumber: ex46000012056050 signure (shallKSAIncryption) issuer: indicquence (0) valistiy subject: Andreament (0) subject: Andreame	e) cc.subjectAltName) b cdfar) ccesubjectAltName) ccesubjectAltName) ccesubjectAltName) ccesubjectAltName) ccesubjectAltName) ccesubjectAltName) ccesubjectAltName) ccesubjectAltName) ccesubjectAltName) ccesubjectAltName) ccesubjectAltName)				
	> Certificate: 3052035a30520272a00302010	2021062176f3fc293988044 (id-at-commonName= <mark>steven-DC-CA</mark> ,dc=st	rven,dc=lab)		
P 8	ecure sockets Layer					

但是,当我们检查端口6972上提供的证书时,您可以看到它是自签证书(颁发者自身),其CN设置为cucm-EC.steven.lab。-EC扩展指明这是CUCM上设置的ECDSA证书。

eth0_diagnostic_logging_tcpdump00_vcsc_2022-07-1	1_16_55_44.pcap				
Edit. View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Teleph	ony Wireless Tools Help				
traportenti972					
Time	Source	Src port Destination	Cest port Protocol	DSCP VLAN	Lendh Job
4730 2022-07-11 16:55:26.006608	10.48.36.46	31576 10.48.36.215	6972 TCP	CS0	74 31576 + 6972 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSVal=878570525 TSecr=0 WS=128
4731 2022-07-11 16:55:26.006851	10.48.36.215	6972 10.48.36.46	31576 TCP	CS0	74 6972 + 31576 [SYN, ACK] Seq+0 Ack=1 Win+28960 Len+0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=343633320 TSecr=878570525 WS=12
4732 2022-07-11 16:55:26.006892	10.48.36.46	31576 10.48.36.215	6972 TCP	CSB	66 31576 + 6972 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64256 Len=0 TSval=878570525 TSecr=343633320
4733 2022-07-11 10:55:26.00/100	10.40.36.915	515/6 10.46.50.215	11574 TLSV1.2	C50	383 Client Milo Cartificate Server Key Sychanae
4735 2022-07-11 16:55:26.016391	10.48.36.46	31576 10.48.36.215	6972 TCP	CS0	66 31576 + 6972 [ACK] Seq=518 ACK=1449 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=878570535 TSecr=343633329
4736 2022-07-11 16:55:26.016408	10.48.36.215	6972 10.48.36.46	31576 TLSv1.2	CS0	499 Certificate Request, Server Hello Done
4737 2022-07-11 16:55:26.016419	10.48.36.46	31576 10.48.36.215	6972 TCP	cse	66 31576 + 6972 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=1882 Win=63744 Len=0 TSval=878578535 TSecr=343633329
4738 2022-07-11 16:55:26.016703	10.48.36.46	31576 10.48.36.215	6972 TLSV1.2	cse	73 Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Unknown CA)
4/39 2022-0/-11 10:55:26.016021	10.48.26.46	31578 10.48.30.215	6972 TCP	C50	As 31576 a 6972 [STN] SEQUE NINEWARE LENNE RESIDENT STATES/ STATES/STATES/STATES/STATES/STATES/STATES/STATES/STATES/STATES/STATES/STATES/STATES/STATES/STATES/STATES/STATES/ STATES/STA STATES/STAT
4741 2022-07-11 16:55:26.016984	10.48.36.215	6972 10.48.36.46	31578 TCP	CSB	74 6972 + 31578 [SVN, ACK] Seque Ack=1 Win+28960 Len+0 MSS=1460 SACK PERM=1 TSVa1=343653330 TSecr=878570535 WS=11
4742 2022-07-11 16:55:26.017009	10.48.36.46	31578 10.48.36.215	6972 TCP	CSB	66 31578 → 6972 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64256 Len=0 TSval=878570535 TSecr=343633330
4743 2022-07-11 16:55:26.017101	10.48.36.215	6972 10.48.36.46	31576 TCP	CSB	66 6972 → 31576 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1882 Ack=525 Win=30080 Len=0 TSval=343633330 TSecr=878570535
4744 2022-07-11 16:55:26.017121	10.48.36.46	31576 10.48.36.215	6972 TCP	CS8	54 31576 + 6972 [RST] Seq=525 Win+0 Len+0
4745 2022-07-11 16:55:26.017218	10.48.36.46	31578 10.48.36.215	6972 TLSv1.2	cse	SB3 Client Hello
4746 2022-07-11 16:55:26.024226	10.48.36.215	6972 10.48.36.46	31578 TLSV1.2	cse	1514 Server Hello, Certificate, Server Key Exchange
4742 2022-07-11 16:55:26.024205	10.48.36.215	6972 10.48.36.46	31578 TLSv1.2	cse	ob 319/8 * 97/2 [Ack] Schels Ackeley Himeriza Lener (Svales/89/094) (Scherse/89833) 588 Certificate Result. Server Hello Done
4749 2022-07-11 16:55:26.024309	10.48.36.46	31578 10.48.36.215	6972 TCP	CSB	66 31578 + 6972 [ACK] Seq=518 ACK=1883 Win+63744 Len+0 TSval+878570543 TSecr=343633337
4750 2022-07-11 16:55:26.024548	10.48.36.46	31578 10.48.36.215	6972 TLSv1.2	CSB	73 Alert (Level: Fatal, Description: Unknown CA)
4751 2022-07-11 16:55:26.024647	10.48.36.46	31578 10.48.36.215	6972 TCP	CS8	66 31578 → 6972 [RST, ACK] Seq=525 Ack×1883 Win+64128 Len+0 TSval×878570543 TSecr=343633337
4767 2022-07-11 16:55:26.083159	10.48.36.46	31580 10.48.36.215	6972 TCP	CS8	74 31580 + 6972 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=878570601 TSecr=0 WS=128
<pre>Length: 643 Certificates Length: 640 Certificates Length: 640 Certificate Length: 657 Certificate Length: 657 Certificate: 100,200,200,200,200,200,200,200,200,200,</pre>	02021074700e62271e3d1346 (id 66205946f0a3bf1d calityHame=Diegen,id-at-stateor ntifier) nts)	-at-localityName-Diegem,id-at-st ProvinceName=Belgium,id-at-commo	ateOrProvinceName+Belgi nName+ <mark>CutH-EC.steven.la</mark>	um,id-at-common o,id-at-organi	NNAMe- <mark>cuca-EC.steven.189</mark> ,id-at-organizationalunitName=TAC,id-at-organizationName=Cisco,id-at-countryNa 2ationalunitName=TAC,id-at-organizationName=Cisco,id-at-countryName=BE)
 Extension (12:25-22:17) (16: Extension (16: 2.5:22:17) (16: GeneralName: 11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11:11	.ce-subjectAltName) ab 354) b1171eb4s9ff03b060cds0ds				

在Cisco Unified OS Administration下的CUCM上,您可以查看Security > Certificate Management下 的现有证书,如下例所示。它显示不同的tomcat和tomcat-ECDSA证书,其中tomcat是CA签名的 (并受Expressway-C信任),而tomcat-ECDSA证书是自签名的,不受Expressway-C信任。

Show - Settings - 5	iecurity · Software Upgrades · Se	vices + Help	•				
Certificate List							
🔒 Generate Self-signe	f 🕒 Upload Certificate/Certificate ch	ain 🧃 Downi	oad CTL 🧕	Generate CSR 🔋 Download CSF	R		
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Find Certificate List wh	ere Certificate v begins with			Find Clear Filter 💠 📟			лот у
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Certificate *	AUTUR curren atauan Jah	Failt sizes of	P.C.A	Curren etauan Jah	AUTION current statutes lab	02/21/2028	Description
Califfactation	current sterrent lab	Charloged	REA	current sterven lab	steven 00-04	07/21/2038	and respirate an universe generative sy aspects
CaliManager, FCDFA	current PC statutes lab	Galfusineed	EC.	curren staruen lab	curm-FC sheven lab	02/18/2022	Set circles approx by anteriors in
CaliMananer-trust	steven-DC-CA	Self-sinned	REA	steven-DC-CA	steven-DC-CA	06/01/2025	ummingendu kan kinake generaliseke vy system. Kinaket Generaliseke
CaliManager-trust	NOMAT-AD-CA	Self-signed	RSA	NOMAT-AD-CA	NOMAT-AD-CA	04/23/2028	Sined Certificate
CaliManager-Inust	C42-872-002	Self-sinned	RCA	CAP.8TP.002	C49-8TP-002	10/10/2023	any new sectors were the sector were sectors and the sector and the sector of this certificate allows the end noint to communicate security with UCM using the MIC when associated with a secure profile.
CalManager-trust	CAPF-eb2c64d8	Self-signed	RSA	CAPF-eb2c64d8	CAPF-eb2c64d8	04/12/2020	
CaliManager-trust	ms-AD2-CA-1	Self-signed	RSA	ms-AD2-CA-1	ms-AD2-CA-1	09/11/2024	vnde CA
CallManager-trust	CAP-RTP-001	Self-signed	RSA	CAP-RTP-001	CAP-RTP-001	02/07/2023	This certificate was used to sign the MIC installed on Cisco endpoint. Presence of this certificate allows the end point to communicate securely with UCH using the MIC when associated with a secure profile.
CallManager-trust	NOMAT-CA-10	Self-signed	RSA	NOMAT-CA-10	NOMAT-CA-10	08/11/2027	Signed Certificate
CallManager-trust	Cisco Root CA M2	Self-signed	RSA	Cisco Root CA M2	Cisco_Root_CA_M2	11/12/2037	This certificate was used to sign the MIC installed on Cisco endpoint. Presence of this certificate allows the end point to communicate securely with UCH using the MIC when associated with a secure profile.
CaliManager-trust	ACT2_SUDI_CA	CA-signed	RSA	ACT2_SUDI_CA	Cisco_Root_CA_2048	05/14/2029	This certificate was used to sign the MIC installed on Cisco endpoint. Presence of this certificate allows the end point to communicate securely with UCH using the MIC when associated with a secure profile.
CallManager-trust	vingtp-ACTIVE-DIR-CA	Self-signed	RSA	vngtp-ACTIVE-DIR-CA	vngtp-ACTIVE-DIR-CA	02/10/2024	VNGTP-CA
CaliManager-trust	Cisco Root CA 2048	Self-signed	RSA	Cisco_Root_CA_2048	Cisco_Root_CA_2048	05/14/2029	This certificate was used to sign the MIC installed on Cisco endpoint. Presence of this certificate allows the end point to communicate securely with UCH using the MIC when associated with a secure profile.
CaliManager-trust	Cisco Manufacturing CA	CA-signed	RSA	Cisco_Manufacturing_CA	Cisco_Root_CA_2048	05/14/2029	This certificate was used to sign the MIC installed on Cisco endpoint. Presence of this certificate allows the end point to communicate securely with UCH using the MIC when associated with a secure profile.
CaliManager-trust	Cisco Manufacturing CA SHA2	CA-signed	RSA	Cisco_Manufacturing_CA_SHA2	Cisco_Root_CA_M2	11/12/2037	This certificate was used to sign the MIC installed on Cisco endpoint. Presence of this certificate allows the end point to communicate securely with UCH using the MIC when associated with a secure profile.
CaliManager-trust	dccomics-WONDERWOMAN-CA	Self-signed	RSA	docomics-WONDERWOMAN-CA	dcomics-WONDERWOMAN-CA	09/19/2037	CA-byanturn
CaliManager-trust	CAPF-616421bc	Self-signed	RSA	CAPF-616421bc	CAPF-616421bc	07/12/2025	
CAPF	CAPF-616421bc	Self-signed	RSA	cucm.steven.lab	CA99-616421bc	07/12/2025	Self-signed certificate generated by system
CAPF-trust	CAP-RTP-002	Self-signed	RSA	CAP-RTP-002	CAP-RTP-002	10/10/2023	This certificate was used to sign the MIC installed on Cisco endpoint. Presence of this certificate allows the end point to communicate securely with UCM using the MIC installed on Cisco endpoint. Presence of this certificate allows the end point to communicate securely with UCM using the MIC installed on Cisco endpoint.
CAPF-trust	CAPF-eb2c64d8	Self-signed	RSA	CAPF-eb2c64d8	CAPF-eb2c64d8	04/12/2020	
CAPF-trust	CAP-RTP-001	Self-signed	RSA	CAP-RTP-001	CAP-RTP-001	02/07/2023	This certificate was used to sign the MIC installed on Cisco endpoint. Presence of this certificate allows the end point to communicate securely with UCH using the MIC when associated with a secure profile.
CAPF-trust	Cisco Root CA M2	Self-signed	RSA	Cisco_Root_CA_M2	Cisco_Root_CA_M2	11/12/2037	This certificate was used to sign the MIC installed on Cisco endpoint. Presence of this certificate allows the end point to communicate securely with UCH using the MIC when associated with a secure profile.
CAPF-trust	AC12_5005_CA	CA-signed	RSA	ACT2_SUBL_CA	CISCO_ROOT_CA_2048	05/14/2029	This certificate was used to sign the MLC initialed on Clico engoint. Presence of this certificate allows the end point to communicate securely with UCH using the MLC when associated with a secure profile.
CAPF-trust	CISCO ROOT CA 2048	Ser-signed	RSA	Cisco_Root_CA_2048	Cisco_Root_CA_2048	05/14/2029	This certificate was used to sign the MIC instance on Clicce endpoint. Presence of this certificate allows the end point to communicate securely with UCH using the MIC when associated with a secure prome.
CAPF-trust	Cisco Handacturing CA	CA-signed	R3A REA	Cisco Manufacturing CA	Cisco Root CA 10	05/14/2029	This certificate was used to sight the MC installed on Cisco endpoint. Presence of this certificate allows the end point to communicate securely with UCH using the MC, when associated with a secure protect.
CAPF-trust	Cisco Hanuacturing CA SHA2	CA-signed	RSA	Class Manufacturing_CA_SHA2	CISCO ROOT CALM2	11/12/2037	This certificate was used to sign the MLC installed on Cisco endpoint. Presence of this certificate allows the end point to communicate securely with UCH using the MLC when associated with a secure prome.
inter	current attention light	Calf-signed	PEA	current et au anciente de la current et au an	current at a way lab	02/12/2025	Gall-cionad rastificate nanarstad hu notam
inter-trust	current shares lab	Salf-signed	REA	Current steven lab	current stervers lab	07/12/2025	ann ragana sa nanan gana ana ay system That' cathfolds
ITLRecovery	ITLRECOVERY cucm steven lab	Self-signed	RSA	ourm.steven.lab	ITLRECOVERY cucm steven lab	02/14/2039	n en sensenen
tomcat	current sheven lab	C&-signed	RSA	ouron steven Jab	steven-DC-CA	07/10/2024	Certificate Stoned by deven-DC-CA
tomcat-ECDSA	cucm-EC steven Jab	CSR Only	EC	cucm.steven.lab			
tomcat-ECDSA	cucm-EC.steven.lab	Self-signed	EC.	cucm.steven.lab	cucm-EC.steven.lab	07/25/2023	Self-signed certificate generated by system
tomcat-trust	steven-DC-CA	Self-signed	RSA	steven-DC-CA	steven-DC-CA	06/01/2025	Trust Certificate
tomcat-trust	NOMAT-AD-CA	Self-signed	RSA	NOMAT-AD-CA	NOMAT-AD-CA	04/23/2028	Signed Certificate
tomcat-trust	cucm-EC.steven.lab	Self-signed	EC	cucm.steven.lab	cucm-EC.steven.lab	07/25/2023	Trust Certificate
tomcat-trust	cucm.steven.lab	CA-signed	RSA	cucm.steven.lab	steven-DC-CA	07/10/2024	Trust Certificate
tomcat-trust	cups-EC.steven.lab	Self-signed	EC	cups.steven.lab	cups-EC.steven.lab	07/25/2023	Trust Certificate
tomcat-trust	NOMAT-CA-10	Self-signed	RSA	NOMAT-CA-10	NOMAT-CA-10	08/11/2027	Signed Certificate
tomcat-trust	vngtp-ACTIVE-DIR-CA	Self-signed	RSA	vngtp-ACTIVE-DIR-CA	vngtp-ACTIVE-DIR-CA	02/10/2024	Trust Certificate
tomcat-trust	dccomics-WONDERWOMAN-CA	Self-signed	RSA	dccomics-WONDERWOMAN-CA	dccomics-WONDERWOMAN-CA	09/19/2037	CA Bruno

2.证书中不包含连接地址(FQDN或IP)

除了信任存储之外,流量服务器还验证MRA客户端向哪个连接地址发出请求。例如,当您在 CUCM上的**System > Server**下设置CUCM时,您的CUCM的IP地址(10.48.36.215),则Expressway-C会将此情况通告给客户端,并且来自客户端(通过Expressway-C代理)的后续请求会指向此地址 。

当该特定连接地址未包含在服务器证书中时,TLS验证也会失败,并引发502错误,从而导致 MRA登录失败。

```
2022-07-11T19:49:01.472+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[3916]: UTCTime="2022-07-11 17:49:01,472"
Module="network.http.trafficserver" Level="DEBUG": Detail="Receive Request" Txn-id="144"
TrackingID="0a334fa8-41e9-4b97-adf4-e165372c38cb" Src-ip="127.0.0.1" Src-port="30044" Last-via-
addr=""
HTTPMSG:
GET http://vcs_control.steven.lab:8443/c3RldmVuLmxhYi9odHRwcy8xMC400C4zNi4yMTUvODQ0Mw/cucm-
uds/user/emusk/devices?max=100 HTTP/1.1
2022-07-11T19:49:01.478+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[3916]: UTCTime="2022-07-11 17:49:01,478"
Module="network.http.trafficserver" Level="INFO": Detail="Sending Request" Txn-id="144"
TrackingID="0a334fa8-41e9-4b97-adf4-e165372c38cb" Dst-ip="10.48.36.215" Dst-port="8443" Msg="GET
/cucm-uds/user/emusk/devices?max=100 HTTP/1.1"
2022-07-11T19:49:01.478+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[3916]: UTCTime="2022-07-11 17:49:01,478"
Module="network.http.trafficserver" Level="DEBUG": Detail="Sending Request" Txn-id="144"
TrackingID="0a334fa8-41e9-4b97-adf4-e165372c38cb" Dst-ip="10.48.36.215" Dst-port="8443"
HTTPMSG:
GET /cucm-uds/user/emusk/devices?max=100 HTTP/1.1
. . .
2022-07-11T19:49:01.491+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[3916]: [ET_NET 2] WARNING: SNI (10.48.36.215)
not in certificate. Action=Terminate server=10.48.36.215(10.48.36.215)
2022-07-11T19:49:01.491+02:00 vcsc traffic_server[3916]: [ET_NET 2] ERROR: SSL connection failed
```

for '10.48.36.215': error:1416F086:SSL routines:tls_process_server_certificate:certificate verify failed

其中c3RldmVuLmxhYi9odHRwcy8xMC40OC4zNi4yMTUvODQ0Mw translate(base64 -

<u>https://www.base64decode.org/</u>)到steven.lab/https/10.48.36.215/8443,表明它必须建立到 10.48.36.215的连接作为连接地址,而不是到cucm.steven.lab。如数据包捕获所示,CUCM tomcat证书不包含SAN中的IP地址,因此引发错误。

如何轻松验证

您可以通过以下步骤验证您是否容易遇到此行为更改:

1.在Expressway-E和C服务器上启动诊断日志记录(最好启用TCPDumps),从**维护>诊断>诊断日 志记录**(如果是集群,从主节点启动就足够了)

2.尝试MRA登录或在升级后测试中断的功能

3.等待失败,然后停止Expressway-E和C服务器上的诊断日志记录(如果是集群,请确保分别从集 群的每个节点收集日志)

4.上传并分析协作解决方案分析器工具上的日志

5.如果遇到问题,它会为每个受影响的服务器选取与此更改相关的最新警告和错误行

Â	Collaboration Solutions Ana CISCO Log Analyzer	Byzer Proview © UTC	🕫 ? Ö
Tools	Diagnostic overview	V Issues found No issue Not applicable Missing Information Potential problem	
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解决方案

长远的解决方法是确保TLS验证正常工作。要执行的操作取决于显示的警告消息。

当您观察到*警告:(<server-FQDN-or-IP>)的核心服务器证书验证失败。 Action=Terminate Error=self signed certificate server=cucm.steven.lab(10.48.36.215)depth=x* message,然后您需要 相应地更新Expressway-C服务器上的信任存储。使用签署此证书的CA链(深度> 0)或使用 Maintenance > Security > Trusted CA Certificate中的自签名证书(深度= 0)。确保在群集中的每 个服务器上执行此操作。另一种方法是,通过Expressway-C信任存储上的已知CA对远程证书进行 签名。

当您观察到*警告:SNI(<server-FQDN-or-IP>)不在证书消息*中,则表示此服务器FQDN或IP未包含 在提供的证书中。您可以调整证书以包含此信息,或者可以修改配置(例如在System > Server上的 CUCM上,修改为服务器证书中包含的内容),然后刷新Expressway-C服务器上的配置以将其考虑 在内。

<u>短期解决方案</u>是应用所记录的解决方法,以回退到X14.2.0之前的先前行为。您可以通过 Expressway-C服务器节点上的CLI使用新引入的命令对此执行操作:

xConfiguration EdgeConfigServer VerifyOriginServer: Off

关于此翻译

思科采用人工翻译与机器翻译相结合的方式将此文档翻译成不同语言,希望全球的用户都能通过各 自的语言得到支持性的内容。

请注意:即使是最好的机器翻译,其准确度也不及专业翻译人员的水平。

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