The DHCP server assigns IP addresses from specified address pools on a switch or router to DHCP clients and manages them. If the DHCP server cannot give the DHCP client the requested configuration parameters from its database, it forwards the request to one or more secondary DHCP servers defined by the network administrator. The switch can act as a DHCP server. If the DHCP server provides the client with the requested configuration, it will not forward the message to the other server.

A DHCP relay agent is a Layer 3 device that forwards DHCP packets between clients and servers. Relay agents forward requests and replies between clients and servers when they are not on the same physical subnet. Relay agent forwarding is different from the normal Layer 2 forwarding, in which IP datagrams are switched transparently between networks. Relay agents receive DHCP messages and generate new DHCP messages to send on output interfaces.

DHCP snooping is a DHCP security feature that provides network security by filtering untrusted DHCP messages and by building and maintaining a DHCP snooping binding database, also referred to as a DHCP snooping binding table.

DHCP snooping acts like a firewall between untrusted hosts and DHCP servers. You use DHCP snooping to differentiate between untrusted interfaces connected to the end user and trusted interfaces connected to the DHCP server or another switch.

Note	For DHCP snooping to function properly, all DHCP servers must be connected to the switch through trusted interfaces, as untrusted DHCP messages will be forwarded only to trusted interfaces.

An untrusted DHCP message is a message that is received through an untrusted interface. By default, the switch considers all interfaces untrusted. So, the switch must be configured to trust some interfaces to use DHCP Snooping. When you use DHCP snooping in a service-provider environment, an untrusted message is sent from a device that is not in the service-provider network, such as a customer’s switch. Messages from unknown devices are untrusted because they can be sources of traffic attacks.

The DHCP snooping binding database has the MAC address, the IP address, the lease time, the binding type, the VLAN number, and the interface information that corresponds to the local untrusted interfaces of a switch. It does not have information regarding hosts interconnected with a trusted interface.

In a service-provider network, an example of an interface you might configure as trusted is one connected to a port on a device in the same network. An example of an untrusted interface is one that is connected to an untrusted interface in the network or to an interface on a device that is not in the network.

When a switch receives a packet on an untrusted interface and the interface belongs to a VLAN in which DHCP snooping is enabled, the switch compares the source MAC address and the DHCP client hardware address. If the addresses match (the default), the switch forwards the packet. If the addresses do not match, the switch drops the packet.

The switch drops a DHCP packet when one of these situations occurs:

• A packet from a DHCP server, such as a DHCPOFFER, DHCPACK, DHCPNAK, or DHCPLEASEQUERY packet, is received from outside the network or firewall.

• A packet is received on an untrusted interface, and the source MAC address and the DHCP client hardware address do not match.

• The switch receives a DHCPRELEASE or DHCPDECLINE broadcast message that has a MAC address in the DHCP snooping binding database, but the interface information in the binding database does not match the interface on which the message was received.

• A DHCP relay agent forwards a DHCP packet that includes a relay-agent IP address that is not 0.0.0.0, or the relay agent forwards a packet that includes option-82 information to an untrusted port.

• The maximum snooping queue size of 1000 is exceeded when DHCP snooping is enabled.

If the switch is an aggregation switch supporting DHCP snooping and is connected to an edge switch that is inserting DHCP option-82 information, the switch drops packets with option-82 information when packets are received on an untrusted interface. If DHCP snooping is enabled and packets are received on a trusted port, the aggregation switch does not learn the DHCP snooping bindings for connected devices and cannot build a complete DHCP snooping binding database.

When an aggregation switch can be connected to an edge switch through an untrusted interface and you enter the ip dhcp snooping information option allow-untrusted global configuration command, the aggregation switch accepts packets with option-82 information from the edge switch. The aggregation switch learns the bindings for hosts connected through an untrusted switch interface. The DHCP security features, such as dynamic ARP inspection or IP source guard, can still be enabled on the aggregation switch while the switch receives packets with option-82 information on untrusted input interfaces to which hosts are connected. The port on the edge switch that connects to the aggregation switch must be configured as a trusted interface.

In residential, metropolitan Ethernet-access environments, DHCP can centrally manage the IP address assignments for a large number of subscribers. When the DHCP option-82 feature is enabled on the switch, a subscriber device is identified by the switch port through which it connects to the network (in addition to its MAC address). Multiple hosts on the subscriber LAN can be connected to the same port on the access switch and are uniquely identified.

Note	The DHCP option-82 feature is supported only when DHCP snooping is globally enabled on the VLANs to which subscriber devices using option-82 are assigned.

The following illustration shows a metropolitan Ethernet network in which a centralized DHCP server assigns IP addresses to subscribers connected to the switch at the access layer. Because the DHCP clients and their associated DHCP server do not reside on the same IP network or subnet, a DHCP relay agent (the Catalyst switch) is configured with a helper address to enable broadcast forwarding and to transfer DHCP messages between the clients and the server.

When you enable the DHCP snooping information option 82 on the switch, the following sequence of events occurs:

• The host (DHCP client) generates a DHCP request and broadcasts it on the network.

• When the switch receives the DHCP request, it adds the option-82 information in the packet. By default, the remote-ID suboption is the switch MAC address, and the circuit-ID suboption is the port identifier, vlan-mod-port , from which the packet is received. You can configure the remote ID and circuit ID.

• If the IP address of the relay agent is configured, the switch adds this IP address in the DHCP packet.

• The switch forwards the DHCP request that includes the option-82 field to the DHCP server.

• The DHCP server receives the packet. If the server is option-82-capable, it can use the remote ID, the circuit ID, or both to assign IP addresses and implement policies, such as restricting the number of IP addresses that can be assigned to a single remote ID or circuit ID. Then the DHCP server echoes the option-82 field in the DHCP reply.

• The DHCP server unicasts the reply to the switch if the request was relayed to the server by the switch. The switch verifies that it originally inserted the option-82 data by inspecting the remote ID and possibly the circuit ID fields. The switch removes the option-82 field and forwards the packet to the switch port that connects to the DHCP client that sent the DHCP request.

In the default suboption configuration, when the described sequence of events occurs, the values in these fields do not change (see the illustration,Suboption Packet Formats):

• Circuit-ID suboption fields

  • Suboption type

  • Length of the suboption type

  • Circuit-ID type

  • Length of the circuit-ID type

• Remote-ID suboption fields

  • Suboption type

  • Length of the suboption type

  • Remote-ID type

  • Length of the remote-ID type

In the port field of the circuit ID suboption, the port numbers start at 3. For example, on a switch with 24 10/100/1000 ports and four small form-factor pluggable (SFP) module slots, port 3 is the Gigabit Ethernet 1/0/1 port, port 4 is the Gigabit Ethernet 1/0/2 port, and so forth. Port 27 is the SFP module slot Gigabit Ethernet1/0/25, and so forth.

The illustration, Suboption Packet Formats. shows the packet formats for the remote-ID suboption and the circuit-ID suboption when the default suboption configuration is used. For the circuit-ID suboption, the module number corresponds to the switch number in the stack. The switch uses the packet formats when you globally enable DHCP snooping and enter the ip dhcp snooping information option global configuration command.

The illustration, User-Configured Suboption Packet Formats, shows the packet formats for user-configured remote-ID and circuit-ID suboptions The switch uses these packet formats when DHCP snooping is globally enabled and when the ip dhcp snooping information option format remote-id global configuration command and theip dhcp snooping vlan information option format-type circuit-id string interface configuration command are entered.

The values for these fields in the packets change from the default values when you configure the remote-ID and circuit-ID suboptions:

• Circuit-ID suboption fields

  • The circuit-ID type is 1.

  • The length values are variable, depending on the length of the string that you configure.

• Remote-ID suboption fields

  • The remote-ID type is 1.

  • The length values are variable, depending on the length of the string that you configure.

During the DHCP-based autoconfiguration process, the designated DHCP server uses the Cisco IOS DHCP server database. It has IP addresses, address bindings, and configuration parameters, such as the boot file.

An address binding is a mapping between an IP address and a MAC address of a host in the Cisco IOS DHCP server database. You can manually assign the client IP address, or the DHCP server can allocate an IP address from a DHCP address pool.

When DHCP snooping is enabled, the switch uses the DHCP snooping binding database to store information about untrusted interfaces. The database can have up to 64,000 bindings.

Each database entry (binding) has an IP address, an associated MAC address, the lease time (in hexadecimal format), the interface to which the binding applies, and the VLAN to which the interface belongs. The database agent stores the bindings in a file at a configured location. At the end of each entry is a checksum that accounts for all the bytes from the start of the file through all the bytes associated with the entry. Each entry is 77 bytes, followed by a space, the checksum value, and the EOL symbol.

To keep the bindings when the switch reloads, you must use the DHCP snooping database agent. If the agent is disabled, dynamic ARP inspection or IP source guard is enabled, and the DHCP snooping binding database has dynamic bindings, the switch loses its connectivity. If the agent is disabled and only DHCP snooping is enabled, the switch does not lose its connectivity, but DHCP snooping might not prevent DHCP spoofing attacks.

When reloading, the switch reads the binding file to build the DHCP snooping binding database. The switch updates the file when the database changes.

When a switch learns of new bindings or when it loses bindings, the switch immediately updates the entries in the database. The switch also updates the entries in the binding file. The frequency at which the file is updated is based on a configurable delay, and the updates are batched. If the file is not updated in a specified time (set by the write-delay and abort-timeout values), the update stops.

This is the format of the file with bindings:

<initial-checksum>
TYPE DHCP-SNOOPING
VERSION 1
BEGIN
<entry-1> <checksum-1>
<entry-2> <checksum-1-2>
...
...
<entry-n> <checksum-1-2-..-n>
END

Each entry in the file is tagged with a checksum value that the switch uses to verify the entries when it reads the file. The initial-checksum entry on the first line distinguishes entries associated with the latest file update from entries associated with a previous file update.

This is an example of a binding file:

3ebe1518
TYPE DHCP-SNOOPING
VERSION 1
BEGIN
10.1.1.1 512 001.0001.0005 3EBE2881 Gi1/1                                e5e1e733
10.1.1.1 512 001.0001.0002 3EBE2881 Gi1/1                                4b3486ec
10.1.1.1 1536 001.0001.0004 3EBE2881 Gi1/1                               f0e02872
10.1.1.1 1024 001.0001.0003 3EBE2881 Gi1/1                               ac41adf9
10.1.1.1 1 001.0001.0001 3EBE2881 Gi1/1                                  34b3273e
END

When the switch starts and the calculated checksum value equals the stored checksum value, the switch reads entries from the binding file and adds the bindings to its DHCP snooping binding database. The switch ignores an entry when one of these situations occurs:

• The switch reads the entry and the calculated checksum value does not equal the stored checksum value. The entry and the ones following it are ignored.

• An entry has an expired lease time (the switch might not remove a binding entry when the lease time expires).

• The interface in the entry no longer exists on the system.

• The interface is a routed interface or a DHCP snooping-trusted interface.

• If a switch port is connected to a DHCP server, configure a port as trusted by entering the ip dhcp snooping trust interface configuration command.

• If a switch port is connected to a DHCP client, configure a port as untrusted by entering the no ip dhcp snooping trust interface configuration command.

• You can display DHCP snooping statistics by entering the show ip dhcp snooping statistics user EXEC command, and you can clear the snooping statistics counters by entering the clear ip dhcp snooping statistics privileged EXEC command.

DHCP server port-based address allocation is a feature that enables DHCP to maintain the same IP address on an Ethernet switch port regardless of the attached device client identifier or client hardware address.

When Ethernet switches are deployed in the network, they offer connectivity to the directly connected devices. In some environments, such as on a factory floor, if a device fails, the replacement device must be working immediately in the existing network. With the current DHCP implementation, there is no guarantee that DHCP would offer the same IP address to the replacement device. Control, monitoring, and other software expect a stable IP address associated with each device. If a device is replaced, the address assignment should remain stable even though the DHCP client has changed.

When configured, the DHCP server port-based address allocation feature ensures that the same IP address is always offered to the same connected port even as the client identifier or client hardware address changes in the DHCP messages received on that port. The DHCP protocol recognizes DHCP clients by the client identifier option in the DHCP packet. Clients that do not include the client identifier option are identified by the client hardware address. When you configure this feature, the port name of the interface overrides the client identifier or hardware address and the actual point of connection, the switch port, becomes the client identifier.

In all cases, by connecting the Ethernet cable to the same port, the same IP address is allocated through DHCP to the attached device.

The DHCP server port-based address allocation feature is only supported on a Cisco IOS DHCP server and not a third-party server.