Catalyst 4500 Series Switch Software Configuration Guide, IOS XE 3.8.xE and IOS 15.2(4)Ex

ARP Cache Poisoning

You can attack hosts, switches, and routers connected to your Layer 2 network by “poisoning” their ARP caches. For example, a malicious user might intercept traffic intended for other hosts on the subnet by poisoning the ARP caches of systems connected to the subnet.

Figure 55-1 shows an example of cache poisoning.

Figure 55-1 ARP Cache Poisoning

Hosts HA, HB, and HC are connected to the switch on interfaces A, B and C, all of which are on the same subnet. Their IP and MAC addresses are shown in parentheses; for example, Host HA uses IP address IA and MAC address MA. When HA needs to communicate to HB at the IP Layer, HA broadcasts an ARP request for the MAC address associated with IB. As soon as HB receives the ARP request, the ARP cache on HB is populated with an ARP binding for a host with the IP address IA and a MAC address MA. When HB responds to HA, the ARP cache on HA is populated with a binding for a host with the IP address IB and a MAC address MB.

Host HC can “poison” the ARP caches of HA and HB by broadcasting forged ARP responses with bindings for a host with an IP address of IA (or IB) and a MAC address of MC. Hosts with poisoned ARP caches use the MAC address MC as the destination MAC address for traffic intended for IA or IB. This means that HC intercepts that traffic. Because HC knows the true MAC addresses associated with IA and IB, HC can forward the intercepted traffic to those hosts using the correct MAC address as the destination. HC has inserted itself into the traffic stream from HA to HB, the classic “man in the middle” attack.

Purpose of Dynamic ARP Inspection

To prevent ARP poisoning attacks, a switch must ensure that only valid ARP requests and responses are relayed. DAI prevents these attacks by intercepting all ARP requests and responses. Each of these intercepted packets is verified for valid MAC address to IP address bindings before the local ARP cache is updated or the packet is forwarded to the appropriate destination. Invalid ARP packets are dropped.

DAI determines the validity of an ARP packet based on valid MAC address to IP address bindings stored in a trusted database. This database is built at runtime by DHCP snooping, provided this feature is enabled on VLANs and on the switch. In addition, in order to handle hosts that use statically configured IP addresses, DAI can also validate ARP packets against user-configured ARP ACLs.

DAI can also be configured to drop ARP packets when the IP addresses in the packet are invalid or when the MAC addresses in the body of the ARP packet do not match the addresses specified in the Ethernet header.

Interface Trust State, Security Coverage and Network Configuration

DAI associates a trust state with each interface on the system. Packets arriving on trusted interfaces bypass all DAI validation checks, while those arriving on untrusted interfaces go using the DAI validation process. In a typical network configuration for DAI, all ports connected to host ports are configured as untrusted, while all ports connected to switches are configured as trusted. With this configuration, all ARP packets entering the network from a given switch pass the security check.

Figure 55-2 Validation of ARP Packets on a DAI-Enabled VLAN

Use the trust state configuration carefully. Configuring interfaces as untrusted when they should be trusted can result in a loss of connectivity. If we assume that both S1 and S2 (in Validation of ARP Packets on a DAI-Enabled VLAN) run DAI on the VLAN ports that contains H1 and H2, and if H1 and H2 were to acquire their IP addresses from the DHCP server connected to S1, then only S1 binds the IP to MAC address of H1. If the interface between S1 and S2 is untrusted, the ARP packets from H1 get dropped on S2. This condition would result in a loss of connectivity between H1 and H2.

Configuring interfaces to be trusted when they are actually untrusted leaves a security hole in the network. If S1 were not running DAI, then H1 can easily poison the ARP of S2 (and H2, if the inter- switch link is configured as trusted). This condition can occur even though S2 is running DAI.

DAI ensures that hosts (on untrusted interfaces) connected to a switch running DAI do not poison the ARP caches of other hosts in the network. It does not, however, ensure that hosts from other portions of the network do not poison the caches of the hosts connected to it.

To handle cases in which some switches in a VLAN run DAI and other switches do not, the interfaces connecting such switches should be configured as untrusted. To validate the bindings of packets from non-DAI switches, however, the switch running DAI should be configured with ARP ACLs. When it is not feasible to determine such bindings, switches running DAI should be isolated from non-DAI switches at Layer 3.

Note Depending on the set up of the DHCP server and the network, it may not be possible to perform validation of a given ARP packet on all switches in the VLAN.

Relative Priority of Static Bindings and DHCP Snooping Entries

As mentioned previously, DAI populates its database of valid MAC address to IP address bindings through DHCP snooping. It also validates ARP packets against statically configured ARP ACLs. It is important to note that ARP ACLs have precedence over entries in the DHCP snooping database. ARP packets are first compared to user-configured ARP ACLs. If the ARP ACL denies the ARP packet, then the packet is denied even if a valid binding exists in the database populated by DHCP snooping.

Logging of Dropped Packets

When the switch drops a packet, it places an entry in the log buffer and then generates system messages on a rate-controlled basis. After the message is generated, the switch clears the entry from the log buffer. Each log entry contains flow information, such as the receiving VLAN, the port number, the source and destination IP addresses, and the source and destination MAC addresses.

You use the ip arp inspection log-buffer global configuration command to configure the number of entries in the buffer and the number of entries needed in the specified interval to generate system messages. You specify the type of packets that are logged by using the ip arp inspection vlan logging global configuration command. For configuration information, see the “Configuring the Log Buffer” section.

Rate Limiting of ARP Packets

DAI performs validation checks in the CPU, so the number of incoming ARP packets is rate-limited to prevent a denial of service attack. By default, the rate for untrusted interfaces is set to 15 pps second but trusted interfaces have no rate limit. When the rate of incoming ARP packets exceeds the configured limit, the port is placed in the error-disable state. The port remains in that state until an administrator intervenes. With the errdisable recovery global configuration command, you can enable error-disable recovery so that ports emerge from this state automatically after a specified timeout period.

You use the ip arp inspection limit global configuration command to limit the rate of incoming ARP requests and responses on the interface. Unless a rate limit is explicitly configured on an interface, changing the trust state of the interface also changes its rate limit to the default value for that trust state; that is, 15 packets per second for untrusted interfaces and unlimited for trusted interfaces. Once a rate limit is configured explicitly, the interface retains the rate limit even when its trust state is changed. At any time, the interface reverts to its default rate limit if the no form of the rate limit command is applied. For configuration information, see the “Limiting the Rate of Incoming ARP Packets” section.

Note When you enable DAI, all ARP packets are forwarded by CPU (software forwarding, the slow path). With this mechanism, whenever a packet exits through multiple ports, the CPU must create as many copies of the packet as there are egress ports. The number of egress ports is a multiplying factor for the CPU. When QoS policing is applied on egress packets that were forwarded by CPU, QoS must be applied in the CPU as well. (You cannot apply QoS in hardware on CPU generated packets because the hardware forwarding path is turned off for CPU generated packets.) Both factors can drive the CPU to a very high utilization level.

Port Channels Function

A given physical port can join a channel only when the trust state of the physical port and of the channel match. Otherwise, the physical port remains suspended in the channel. A channel inherits its trust state from the first physical port that joined the channel. Consequently, the trust state of the first physical port need not match the trust state of the channel.

Conversely, when the trust state is changed on the channel, the new trust state is configured on all the physical ports that comprise the channel.

The rate limit check on port channels is unique. The rate of incoming packets on a physical port is checked against the port channel configuration rather than the physical ports’ configuration.

The rate limit configuration on a port channel is independent of the configuration on its physical ports.

The rate limit is cumulative across all physical ports; that is, the rate of incoming packets on a port channel equals the sum of rates across all physical ports.

When you configure rate limits for ARP packets on trunks, you must account for VLAN aggregation because a high rate limit on one VLAN can cause a denial of service attack to other VLANs when the port is error-disabled by software. Similarly, when a port channel is error-disabled, a high rate limit on one physical port can cause other ports in the channel to go down.

Configuring Dynamic ARP Inspection in DHCP Environments

This procedure shows how to configure dynamic ARP inspection when two switches support this feature. Host 1 is connected to Switch A, and Host 2 is connected to Switch B as shown in ARP Packet Validation on a VLAN Enabled for DAI. Both switches are running DAI on VLAN 100 where the hosts are located. A DHCP server is connected to Switch A. Both hosts acquire their IP addresses from the same DHCP server. Switch A has the bindings for Host 1, and Switch B has the bindings for Host 2.

Figure 55-3 ARP Packet Validation on a VLAN Enabled for DAI

Note DAI depends on the entries in the DHCP snooping binding database to verify IP-to-MAC address bindings in incoming ARP requests and ARP responses. Make sure to enable DHCP snooping to permit ARP packets that have dynamically assigned IP addresses. For configuration information, see Chapter56, “Configuring DHCP Snooping, IP Source Guard, and IPSG for Static Hosts”

For information on how to configure DAI when only one switch supports the feature, see the “Configuring ARP ACLs for Non-DHCP Environments” section.

To configure DAI, perform this task on both switches:

DAI Configuration Example

This example shows how to configure DAI on Switch A in VLAN 100. You would perform a similar procedure on Switch B.

Switch A

Switch B

Configuring ARP ACLs for Non-DHCP Environments

This procedure shows how to configure DAI when Switch B shown in ARP Packet Validation on a VLAN Enabled for DAI does not support DAI or DHCP snooping.

If you configure port 1 on Switch A as trusted, a security hole is created because both Switch A and Host 1 could be attacked by either Switch B or Host 2. To prevent this possibility, you must configure port 1 on Switch A as untrusted. To permit ARP packets from Host 2, you must set up an ARP ACL and apply it to VLAN 100. If the IP address of Host 2 is not static, such that it is impossible to apply the ACL configuration on Switch A, you must separate Switch A from Switch B at Layer 3 and use a router to route packets between them.

To configure an ARP ACL (on switch A in a non-DHCP environment), perform this task:

To remove the ARP ACL, use the no arp access-list global configuration command. To remove the ARP ACL attached to a VLAN, use the no ip arp inspection filter arp-acl-name vlan vlan-range global configuration command.

This example shows how to configure an ARP ACL called host2 on Switch A, to permit ARP packets from HostB (IP address 170.1.1.2 and MAC address 2.2.2), to apply the ACL to VLAN 100, and to configure port 1 on Switch A as untrusted:

Configuring the Log Buffer

When the switch drops a packet, it places an entry in the log buffer and then generates system messages on a rate-controlled basis. After the message is generated, the switch clears the entry from the log buffer. Each log entry contains flow information, such as the receiving VLAN, the port number, the source and destination IP addresses, and the source and destination MAC addresses.

A log-buffer entry can represent more than one packet. For example, if an interface receives many packets on the same VLAN with the same ARP parameters, the switch combines the packets as one entry in the log buffer and generates a single system message for the entry.

If the log buffer overflows, it means that a log event does not fit into the log buffer, and the display for the show ip arp inspection log privileged EXEC command is affected. No other statistics are provided for the entry.

To configure the log buffer, perform this task:

To return to the default log buffer settings, use the no ip arp inspection log-buffer global configuration command. To return to the default VLAN log settings, use the
no ip arp inspection vlan vlan-range logging { acl-match | dhcp-bindings } global configuration command. To clear the log buffer, use the clear ip arp inspection log privileged EXEC command.

This example shows how to configure the number of entries for the log buffer to 1024. It also shows how to configure your Catalyst 4500 series switch so that the logs must be generated from the buffer at the rate of 100 per 10 seconds.

Limiting the Rate of Incoming ARP Packets

The switch CPU performs DAI validation checks; therefore, the number of incoming ARP packets is rate-limited to prevent a denial-of-service attack.

Note Unless you explicitly configure a rate limit on an interface, changing the trust state of the interface also changes its rate limit to the default value for that trust state. After you configure the rate limit, the interface retains the rate limit even when its trust state is changed. If you enter the
no ip arp-inspection limit interface configuration command, the interface reverts to its default rate limit.

By default, the switch places the port in the error-disabled state when the rate of incoming ARP packets exceeds the configured limit. To prevent the port from shutting down, you can use the errdisable detect cause arp-inspection action shutdown vlan global configuration command to shut down just the offending VLAN on the port where the violation occurred.

When a port is in the error-disabled state, you can bring it out of this state automatically by configuring the errdisable recovery cause arp-inspection global configuration command or you can manually reenable it by entering the shutdown and no shut down interface configuration commands. If a port is in per-VLAN error-disable mode, you can also use clear errdisable interface name vlan range command to reenable the VLAN on the port.

To limit the rate of incoming ARP packets, perform this task:

To return to the default rate-limit configuration, use the no ip arp inspection limit interface configuration command. To disable error recovery for DAI, use the no errdisable recovery cause arp-inspection global configuration command.

This example shows how to set an upper limit for the number of incoming packets (100 pps) and to specify a burst interval (1 second):

Performing Validation Checks

DAI intercepts, logs, and discards ARP packets with invalid IP-to-MAC address bindings. You can configure the switch to perform additional checks on the destination MAC address, the sender and target IP addresses, and the source MAC address.

To perform specific checks on incoming ARP packets, perform this task:

To disable checking, use the no ip arp inspection validate [ src-mac ] [ dst-mac ] [ ip ] global configuration command. To display statistics for forwarded, dropped, MAC validation failure, and IP validation failure packets , use the show ip arp inspection statistics privileged EXEC command.

This example shows how to configure source mac validation. Packets are dropped and an error message may be generated when the source address in the Ethernet header does not match the sender hardware address in the ARP body.