



Configuring Certificate Authorities and Digital Certificates

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About Certificate Authorities and Digital Certificates

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) support provides the means for the Cisco MDS 9000 Family switches to obtain and use digital certificates for secure communication in the network. PKI support provides manageability and scalability for IPsec/IKE and SSH.

Purpose of Certificate Authorities and Digital Certificates

Certificate Authorities (CAs) manage certificate requests and issue certificates to participating entities such as hosts, network devices, or users. The CAs provide centralized key management for the participating entities.

Digital signatures, based on public key cryptography, digitally authenticate devices and individual users. In public key cryptography, such as the RSA encryption system, each device or user has a key-pair consisting of both a private key and a public key. The private key is kept secret and is known only to the owning device or user. However, the public key is known to everybody. The keys act as complements. Anything encrypted with one of the keys can be decrypted with the other. A signature is formed when data is encrypted with a sender's private key. The receiver verifies the signature by decrypting the message with the sender's public key. This process relies on the receiver having a copy of the sender's public key and knowing with a high degree of certainty that it really does belong to the sender and not to someone pretending to be the sender.

Digital certificates link the digital signature to the sender. A digital certificate contains information to identify a user or device, such as the name, serial number, company, department, or IP address. It also contains a copy of the entity's public key. The certificate is itself signed by a CA, a third party that is explicitly trusted by the receiver to validate identities and to create digital certificates.

To validate the signature of the CA, the receiver must first know the CA's public key. Normally this process is handled out-of-band or through an operation done at installation. For instance, most web browsers are

configured with the public keys of several CAs by default. Internet Key Exchange (IKE), an essential component of IPsec, can use digital signatures at scale to authenticate peer devices before setting up security associations.

Trust Model, Trust Points, and Identity Certificate Authorities

The trust model that is used in PKI support is hierarchical with multiple configurable trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs). Each participating entity is configured with a list of CAs to be trusted so that the peer's certificate that is obtained during the security protocol exchanges can be verified, provided it has been issued by one of the locally trusted CAs. To accomplish this, the CA's self-signed root certificate (or certificate chain for a subordinate CA) is locally stored. The process of securely obtaining and storing this locally is called *CA authentication*. This is a mandatory step in trusting a CA.

The information about a trusted CA that is locally configured is called the *trust point* and the CA itself is called a *trust point CA*. This information consists of CA certificate (or certificate chain in case of a subordinate CA) and the certificate revocation checking information.

An *identity* is the name of device. An *identity certificate* (also known as public key or digital certificates) is a public key certificate of a device that has been signed by a trust point. An *identity CA* is a trust point that can issue identity certificates.

The process of enrolling an MDS switch with a trust point to obtain an identity certificate for a set of applications (for example, IPsec/IKE) is called *enrollment*. This trust point is called an *identity CA*.

RSA Key-Pairs and Identity Certificates

You can generate one or more RSA key-pairs and associate each RSA key-pair with a trust point CA where the MDS switch intends to enroll to obtain an identity certificate. The MDS switch needs only one identity per CA, which consists of one key-pair and one identity certificate per CA.

Cisco MDS NX-OS allows you to generate RSA key-pairs with a configurable key size (or modulus). Key-pairs may also be generated on other devices and imported on to the MDS switch. You can configure a label for each RSA key-pair. For information about RSA key-pair maximums and defaults, see the [Table 1: Maximum Limits for CA and Digital Certificate](#) and [Table 2: Default CA and Digital Certificate Parameters](#).

The following list summarizes the relationship between trust points, RSA key-pairs, and identity certificates:

- A trust point corresponds to a specific CA that the MDS switch trusts for peer certificate verification for any application (such as IKE or SSH).
- An MDS switch can have many trust points and all applications on the switch can trust a peer certificate issued by any of the trust point CAs.
- A trust point is not restricted to a specific application.
- An MDS switch enrolls with the CA corresponding to the trust point to obtain an identity certificate. You can enroll your switch with multiple trust points thereby obtaining a separate identity certificate from each trust point. The identity certificates are used by applications depending upon the purposes specified in the certificate by the issuing CA. The purpose of a certificate is stored in the certificate as certificate extensions.
- When enrolling with a trust point, you must specify an RSA key-pair to be certified. This key-pair must be generated and associated to the trust point before generating the enrollment request. The association between the trust point, key-pair, and identity certificate is valid until it is explicitly removed by deleting the certificate, key-pair, or trust point.

- The subject name in the identity certificate is the fully qualified domain name for the MDS switch.
- You can generate one or more RSA key-pairs on a switch and each can be associated to one or more trust points. But no more than one key-pair can be associated to a trust point, which means only one identity certificate is allowed from a CA.
- If multiple identity certificates (each from a distinct CA) have been obtained, the certificate that an application selects to use in a security protocol exchange with a peer is application-specific.
- You do not need to designate trust points for an application. Any application can use any certificate issued by any trust point as long as the certificate purpose satisfies the application requirements.
- You do not need more than one identity certificate from a trust point or more than one key-pair to be associated to a trust point. A CA certifies a given identity (name) only once and does not issue multiple certificates with the same subject name. If you need more than one identity certificate for a CA, then define another trust point for the same CA, associate another key-pair to it, and have it certified, provided CA allows multiple certificates with the same subject name.

Multiple Trusted Certificate Authorities

Multiple trusted (Certificate Authorities) CA support enables a switch to verify the identity of devices enrolled in different CA domains. With multiple trusted CAs, you do not have to enroll a switch with the specific CA that issued a certificate to a peer. Instead, you configure the switch with multiple trusted CAs that the peer also trusts. A switch can then use a configured trusted CA to verify certificates offered by a peer that were not issued by the same CA defined in the identity certificate of the local switch. This can be used by IKE when establishing IPsec tunnels.

Multiple Identity Certificate Authorities

Multiple identity Certificate Authorities (CA) support enables a switch to enroll with more than one trust point. This results in multiple identity certificates; each from a distinct CA. This allows the switch to participate in IPsec and other applications with many peers using certificates issued by appropriate CAs that are acceptable to those peers.


The multiple RSA key-pair support feature allows the switch to maintain a distinct key-pair for each CA with which it is enrolled. Thus, it can match policy requirements for each CA without conflicting with the requirements specified by the other CAs, such as key length. When enrolling with a trust point, the associated key-pair is used to construct the certificate signing request.

PKI Enrollment

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Enrollment is the process of obtaining an identity certificate for the switch that is used for applications such as IPsec/IKE or SSH. It occurs between the MDS switch requesting the certificate and the Certificate Authority.

The figure below and the following steps describe the certificate enrollment process.

Figure 1: Certificate Enrollment Process



The process involves the following steps:

1. Generate an RSA private and public key-pair.
2. Generate a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in standard format and forward it to the CA.
3. Approve the CSR on the CA to generate the identity certificate, signed by the CA's private key, and forward it to the MDS switch administrator. Manual intervention on the CA by the CA administrator may be required to approve the request.
4. Install the identity certificate from the CA on the MDS switch.
5. Save the certificate into a nonvolatile storage area on the MDS switch.

RSA key-pairs and CSRs may be generated either on the switch or on another device with suitable utilities. If key-pairs are generated on another device they must be installed on the MDS switch as well as the identity certificates. The MDS switch does not support all the possible fields for CSRs. CSR generating tools on other devices may allow specification of more fields than enrollment done from the MDS switch.

Manual Enrollment Using the Cut-and-Paste Method

Cisco MDS NX-OS supports certificate retrieval and enrollment using the manual cut-and-paste method. Cut-and-paste enrollment means you must cut and paste the certificate requests and resulting certificates between the switch and the CA, as follows:

1. Create an enrollment certificate signing request, which is displayed in base64 encoded textform.
2. Cut and paste the encoded certificate request text in an e-mail message and send it to the CA or in a web form on the CA.
3. Receive the issued certificate in base64 encoded text form from the CA in an e-mail message or in a web browser download.
4. Cut and paste the issued certificate to the switch using the **certificate import** command.

Peer Certificate Verification

PKI support on an MDS switch provides the means to verify peer certificates. The switch verifies certificates presented by peers during security exchanges for applications, such as IPsec/IKE and SSH. The applications

verify the validity of the peer certificates presented to them. The peer certificate verification process involves the following steps:

- Verifies that the peer certificate is issued by one of the locally trusted CAs.
- Verifies that the peer certificate is valid (not expired) with respect to current time.
- Verifies that the peer certificate is not yet revoked by the issuing CA.

For revocation checking, the switch can use the certificate revocation list (CRL) method. A trust point uses the CRL method to verify that the peer certificate has not been revoked.

CRL Downloading, Caching, and Checking Support

Certificate revocation lists (CRLs) are maintained by CAs to give information of revoked certificates, and are published in a repository. The download URL is made public and also specified in all issued certificates. A client verifying a peer's certificate should obtain the latest CRL from the issuing CA and use it to determine if the certificate has been revoked. A client can cache the CRLs of some or all of its trusted CAs locally and use them later, if necessary, until the CRLs expire.

Cisco MDS NX-OS allows the manual configuration of pre-downloaded of CRLs for the trust points, and then caches them in the switch certificate store. During the verification of a peer certificate, the issuing CA's CRL is consulted only if the CRL has already been cached locally and the revocation checking is configured to use CRL. Otherwise, CRL checking is not performed and the certificate is considered to be not revoked if no other revocation checking methods are configured. This mode of CRL checking is called CRL optional.

Import and Export of Certificates and Associated Key-Pairs

As part of the CA authentication and enrollment process, the subordinate CA certificate (or certificate chain) and identity certificates are imported in standard PEM (base64) format. If key-pairs have been externally generated they need to be imported in a separate step.

The complete identity information in a trust point can be exported to a file in the password-protected PKCS12 standard format. It can be later imported to the same switch (for example, after a system crash) or to a replacement switch. The information in a PKCS12 file consists of the RSA key-pair, the identity certificate, and the CA certificate (or chain).

Configuring Certificate Authorities and Digital Certificates

This section describes the tasks that you must perform to allow CAs and digital certificates for your Cisco MDS switch device to interoperate:

Configuring the Host Name and IP Domain Name

You must configure the host name and IP domain name of the switch if they are not already configured. This is required because the switch FQDN is used as the subject in the identity certificate. Also, the switch FQDN is used as a default key label when none is specified during key-pair generation. For example, a certificate named SwitchA.example.com is based on a switch host name of SwitchA and a switch IP domain name of example.com.



Caution Changing the IP host name or IP domain name after generating the certificate can invalidate the certificate.

To configure the IP host name and IP domain name of the switch, follow these steps:

Procedure

- Step 1** switch# **configure terminal**
switch(config)#
Enters configuration mode.
- Step 2** switch(config)# **switchname SwitchA**
Configures the IP host name of the switch as "SwitchA".
- Step 3** SwitchA(config)# **ip domain-name example.com**
Configures the IP domain name of the switch as "example.com".
-

Generating an RSA Key-Pair

RSA key-pairs are used to sign and/or encrypt and decrypt the security payload during security protocol exchanges for applications such as IKE/IPsec and SSH, and they are required before you can obtain a certificate for your switch.

To generate an RSA key-pair, follow these steps:

Procedure

- Step 1** switch# **configure terminal**
switch(config)#
Enters configuration mode.
- Step 2** switch(config)# **crypto key generate rsa**
Generates an RSA key-pair with the switch FQDN as the default label and 512 as the default modulus. By default, the key is not exportable.
- Note** The security policy (or requirement) at the local site (MDS switch) and at the CA (where enrollment is planned) should be considered in deciding the appropriate key modulus.
- For more information about the maximum RSA key-pairs supported, see the [Maximum Limits, on page 40](#) section.
- Step 3** switch(config)# **crypto key generate rsa label SwitchA modulus 768**
Generates an RSA key-pair with the label SwitchA and modulus 768. Valid modulus values are 512, 768, 1024, 1536, 2048, and 4096. By default, the key is not exportable.

Step 4 switch(config)# **crypto key generate rsa exportable**

Generates an RSA key-pair with the switch FQDN as the default label and 512 as the default modulus. The key is exportable.

Caution The exportability of a key-pair cannot be changed after key-pair generation.

Note Only exportable key-pairs can be exported in PKCS#12 format.

Creating a Trust Point Certificate Authority Association

You must associate the Cisco MDS device with a trust point CA.

To create a trust point CA association, follow these steps:

Procedure

Step 1 switch(config)# **crypto ca trustpoint admin-ca**

```
switch(config-trustpoint)#
```

Declares a trust point CA called "admin-ca" that the switch should trust and enters trust point configuration submode for this trust point.

Note The maximum number of trust points that you can declare on a switch is 16.

Step 2 switch(config)# **no crypto ca trustpoint admin-ca**

(Optional) Removes the trust point CA.

Step 3 switch(config-trustpoint)# **enroll terminal**

Specifies manual cut-and-paste certificate enrollment (default).

Note Manual cut-and-paste certificate enrollment is the only method supported for enrollment.

Step 4 switch(config-trustpoint)# **rsa keypair SwitchA**

Specifies the label of the RSA key-pair to be associated to this trust point for the purpose of enrollment. It was generated earlier in the [Generating an RSA Key-Pair, on page 6](#) section. Only one RSA key-pair can be specified per CA.

Step 5 switch(config-trustpoint)# **no rsa keypair SwitchA**

(Optional) Disassociates the RSA key-pair from the trust point.

Step 6 switch(config-trustpoint)# **end**

```
switch#
```

Exits trust point configuration submode.

Step 7 switch# **copy running-config startup-config**

Copies the running configuration to the startup configuration so that the configuration is persistent across reboots.

Authenticating a Trust Point Certificate Authority

The configuration process of trusting a Certificate Authority (CA) is complete only when the CA is authenticated to the MDS switch. The switch must authenticate the CA. It does this by obtaining the self-signed certificate of the CA in PEM format, which contains the public key of the CA. Because the certificate of the CA is self-signed (the CA signs its own certificate) the public key of the CA should be manually authenticated by contacting the CA administrator to compare the fingerprint of the CA certificate.



Note If the CA being authenticated is not a self-signed CA (that is, it is a subordinate CA to another CA, which itself may be a subordinate to yet another CA, and so on, finally ending in a self-signed CA), then the full list of the CA certificates of all the CAs in the certification chain needs to be input during the CA authentication step. This is called the *CA certificate chain* of the CA being authenticated. The maximum number of certificates in a CA certificate chain is 10.

To authenticate the certificate of the CA by cutting and pasting the certificate from an e-mail message or a website, follow these steps:

Procedure

Step 1 switch# **configure terminal**

```
switch(config)#
```

Enters configuration mode.

Step 2 switch(config)# **crypto ca authenticate admin-ca**

```
xEzARBgNVBAsTCm51dHN0b3JhZ2UxeEjAQBGNVBAMTCUFwYXJuYSBD
QTAEFw0wNTA1MDMyMjQ2MzdaFw0wNzA1MDMyMjU1MTdaMIGQMSAwHgYJKoZIhvcN
AQkBFHfHbWfFuZGt1QGNpc2NvLmNvbTELMakGA1UEBhMCSU4xeEjAQBGNVBAGTCUth
cm5hdGFrYTESMBAGA1UEBxMJQmFuZ2Fsb3JlMQ4wDAYDVQQKEwVdXNjbzETMBEG
A1UECXMKbMv0c3RvcnFnZTESMBAGA1UEAxMJQXBhcm5hIENBMFwwDQYJKoZIhvcN
AQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAMW/7b3+DXJPANBsIHHz1uNccNM87ypyzwuoSNZXOMpeRXXI
OzyBAGiXT2ASFuUOwQ1iDM8rO/41jf8RxxvYKvysCAwEAAaOBvzCBvDALBgNVHQ8E
BAMCAcYwDwYDVR0TAAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUJyJyRoMbrCNMRU2OyRhQ
GgsWbHEwawYDVR0fBGQwYjAuoCygKoYoaHR0cDovL3NzZS0wOC9DZXJ0RW5yb2xs
L0FwYXJuYSUyMENBLmNybDAwOC6gLIYqZmlsZTovL1xccc3N1LTA4XEN1cnRFbnJv
bGxcQXBhcm5hJTIwQ0EuY3JsbGAGCSsGAQQBgjcvVAQDQAgEAMA0GCSqSIB3DQEB
BQUAAOEAHv6UQ+8nE399Tww+KaGr0g0NIJaNgLh0AFcT0rEyuyt/WYGPzksF9EA
NBG7E0oN66zex0EOEfG1Vs6mXp1//w==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
END OF INPUT
Fingerprint(s): MD5 Fingerprint=65:84:9A:27:D5:71:03:33:9C:12:23:92:38:6F:78:12
```

Do you accept this certificate? [yes/no]: y

Prompts you to cut and paste the certificate of the CA. Use the same name that you used when declaring the CA.

Note The maximum number of trust points you can authenticate to a specific CA is 10.

Note For subordinate CA authentication, the full chain of CA certificates ending in a self-signed CA is required because the CA chain is needed for certificate verification as well as for PKCS#12 format export.

Configuring Certificate Revocation Checking Methods

During security exchanges with a client (for example, an IKE peer or SSH user), the Cisco MDS switch performs the certificate verification of the peer certificate sent by the client. The verification process may involve certificate revocation status checking.

You can use different methods for checking revoked sender certificates. You can configure the switch to check the Certificate revocation lists (CRL) downloaded from the Certificate Authorities (CA) (see the [Configuring a CRL, on page 14](#) section). Downloading the CRL and checking locally does not generate traffic in your network. However, certificates can be revoked between downloads and your switch would not be aware of the revocation. Using local CRL checking provides the most secure method for checking for revoked certificates.



Note You must authenticate the CA before configuring certificate revocation checking.

To configure certificate revocation checking methods, follow these steps:

Procedure

- Step 1** `switch(config)# crypto ca trustpoint admin-ca`
`switch(config-trustpoint)#`
Declares a trust point CA that the switch should trust and enters trust point configuration submode.
- Step 2** `switch(config-trustpoint)# revocation-check crl`
Specifies CRL (default) as the revocation checking method to be employed during verification of peer certificates issued by the same CA as that of this trust point.
- Step 3** `switch(config-trustpoint)# revocation-check none`
Does not check for revoked certificates.
- Step 4** (Optional) `switch(config-trustpoint)# no revocation-check`
Reverts to default method.
-

Generating Certificate Signing Requests

You must generate a request to obtain identity certificates from a trust point CA for each of your switch's RSA key-pairs. You must then cut and paste the displayed request into an e-mail message or in a website form for the CA.

To generate a request for signed certificates from the CA, follow these steps:

Procedure

-
- Step 1** switch# **configure terminal**
- switch(config)#
- Enters configuration mode.
- Step 2** switch(config)# **crypto ca enroll admin-ca**
- Create the certificate request..
 Create a challenge password. You will need to verbally provide this password to the CA Administrator in order to revoke your certificate. For security reasons your password will not be saved in the configuration. Please make a note of it.
 Password: abc123
 The subject name in the certificate will be: SwitchA.example.com
 Include the switch serial number in the subject name? [yes/no]: no
 Include an IP address in the subject name [yes/no]: yes
 ip address: 192.168.31.162
 The certificate request will be displayed...
 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
 MIIBqzCCARQCAQAwHDEaMBGGA1UEAxMRVmVnYXNjby5jb20wgZ8wDQYJ
 KoZlHvcNAQEEBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAL8Y1UAJ2NC7jUJ1DVA5MqNIgJ2kt8r14lKY
 0JC6ManNy4qxk8VeMXZSiLJ4JgTzKWdxblDkTTysnjuCXGvjb+wj0hEhv/y51T9y
 P2NJU8ornqShrvFzgC7ysN/PyMwKcgzhhVpj+rargZvHtGJ91XTq4WoVksCzXv8S
 VqyH0vEvAgMBAAGgTzAVBqkqhkiG9w0BCQcxCBMGBmJ2MTIzMDYGCsQSIb3DQEJ
 DjEpMCCwJQYDVR0RAQH/BBswGYIRVmVnYXNjby5jb20wZ8wDQYJ
 KoZlHvcNAQEEBQADgYEAKT60KER6Qo8nj0sDXZVHSfJZh6K6JtDz3Gkd99G1FWgt
 PftrNcWUE/pw6HayfQ12T3ecgNwel2d15133YBF2bktExiI6U188nTOjglXMjja8
 8a23bNDpNsM8rklwA6hWkrVL8NUZEFJxqbjfngPNTZacJCUS6ZqKCMetbKytUx0=
 -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----

Generates a certificate request for an authenticated CA.

Note The challenge password is not saved with the configuration. This password is required in the event that your certificate needs to be revoked, so you must remember this password.

Installing Identity Certificates

You receive the identity certificate from the CA by e-mail or through a web browser in base64 encoded text form. You must install the identity certificate from the CA by cutting and pasting the encoded text using the CLI import facility.

To install an identity certificate received from the CA by e-mail or through a web browser, follow these steps:

Procedure

- Step 1** switch# **configure terminal**
- switch(config)#
- Enters configuration mode.
- Step 2** switch(config)# **crypto ca import admin-ca certificate**

```
input (cut & paste) certificate in PEM format:
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

Prompts you to cut and paste the identity certificate for the CA named "admin-ca". If the certificate was not issued by a root CA, then this will have multiple "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" lines and end with the root CA certificate. Paste the whole certificate chain supplied by the CA and ensure that the text terminates with an "END CERTIFICATE" line.

Note The maximum number of identify certificates that you can configure on a switch are 16.

Ensuring Trust Point Configurations Persist Across Reboots

The trust point configuration is a normal Cisco NX-OS configuration that persists across system reboots only if you copy it explicitly to the startup configuration. The certificates, key-pairs, and CRL associated with a trust point are automatically persistent if you have already copied the trust point configuration in the startup configuration. Conversely, if the trust point configuration is not copied to the startup configuration, the certificates, key-pairs, and CRL associated with it are not persistent since they require the corresponding trust point configuration after a reboot. Always copy the running configuration to the startup configuration to ensure that the configured certificates, key-pairs, and CRLs are persistent. Also, save the running configuration after deleting a certificate or key-pair to ensure that the deletions are permanent.

The certificates and CRL associated with a trust point automatically become persistent when imported (that is, without an explicitly copying to the startup configuration) if the specific trust point is already saved in startup configuration.

We also recommend that you create a password-protected backup of the identity certificates and save it to an external server (see [Exporting Identity Information in PKCS12 Format, on page 13](#)).



Note Copying the running or startup configuration to an external server does include the certificates and key-pairs.

1. `switch# copy running-config startup-config`

Saves the current configuration to startup configuration.

Monitoring and Maintaining Certificate Authorities and Certificates Configuration

The tasks in the section are optional.

Generating A Key-Pair and Certificate Signing Request on Another Device

RSA key-pairs and CSRs may be generated on another device. For example, to generate these on a host using openssl, follow these steps:

1. `host$ openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout SwitchA.example.com-rsa-pem.privatekey -out SwitchA.example.com-pkcs10.csr`

```
Generating a 2048 bit RSA private key
.....+++
.....+++
writing new private key to SwitchA.example.com-rsa-pem.privatekey'
Enter PEM pass phrase:abc123
Verifying - Enter PEM pass phrase:abc123
-----
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
-----
Country Name (2 letter code) []:BE
State or Province Name (full name) []:Brussels
Locality Name (eg, city) []:Brussels
Organization Name (eg, company) []:Example
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:SAN
Common Name (eg, fully qualified host name) []:SwitchA.example.com
Email Address []:cert-admin@example.com

Please enter the following 'extra' attributes
to be sent with your certificate request
A challenge password []:abc123
```

Generates an RSA key-pair with a key modulus of 2048-bits and CSR using the switch FQDN.

2. `host$ cat SwitchA.example.com-pkcs10.csr`

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
...
-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
```

Displays the generated base-64 format CSR for sending to the CA.

Exporting Identity Information in PKCS12 Format

You can export the identity certificate along with the RSA key-pair and CA certificate (or the entire chain in the case of a subordinate CA) of a trust point to a PKCS12 file for backup purposes. You can later import the certificate and RSA key-pair to recover from a system crash on your switch or when you replace supervisor modules.



Note Only the `bootflash:filename` format local syntax is supported when specifying the export and import URL.

To export a certificate and key-pair to a PKCS12 formatted file, follow these steps:

Procedure

- Step 1** switch# **configure terminal**
switch(config)#
Enters configuration mode.
- Step 2** switch(config)# **crypto ca export admin-ca pkcs12 bootflash:adminid.p12 abc123**
Exports the identity certificate and associated key-pair and CA certificates for trust point "admin-ca" to the file `bootflash:adminid.p12` in PKCS12 format, protected using password "abc123".
- Step 3** switch(config)# **exit**
switch#
Returns to EXEC mode.
- Step 4** switch# **copy bootflash:adminid.p12 tftp:adminid.p12**
Copies the PKCS12 format file to a TFTP server.
-

Importing Identity Information in PKCS12 Format

To import a certificate and/or key-pair from a PKCS12 formatted file, follow these steps:

Procedure

- Step 1** switch# **copy tftp:adminid.p12 bootflash:adminid.p12**
Copies the PKCS12 format file from a TFTP server.

Step 2 switch# **configure terminal**

```
switch(config)#
```

Enters configuration mode.

Step 3 switch(config)# **crypto ca import admin-ca pkcs12 bootflash:adminid.p12 abc123**

Imports the identity certificate and associated key-pair and CA certificates for trust point "admin-ca" from the file bootflash:adminid.p12 in PKCS12 format, protected using password "abc123".

Configuring a CRL

To import the CRL from a file to a trust point, follow these steps:

Procedure

Step 1 switch# **copy tftp:adminca.crl bootflash:adminca.crl**

Downloads the CRL.

Step 2 switch# **configure terminal**

```
switch(config)#
```

Enters configuration mode.

Step 3 switch(config)# **crypto ca crl request admin-ca bootflash:adminca.crl**

Configures or replaces the current CRL with the one specified in the file.

Deleting Certificates from the Certificate Authorities Configuration

You can delete the identity certificates and Certificate Authorities (CA) certificates that are configured in a trust point. You must first delete the identity certificate, followed by the CA certificates. After deleting the identity certificate, you can disassociate the RSA key-pair from a trust point. The certificate deletion is necessary to remove expired or revoked certificates, certificates whose key-pairs are compromised (or suspected to be compromised) or CAs that are no longer trusted.

To delete the CA certificate (or the entire chain in the case of a subordinate CA) from a trust point, follow these steps:

Procedure

Step 1 switch# **configure terminal**

```
switch(config)#
```

Enters configuration mode.

Step 2 switch(config)# **crypto ca trustpoint myCA**

Enters trustpoint configuration submode.

Step 3 switch(config-trustpoint)# **delete ca-certificate**

Deletes the CA certificate or certificate chain.

Step 4 switch(config-trustpoint)# **delete certificate**

Deletes the identity certificate.

Step 5 switch(config-trustpoint)# **delete certificate force**

Forces the deletion of the identity certificate.

Note If the identity certificate being deleted is the last-most or only identity certificate in the device, you must use the **force** option to delete it. This ensures that the administrator does not mistakenly delete the last-most or only identity certificate and leave the applications (such as IKE and SSH) without a certificate to use.

Step 6 switch(config-trustpoint)# **end**

switch#

Returns to EXEC mode.

Step 7 switch# **copy running-config startup-config**

Copies the running configuration to the startup configuration to ensure the configuration is persistent across reboots.

Deleting RSA Key-Pairs from Your Switch

Under certain circumstances you may want to delete your switch's RSA key-pairs. For example, if you believe the RSA key-pairs were compromised in some way and should no longer be used, you should delete the key-pairs.

To delete RSA key-pairs from your switch, follow these steps:

Procedure

Step 1 switch# **configure terminal**

switch(config)#

Enters configuration mode.

Step 2 switch(config)# **crypto key zeroize rsa MyKey**

Deletes the RSA key-pair whose label is MyKey.

Step 3 switch(config)# **end**

switch#

Returns to EXEC mode.

Step 4 switch# **copy running-config startup-config**

Copies the running configuration to the startup configuration to ensure the configuration is persistent across reboots.

Example



Note After you delete RSA key-pairs from a switch, ask the CA administrator to revoke your switch's certificates at the CA. You must supply the challenge password you created when you originally requested the certificates. See [Generating Certificate Signing Requests, on page 10](#).

Displaying Key-Pair and Certificate Authorities Information

To view key-pair and Certificate Authorities (CA) information, use the following commands:

Command	Purpose
switch# show crypto key mypubkey rsa	Displays information about the switch's RSA public keys.
switch# show crypto ca certificates	Displays information on CA and identity certificates.
switch# show crypto ca crt	Displays information about CA CRLs.
switch# show crypto ca trustpoints	Displays information about CA trust points.

Displaying Root Certificates

Secure clients validate incoming certificates from the server, but do not offer certificates. Validation is done by verifying the root certificate of the incoming certificate chain from either the bundled trustpool (certificates pre-packaged with the image) or the user installed trustpoints.

To view the bundled root certificates, use the following command:

```
switch# show crypto ca trustpool
Trustpool download status :
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number      :01
Subject            :Cisco Licensing Root CA
Issued By          :Cisco Licensing Root CA
Validity Start     :May 30 19:48:47 2013 GMT
Validity End       :May 30 19:48:47 2038 GMT
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number      :01A65AF15EE994EBE1
Subject            :Cisco Basic Assurance Root CA 2099
Issued By          :Cisco Basic Assurance Root CA 2099
Validity Start     :May 26 19:19:29 2017 GMT
Validity End       :May 26 19:19:29 2099 GMT
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number      :03
Subject            :Cisco ECC Root CA
Issued By          :Cisco ECC Root CA
```



```
Validity Start      :Apr  4 08:15:44 2013 GMT
Validity End       :Sep  7 16:24:07 2099 GMT
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number      :5FF87B282B54DC8D42A315B568C9ADFF
Subject            :Cisco Root CA 2048
Issued By          :Cisco Root CA 2048
Validity Start     :May 14 20:17:12 2004 GMT
Validity End       :May 14 20:25:42 2029 GMT
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number      :019A335878CE16C1C1
Subject            :Cisco Root CA 2099
Issued By          :Cisco Root CA 2099
Validity Start     :Aug  9 20:58:28 2016 GMT
Validity End       :Aug  9 20:58:28 2099 GMT
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number      :2ED20E7347D333834B4FDD0DD7B6967E
Subject            :Cisco Root CA M1
Issued By          :Cisco Root CA M1
Validity Start     :Nov 18 21:50:24 2008 GMT
Validity End       :Nov 18 21:59:46 2033 GMT
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number      :01
Subject            :Cisco Root CA M2
Issued By          :Cisco Root CA M2
Validity Start     :Nov 12 13:00:18 2012 GMT
Validity End       :Nov 12 13:00:18 2037 GMT
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number      :01
Subject            :Cisco RXC-R2
Issued By          :Cisco RXC-R2
Validity Start     :Jul  9 21:46:56 2014 GMT
Validity End       :Jul  9 21:46:56 2034 GMT
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number      :066C9FCF99BF8C0A39E2F0788A43E696365BCA
Subject            :Amazon Root CA 1
Issued By          :Amazon Root CA 1
Validity Start     :May 26 00:00:00 2015 GMT
Validity End       :Jan 17 00:00:00 2038 GMT
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number      :066C9FD29635869F0A0FE58678F85B26BB8A37
Subject            :Amazon Root CA 2
Issued By          :Amazon Root CA 2
Validity Start     :May 26 00:00:00 2015 GMT
Validity End       :May 26 00:00:00 2040 GMT
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number      :066C9FD5749736663F3B0B9AD9E89E7603F24A
Subject            :Amazon Root CA 3
Issued By          :Amazon Root CA 3
Validity Start     :May 26 00:00:00 2015 GMT
Validity End       :May 26 00:00:00 2040 GMT
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number      :066C9FD7C1BB104C2943E5717B7B2CC81AC10E
Subject            :Amazon Root CA 4
Issued By          :Amazon Root CA 4
Validity Start     :May 26 00:00:00 2015 GMT
```

```

Validity End          :May 26 00:00:00 2040 GMT
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number        :083BE056904246B1A1756AC95991C74A
Subject              :DigiCert Global Root CA
Issued By            :DigiCert Global Root CA
Validity Start       :Nov 10 00:00:00 2006 GMT
Validity End         :Nov 10 00:00:00 2031 GMT
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number        :0A014280000014523C844B500000002
Subject              :IdenTrust Commercial Root CA 1
Issued By            :IdenTrust Commercial Root CA 1
Validity Start       :Jan 16 18:12:23 2014 GMT
Validity End         :Jan 16 18:12:23 2034 GMT
=====
CA certificate
Serial Number        :0509
Subject              :QuoVadis Root CA 2
Issued By            :QuoVadis Root CA 2
Validity Start       :Nov 24 18:27:00 2006 GMT
Validity End         :Nov 24 18:23:33 2031 GMT

```

To view the user-installed certificates, use the following command:

```

switch# show crypto ca certificates
Trustpoint: myCA
CA certificate 0:
subject= /O=Cisco Systems/CN=TEST-SSL-CA
issuer= /O=Cisco Systems/CN=TEST Root CA 2048
serial=54AEC560000000000043
notBefore=Feb 25 23:21:52 2009 GMT
notAfter=Feb 19 21:09:53 2034 GMT
SHA1 Fingerprint=C7:8E:BB:8D:ED:FD:CF:A0:14:C6:B3:D9:F2:FF:3F:F1:38:2A:0F:D4
purposes: sslserver sslclient
CA certificate 1:
subject= /O=Cisco Systems/CN=TEST Root CA 2048
issuer= /O=Cisco Systems/CN=TEST Root CA 2048
serial=228AFC0C5220CDA94E298AF8CDAD4243
notBefore=Feb 19 21:01:38 2004 GMT
notAfter=Aug 11 20:29:31 2034 GMT
SHA1 Fingerprint=91:AD:ED:70:CB:E0:1A:D5:9A:18:DC:EF:82:B2:1C:A9:60:7D:3C:2D
purposes: sslserver sslclient

```

Example Configurations

This section shows an example of the tasks that you can use to configure certificates and CRLs on the Cisco MDS 9000 Family switches using the Microsoft Windows Certificate server.

Configuring Certificates on the MDS Switch

To configure certificates on an MDS switch, follow these steps:

Procedure

Step 1 Configure the switch FQDN.

```
switch# configure terminal
Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z.
switch(config)# switchname SwitchA
SwitchA(config)#
```

Step 2 Configure the DNS domain name for the switch.

```
SwitchA(config)# ip domain-name example.com
SwitchA(config)#
```

Step 3 Create a trust point.

```
SwitchA(config)# crypto ca trustpoint myCA
SwitchA(config-trustpoint)# exit
SwitchA(config)# show crypto ca trustpoints

trustpoint: myCA; key:
revokation methods: crl
SwitchA(config)#
```

Step 4 Create an RSA key-pair for the switch.

```
SwitchA(config)# crypto key generate rsa label myKey exportable modulus 1024
SwitchA(config)# show crypto key mypubkey rsa

key label: myKey
key size: 1024
exportable: yes
SwitchA(config)#
```

Step 5 Associate the RSA key-pair to the trust point.

```
SwitchA(config)# crypto ca trustpoint myCA
SwitchA(config-trustpoint)# rsakeypair myKey
SwitchA(config-trustpoint)# exit
SwitchA(config)# show crypto ca trustpoints

trustpoint: myCA; key: myKey
revokation methods: crl
SwitchA(config)#
```

Step 6 Download the CA certificate from the Microsoft Certificate Service web interface (see [Downloading a Certificate Authorities Certificate, on page 22](#))

Step 7 Authenticate the CA that you want to enroll to the trust point.

```
SwitchA(config)# crypto ca authenticate myCA

input (cut & paste) CA certificate (chain) in PEM format;
end the input with a line containing only END OF INPUT :
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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```

```
OzyBAGiXT2ASFuUOwQ1iDM8rO/41jf8RxvYKvysCAwEAAaOBvzCBvDALBgNVHQ8E
BAMCAcYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUJyJyRoMbrCNMRU2OyRhQ
GgsWbHEwawYDVR0fBGQwYjAuoCygKoYoaHR0cDovL3NzZS0wOC9DZXJ0RW5yb2xs
L0FwYXJ0YSUyMENBLmNybdAwoc6gLIYqZmlsZTovL1xccc3NlLTA4XENLcnRFbnJv
bGxcQXBhcm5hJTItwQ0EuY3JsbGAGCSsGAQQBbjcVAQQDAgEAMA0GCSqGSIB3DQEB
BQUAA0EAHV6UQ+8nE399Tww+KaGr0g0NIJaQNgLh0AFcT0rEyuyt/WYGPzksF9Ea
NBG7E0cN66zex0EOEFG1Vs6mXp1//w==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
END OF INPUT
Fingerprint(s): MD5 Fingerprint=65:84:9A:27:D5:71:03:33:9C:12:23:92:38:6F:78:12
```

```
Do you accept this certificate? [yes/no]:y
SwitchA(config)#
SwitchA(config)# show crypto ca certificates
```

```
Trustpoint: myCA
CA certificate 0:
subject= /emailAddress=admin@yourcompany.com/C=IN/ST=Karnataka/L=Bangalore/O=Yourcompany/O
U=netstorage/CN=Aparna CA
issuer= /emailAddress=admin@yourcompany.com/C=IN/ST=Karnataka/L=Bangalore/O=Yourcompany/OU
=netstorage/CN=Aparna CA
serial=0560D289ACB419944F4912258CAD197A
notBefore=May 3 22:46:37 2005 GMT
notAfter=May 3 22:55:17 2007 GMT
MD5 Fingerprint=65:84:9A:27:D5:71:03:33:9C:12:23:92:38:6F:78:12
purposes: sslserver sslclient ike
```

Step 8 Generate a request certificate to use to enroll with a trust point.

```
SwitchA(config)# crypto ca enroll myCA

Create the certificate request..
Create a challenge password. You will need to verbally provide this
password to the CA Administrator in order to revoke your certificate.
For security reasons your password will not be saved in the configuration.
Please make a note of it.
Password:abc123
The subject name in the certificate will be: SwitchA.example.com
Include the switch serial number in the subject name? [yes/no]:no
Include an IP address in the subject name [yes/no]:yes
ip address:10.10.1.1
The certificate request will be displayed...
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
MIIBqzCCARQAQAwHDEaMBGGA1UEAxMRVmnVnYXNjby5jb20wgZ8wDQYJ
KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAL8Y1UAJ2NC7jUJ1DVA5MqNIgJ2kt8rl41KY
0JC6ManNy4qxk8VeMXZSiLJ4JgTzKWdxBLDkTTysnjucXGvjb+wj0hEhv/y51T9y
P2NJJ8ornqShrvFZgC7ysN/PyMwKcgzhbVpj+rargZvHtGJ91XTq4WoVksCzXv8S
VqyH0vEvAgMBAAGTzAVBgkqhkiG9w0BCQcxCBMGMj2MTIzMDYGCsGSIb3DQEB
DjEpMCcwJQYDVR0RAQH/BSswGYIRVmVnYXNjby5jb22HBKwWH6IwDQYJ
KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgYEAkT60KER6Qo8nj0sDXZVHSfJZh6K6JtDz3Gkd99G1FWgt
PftrNcWUE/pw6HayfQ12T3ecgNwel2d15133YBF2bktExiI6U188nTOjglXMjja8
8a23bNDpNsM8rklwA6hWkrVL8NUZEFJxqbjfngPNTZacJCUS6ZqKCMetbKytUx0=
-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----

SwitchA(config)#
```

Step 9 Request an identity certificate from the Microsoft Certificate Service web interface (see [Requesting an Identity Certificate](#), on page 25).

Step 10 Import the identity certificate.

```
SwitchA(config)# crypto ca import myCA certificate

input (cut & paste) certificate in PEM format:
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIEADCCA6ggAwIBAgIKCj0OoQAAAAAdDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADCbDEgMB4G
CSqGSIB3DQEJARYRYW1hbmRrZUBjaXNjby5jb20xCzAJBgNVBAYTAklOMRIWEAYD
VQQIEWw1LlYXJuYXRha2ExEjAQBGNVBAcTCUJhbmdhbG9yZTEOMAwGA1UEChMFQ21z
Y28xEzARBGNVBAStcm5ldHN0b3JhZ2UxEjAQBGNVBAMTCUFwYXJuYSBDQTAeFw0w
NTEwMTIwMzAyNDBaFw0wNjExMTIwMzEyNDBaMBwxGjAYBgNVBAMTEVZlZ2FzLzE2
Y21zY28uY29tMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBQUAA4GNADCBiQKkgQC/GNVACdjQu41C
dQ1WkjkjSICdpLfk5eJSmNCUjGpzcukSjZPFXjF2UoieCYE8ylnCwyw5E08rJ47
glxr42/sI9IRIb/8udU/cj9jSSfKK56koa7xWYAu8rDfz8jMcNIM4W1aY/q2q4Gb
x7RifdV06uFqFZEgsl7/Elash9LxLwIDAQABo4ICEzCCAgs8wJQYDVR0RAQH/BBsw
GYIRVmVnYXMTMS5jaXNjby5jb22HBKwWH6IwHQYDVR0OBBYEFKCLi+2sspWEfgrR
bhWmlVyo9jngMIHMBGNVHSMGcQwgcGAFCCo8kaDG6wjTEVNjSkYUBoLFmxxoYGW
pIGTMIGQMSAwHgYJKoZiHvcNAQkBFhFhbWwFuZGt1QGNpc2NvLmNvbTELMakGA1UE
BHMCSU4xEjAQBGNVBAgTCUthcm5hdGFrYTESMBAGALUEBxMJQmFuZ2Fsb3JlMQ4w
DAYDVQQKEwVdaXNjczETMBEGA1UECXMkbnV0c3RvcmlmZnZTESMBAGALUEAxMjQX
cm5hIENBghAFYnkjRlZ21E9JEiWMrRl6MGsGALUdHwRkMGUwLQAsocQgKgh0dHA6
Ly9zc2UtdGvQ2VydEVucm9sbC9BcGFybmElMjBDQS5jcmwwMKAuoCyGKmZpbGU6
Ly9cXHNzZS0wOFxDZXJ0RW5yb2xsXEFwYXJuYSUyMENBLmNybDCBbigYIKwYBBQUH
AQEEfjB8MDsGCCsGAQUFBzAChi9odHRwOi8vc3NlLTA4L0N1cnRfbnJvbGwvc3Nl
LTA4X0FwYXJuYSUyMENBLmNydDA9BggrBgEFBQcwAoYxZmlsZTovLl1xc3NlLTA4
FEN1cnRfbnJvbGwvc3NlLTA4X0FwYXJuYSUyMENBLmNydDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUF
AANBAdBGBGsbE7GNLh9xeOTWBNbm24U69ZSuDDcOcUZUUTgrpnTqVpPyejtsyflw
E36cIZu4WsExREqxbTk8ycx7V5o=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
SwitchA(config)# exit
SwitchA#
```

Step 11 Verify the certificate configuration.

```
SwitchA# show crypto ca certificates
```

```
Trustpoint: myCA
certificate:
subject= /CN=SwitchA.example.com
issuer= /emailAddress=admin@yourcompany.com/C=IN/ST=Karnataka/L=Bangalore/O=Cisco/OU
=netstorage/CN=Aparna CA
serial=0A338EA1000000000074
notBefore=Nov 12 03:02:40 2005 GMT
notAfter=Nov 12 03:12:40 2006 GMT
MD5 Fingerprint=3D:33:62:3D:B4:DO:87:A0:70:DE:A3:87:B3:4E:24:BF
purposes: sslserver sslclient ike
```

```
CA certificate 0:
subject= /emailAddress=admin@yourcompany.com/C=IN/ST=Karnataka/L=Bangalore/O=Yourcompany/O
U=netstorage/CN=Aparna CA
issuer= /emailAddress=admin@yourcompany.com/C=IN/ST=Karnataka/L=Bangalore/O=Yourcompany/OU
=netstorage/CN=Aparna CA
serial=0560D289ACB419944F4912258CAD197A
notBefore=May 3 22:46:37 2005 GMT
notAfter=May 3 22:55:17 2007 GMT
MD5 Fingerprint=65:84:9A:27:D5:71:03:33:9C:12:23:92:38:6F:78:12
purposes: sslserver sslclient ike
```

Step 12 Save the certificate configuration to the startup configuration.


```
SwitchA# copy running-config startup-config
```

Downloading a Certificate Authorities Certificate


To download a Certificate Authorities (CA) certificate from the Microsoft Certificate Services web interface, follow these steps:

Procedure


- Step 1** Click the **Retrieve the CA certificate or certificate revocation task** radio button in the Microsoft Certificate Services web interface and click the **Next** button.



- Step 2** Select the CA certificate file to download from the displayed list. Click the **Base 64 encoded** radio button, and choose the **Download CA certificate** link.




Step 3 Click the **Open** button in the File Download dialog box.




144759

Step 4 Click the **Copy to File** button in the Certificate dialog box and click **OK**.




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Step 5 Select the **Base-64 encoded X.509 (CER)** on the Certificate Export Wizard dialog box and click **Next**.




Step 6 Enter the destination file name in the File name: text box on the Certificate Export Wizard dialog box and




click **Next**.

Step 7 Click the **Finish** button on the Certificate Export Wizard dialog box.



Step 8 Display the CA certificate stored in Base-64 (PEM) format using the Microsoft Windows **type** command.




Requesting an Identity Certificate

To request an identify certificate from a Microsoft Certificate server using a PKCS#10 certificate signing request (CRS), follow these steps:

Procedure


Step 1 Choose the **Request a certificate** radio button on the Microsoft Certificate Services web interface and click



The screenshot shows the Microsoft Certificate Services web interface for the Apama CA. The page title is "Microsoft Certificate Services -- Apama CA" and there is a "Home" link. The main heading is "Welcome". Below the heading, there is a paragraph explaining the site's purpose: "You use this web site to request a certificate for your web browser, e-mail client, or other secure program. Once you acquire a certificate, you will be able to securely identify yourself to other people over the web, sign your e-mail messages, encrypt your e-mail messages, and more depending upon the type of certificate you request." Underneath, there is a section titled "Select a task:" with three radio button options: "Retrieve the CA certificate or certificate revocation list", "Request a certificate" (which is selected), and "Check on a pending certificate". A "Next >" button is located at the bottom right of the form area. The page number "144765" is visible in the bottom right corner.

Next.

Step 2 Choose the **Advanced request** radio button and click **Next**.



The screenshot shows the Microsoft Certificate Services web interface for the Apama CA. The page title is "Microsoft Certificate Services -- Apama CA" and there is a "Home" link. The main heading is "Choose Request Type". Below the heading, there is a paragraph: "Please select the type of request you would like to make:". There are two radio button options: "User certificate request:" and "Advanced request". Under "User certificate request:", there is a dropdown menu with "Web Browser Certificate" selected and "E-Mail Protection Certificate" as an option. The "Advanced request" radio button is selected. A "Next >" button is located at the bottom right of the form area. The page number "144766" is visible in the bottom right corner.

Step 3

Choose the **Submit a certificate request using a base64 encoded PKCS#10 file or a renewal request using a base64 encoded PKCS#7 file** radio button and click **Next**.

Microsoft Certificate Services -- Aparna CA Home

Advanced Certificate Requests

You can request a certificate for yourself, another user, or a computer using one of the following methods. Note that the policy of the certification authority (CA) will determine the certificates that you can obtain.

- Submit a certificate request to this CA using a form.
- Submit a certificate request using a base64 encoded PKCS #10 file or a renewal request using a base64 encoded PKCS #7 file.
- Request a certificate for a smart card on behalf of another user using the Smart Card Enrollment Station.
You must have an enrollment agent certificate to submit a request for another user.

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Step 4

Paste the base64 PKCS 10 certificate request in the Saved Request text box and click **Next**.

The certificate request is copied from the MDS switch console (see [Generating Certificate Signing Requests, on page 10](#) and [Configuring Certificates on the MDS Switch, on page 18](#)).

Microsoft Certificate Services -- Aparna CA Home

Submit A Saved Request

Paste a base64 encoded PKCS #10 certificate request or PKCS #7 renewal request generated by an external application (such as a web server) into the request field to submit the request to the certification authority (CA).

Saved Request:

Base64 Encoded Certificate Request (PKCS #10 or #7):
 VqyHOvEvAgMBAAGgTzAVBgkqhkiG9w0BCQcxCMBC...
 -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----


[Browse](#) for a file to insert.

Additional Attributes:


Attributes: []

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
Step 5 Wait one or two days until the certificate is issued by the CA administrator.



Step 6 The CA administrator approves the certificate request.




Step 7 Choose the **Check on a pending certificate** radio button on the Microsoft Certificate Services web interface




and click **Next**.


Step 8 Select the certificate request you want to check and click **Next**.




Step 9 Select **Base 64 encoded** and click the **Download CA certificate** link.




Step 10 Click **Open** on the File Download dialog box.




Step 11 Click the **Details** tab on the Certificate dialog and click the **Copy to File** button. Choose the **Base-64 encoded X.509 (.CER)** radio button on the Certificate Export Wizard dialog box and click **Next**.



Step 12 Enter the destination file name in the **File name:** text box on the Certificate Export Wizard dialog box, then




click **Next**.



Step 13 Click **Finish**.

Step 14 Display the identity certificate in base64-encoded format using the Microsoft Windows **type** command.




Revoking a Certificate


To revoke a certificate using the Microsoft CA administrator program, follow these steps:

Procedure


- Step 1** Click the **Issued Certificates** folder on the Certification Authority tree. From the list, right-click the certificate you want to revoke.
- Step 2** Select **All Tasks > Revoke Certificate**.



- Step 3** Select a reason for the revocation from the Reason code drop-down list, and click **Yes**.



Step 4 Click the **Revoked Certificates** folder to list and verify the certificate revocation.




Generating and Publishing the CRL


To generate and publish the CRL using the Microsoft CA administrator program, follow these steps:

Procedure

Step 1 Select **Action > All Tasks > Publish** on the Certification Authority screen.



Step 2 Click **Yes** on the Certificate Revocation List dialog box to publish the latest CRL.




Downloading the CRL


To download the CRL from the Microsoft CA website, follow these steps:

Procedure


- Step 1** Choose **Request the CA certificate or certificate revocation list** radio button on the Microsoft Certificate Services web interface and click **Next**.



- Step 2** Click the **Download latest certificate revocation list** link.




Step 3 Click **Save** in the File Download dialog box.



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Step 4 Enter the destination file name in the Save As dialog box and click **Save**.



144787


```
Issuer: /emailAddress=admin@yourcompany.com/C=IN/ST=Karnatak
Yourcompany/OU=netstorage/CN=Aparna CA
Last Update: Nov 12 04:36:04 2005 GMT
Next Update: Nov 19 16:56:04 2005 GMT
CRL extensions:
  X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
    keyid:27:28:F2:46:83:1B:AC:23:4C:45:4D:8E:C9:18:50:1
    1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.1:
      ...
Revoked Certificates:
  Serial Number: 611B09A1000000000002
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:52:19 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 4CDE464E000000000003
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:52:29 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 4CFC2B42000000000004
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:52:41 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 6C699EC2000000000005
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:52:52 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 6CCF7DDC000000000006
    Revocation Date: Jun 8 00:12:04 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 70CC4FFF000000000007
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:53:15 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 4D9B1116000000000008
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:53:15 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 52A80230000000000009
    Revocation Date: Jun 27 23:47:06 2005 GMT
  CRL entry extensions:
    X509v3 CRL Reason Code:
      CA Compromise
  Serial Number: 5349AD46000000000000A
    Revocation Date: Jun 27 23:47:22 2005 GMT
  CRL entry extensions:
    X509v3 CRL Reason Code:
      CA Compromise
  Serial Number: 53BD173C000000000000B
    Revocation Date: Jul 4 18:04:01 2005 GMT
  CRL entry extensions:
    X509v3 CRL Reason Code:
      Certificate Hold
  Serial Number: 591E7ACE000000000000C
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:53:15 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 5D3FD52E000000000000D
    Revocation Date: Jun 29 22:07:25 2005 GMT
  CRL entry extensions:
    X509v3 CRL Reason Code:
      Key Compromise
  Serial Number: 5DAB7713000000000000E
    Revocation Date: Jul 14 00:33:56 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 5DAE53CD000000000000F
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:53:15 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 5DB140D30000000000010
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:53:15 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 5E2D7C1B0000000000011
    Revocation Date: Jul 6 21:12:10 2005 GMT
  CRL entry extensions:
    X509v3 CRL Reason Code:
      Cessation Of Operation
  Serial Number: 16DB4F8F0000000000012
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:53:15 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 261C39240000000000013
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:53:15 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 262B52020000000000014
    Revocation Date: Jul 14 00:33:10 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 2634C7F20000000000015
```

```

    Revocation Date: Jul 14 00:32:45 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 2635B000000000000016
    Revocation Date: Jul 14 00:31:51 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 264850400000000000017
    Revocation Date: Jul 14 00:32:25 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 2A2763570000000000018
Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:53:15 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 3F88CBF70000000000019
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:53:15 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 6E4B5F5F000000000001A
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:53:15 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 725B89D8000000000001B
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:53:15 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 735A8878000000000001C
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:53:15 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 148511C7000000000001D
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:53:15 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 14A71701000000000001E
    Revocation Date: Aug 16 21:53:15 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 14FC45B5000000000001F
    Revocation Date: Aug 17 18:30:42 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 486CE80B0000000000020
    Revocation Date: Aug 17 18:30:43 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 4CA4A3AA0000000000021
    Revocation Date: Aug 17 18:30:43 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 1AA55C8E000000000002F
    Revocation Date: Sep  5 17:07:06 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 3F0845DD000000000003F
    Revocation Date: Sep  8 20:24:32 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 3F619B7E0000000000042
    Revocation Date: Sep  8 21:40:48 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 6313C4630000000000052
    Revocation Date: Sep 19 17:37:18 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 7C3861E30000000000060
    Revocation Date: Sep 20 17:52:56 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 7C6EE3510000000000061
    Revocation Date: Sep 20 18:52:30 2005 GMT
  Serial Number: 0A338EA10000000000074    <-- Revoked identity certificate
    Revocation Date: Nov 12 04:34:42 2005 GMT
  Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
    0b:cb:dd:43:0a:b8:62:1e:80:95:06:6f:4d:ab:0c:d8:8e:32:
    44:8e:a7:94:97:af:02:b9:a6:9c:14:fd:eb:90:cf:18:c9:96:
    29:bb:57:37:d9:1f:d5:bd:4e:9a:4b:18:2b:00:2f:d2:6e:c1:
    1a:9f:1a:49:b7:9c:58:24:d7:72

```

Maximum Limits

The following table lists the maximum limits for CAs and digital certificate parameters.

Table 1: Maximum Limits for CA and Digital Certificate

Feature	Maximum Limit
Trust points declared on a switch	16
RSA key-pairs generated on a switch	16

Feature	Maximum Limit
RSA key-pair size	4096 bits
Identity certificates configured on a switch	16
Certificates in a CA certificate chain	10
Trust points authenticated to a specific CA	10

Default Settings

The following table lists the default settings for CAs and digital certificate parameters.

Table 2: Default CA and Digital Certificate Parameters

Parameters	Default
Trust point	None
RSA key-pair	None
RSA key-pair label	Switch FQDN
RSA key-pair modulus	1024
RSA key-pair exportable	Yes
Revocation check method of trust point	CRL

